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THREE TREATISES

THE FIRST
CONCERNING ART

THE SECOND
CONCERNING MUSIC
PAINTING AND POETRY

THE THIRD
CONCERNING HAPPINESS

BY JAMES HARRIS ESQ.

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THE FIFTH EDITION
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THREE TREATISES

CONCERNING ART

PAINTING AND SCULPTURE



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Advertisement to the Reader.

*I*N the Treatises here published, there is the following Connection. The first treats of Art in its most comprehensive Idea, when considered as a Genus to many subordinate Species. The second considers three of these subordinate Species, whose Beauty and Elegance are well known to all. The last treats of that Art, which respects the Conduct of Human Life, and which may justly be valued, as of all Arts the most important, if it can truly lead us to the End proposed.

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TREATISE THE FIRST
A DIALOGVE
CONCERNING ART

TO THE RIGHT HONOVABLE
THE EARL OF SHAFTESBVRY

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CONCERNING ART

A DIALOGUE

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY

MY LORD,

THE following is a Conversation in its kind somewhat uncommon, and for this reason I have remembered it more minutely than I could imagine. Should the same Peculiarity prove a Reason to amuse your Lordship, I shall think myself well rewarded in the Labour of reciting. If not, you are candid enough to accept of the Intention, and to think there is some Merit even in the Sincerity of my Endeavours. To make no longer Preface, the Fact was as follows.

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A FRIEND

A FRIEND from a distant Country having by chance made me a Visit, we were tempted by the Serenity of a chearful Morning in the Spring, to walk from *Salisbury* to see Lord *Pembroke's* at *Wilton*. The Beauties of Gardening, Architecture, Painting, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, were the Subject of great Entertainment to my Friend: Nor was I, for my own part, less delighted than he was, to find that our Walk had so well answered his Expectations. We had given a large Scope to our Curiosity, when we left the Seat, and leisurely began our return towards home.

AND here, my Lord, in passing over a few pleasant Fields, commenced the Conversation which I am to tell you, and which fell at first, as was natural, on the many curious Works, which had afforded us both so elegant an Amusement. This led us insensibly to discoursing upon ART, for we both agreed, that whatever we had been admiring of Fair and Beautiful, could all be referred

referred to no other Cause. And here, I well remember, I called upon my Friend to give me his Opinion upon the meaning of the word ART: A word it was (I told him) in the Mouth of every one; but that nevertheless, as to its precise and definite Idea, this might still be a Secret; that so it was in fact with a thousand Words beside, all no less common, and equally familiar, and yet all of them equally vague and undetermined. To this he answered, That as to the precise and definite Idea of Art, it was a Question of some Difficulty, and not so soon to be resolved; that, however, he could not conceive a more likely Method of coming to know it, than by considering those several Particulars, to each of which we gave the Name. It is hardly probable, said he, that Music, Painting, Medicine, Poetry, Agriculture, and so many more, should be *all called by one common Name, if there was not something in each, which was common to all.* It should seem so, replied I.



What then, said he, shall we pronounce this to be? At this, I remember, I was

under some sort of Hesitation. Have Courage, cried my Friend, perhaps the Case is not so desperate. Let me ask you—Is Medicine the Cause of any thing? Yes surely, said I, of Health. And Agriculture, of what? Of the plentiful Growth of Grain. And Poetry, of what? Of Plays and Satires, and Odes, and the like.

And is not the same true, said he, of Music, of Statuary, of Architecture, and, in short, of every Art whatever? I confess, said I, it seems so. Suppose, then, said he, we should say, *It was common to every Art to be a Cause*—Should we err? I replied, I thought not. Let this then, said he, be remembered, that *all Art is Cause*. I promised him it should.

BUT how then, continued he, if *all Art be Cause*, is it also true, that *all Cause is Art*? At this again I could not help hesitating. You have heard, said he, without doubt, of that Painter famed in Story, who being to paint the Foam of a Horse, and not succeeding to his Mind, threw

threw at the Picture in Resentment a Sponge bedaubed with colours, and produced a Foam the most natural imaginable. Now, what say you to this Fact? Shall we pronounce Art to have been the Cause?

By no means, said I. What, said he, if instead of *Chance*, his Hand had been guided by mere *Compulsion*, himself dissenting and averse to the Violence? Even here, replied I, nothing could have been referred to his Art. But what, continued he, if instead of a *casual Throw* or *involuntary Compulsion*, he had *willingly* and *designedly* directed his Pencil, and so produced that Foam, which Story says he failed in?—Would not Art *here* have been the Cause? I replied, in this case, I thought it would. It should seem then, said he, that *Art* implies not only *Cause*, but the additional Requisite of *Intention*, *Reason*, *Volition*, and *Consciousness*; so that *not every Cause is Art*, but only *voluntary* or *intentional Cause*. So, said I, it appears.

AND shall we then, added he, pronounce *every* intentional Cause to be Art? I see no reason, said I, why not. Consider, said he; Hunger this Morning prompted you to eat. You were then the *Cause*, and that too the *intentional Cause*, of consuming certain Food: And yet will you refer this Consumption to Art? Did you chew by Art? Did you swallow by Art?

No certainly, said I. So by opening your Eyes, said he, you are the *intentional Cause* of Seeing, and by stretching your Hand, the *intentional Cause* of Feeling; and yet will you affirm, that *these Things proceed from Art*? I should be wrong, said I, if I did: For what *Art* can there be *in doing, what every one is able to do by mere Will, and a sort of uninstructed Instinct*? You say right, replied he, and the reason is manifest: Were it otherwise, we should make all Mankind universal Artists in every single Action of their Lives. And what can be a greater Absurdity than this? I confessed that the Absurdity appeared

peared to be evident. But if nothing then, continued he, which we do by *Compulsion*, or without intending it, be *Art*; and not even what we do *intentionally*, if it proceed from mere Will and *uninstructed* Instinct; what is it we have left remaining, where Art may be found conversant? Or can it indeed possibly be in any thing else, than in that which we do by *Use, Practice, Experience* and the like, all which are born with no one, but are all acquired afterward by advances unperceived. I can think, said I, of nothing else. Let therefore the Words *Habit* and *Habitual*, said he, represent this Requisite, and let us say, that *Art* is not only a *Cause*, but an *intentional Cause*; and not only an *intentional Cause*, but an *intentional Cause founded in Habit*, or in other Words, an *habitual Cause*. You appear, said I, to argue rightly.

BUT if Art, said he, be what we have now asserted, something *learnt and acquired*, if it be also a thing *intentional*

or

or *voluntary*, and not governed either by *Chance* or blind *Necessity*—If this, I say, be the Case, then mark the Consequences.

And what, said I, are they? The first, said he, is, that *no Events*, in what we call *the natural World*, must be referred to *Art*; such as Tides, Winds, Vegetation, Gravitation, Attraction, and the like. For these all happen by stated Laws; by a curious *Necessity*, which is not to be withstood, and where the *nearer and immediate Causes* appear to be *wholly unconscious*. I confess, said I, it seems so.

In the next place, continued he, we must exclude all those admired *Works* of the *Animal World*, which, for their Beauty and Order, we *metaphorically* call *artificial*. The Spider's Web, the Bee's Comb, the Beaver's House, and the Swallow's Nest, must all be referred to another Source—For who can say, these ever *learnt* to be thus ingenious? or, that they were *ignorant by Nature*, and *knowing only by Education*?

None, surely, replied I. But we have still, said he, a higher Consideration. And what, said I,

is that? It is, answered he, this——
 Not even that *Divine Power*, which gave
 Form to all things, *then acted* by *Art*, when
 it gave that Form. For how, continued
 he, can that Intelligence, which has *all*
Perfection ever in Energy, be supposed to
 have any Power, *not original to its Nature*?
 How can it ever have any thing to *learn*,
 when it *knows all from the Beginning*; or,
 being *perfect and complete*, admit of what
 is *additional and secondary*? I should
 think, said I, it were impossible. If so,
 said he, then Art can never be numbered
 among its Attributes: For *all Art* is some-
 thing *learnt*, something *secondary and ac-*
quired, and *never original* to any Being,
 which possesses it. So the fact, said I,
 has been established.

If this therefore, continued he, be true;
 if Art belong not either to the Divine
 Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate
 Nature,——to what Nature shall we say it
 does belong? I know not, said I, unless
 it be to the *Human*. You are right, said
 he;

he; for every Nature else you perceive is either *too excellent* to want it, or *too base* to be capable of it. Beside, except the Human, what other Nature is there left? Or where else can we find any of the Arts already instanced, or indeed whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate? Who are Statuaries, but Men? Who Pilots, who Musicians? This seems, replied I, to be the Fact.

LET us then, continued he, say, not only that *Art* is a *Cause*, but that it is *Man becoming a Cause*; and not only Man, but *Man intending to do what is going to be done*, and *doing it also by Habit*; so that its whole Idea, as far as we have hitherto conceived it, is—*Man becoming a Cause, Intentional and Habitual*. I confess, said I, it has appeared so.

AND thus, said he, have you had exhibited to you a Sketch of Art. You must remember however, it is but a Sketch: there is still something wanting to make it a finished

finished Piece. I begged to know what this was. In order to that, replied he, I cannot do better, than remind you of a Passage in your admired *Horace*. It is concerning *Alfenus*; who (if you remember) he tells us, though his tools were laid aside, and his Shop shut up, was still an Artist as much as ever.—

— *Alfenus vaser omni*

*Abjeeto instrumento Artis clausaq. taberna,
Sutor erat*——

I remember, said I, the Passage, but to what purpose is it quoted? Only, replied he, to shew you, that I should not be without Precedent, were I to affirm it not absolutely necessary to the being of Art, that it should be Man *actually becoming* a Cause; but that it was enough if he had the *Power or Capacity* of so becoming. Why then, said I, did you not settle it so at first? Because, replied he, *Faculties, Powers, Capacities*, (call them as you will) are in themselves, abstract from Action, but *obscure and hidden* things. On the contrary *Energies and Operations lie open to the Senses*, and cannot

cannot but be observed, even whether we will or no. And hence therefore, when first we treated of Art, we chose to treat of it, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured somewhat farther. Repeat then, said I, if you please, the Alteration, which you have made. At first, answered he, we reasoned upon Art, as if it was only Man *actually becoming* a Cause intentional and habitual. Now we say it is a *Power* in Man of becoming such Cause; and that, *though he be not actually in the Exercise of such a Power*. I told him, his Amendment appeared to be just.

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THERE is too another Alteration, added he, which, for the sake of Accuracy, is equally wanting; and that is with respect to the Epithet, *Intentional or Voluntary*. And what, said I, is that? We have agreed it, replied he, to be necessary, that all *Art* should be under the Guidance of *Intention* or *Volition*, so that no Man acting by *Compulsion*, or by *Chance*, should be called an

an *Artist*. We have, Now tho' this, said he, be true, yet it is not sufficient. We must limit this Intention or Volition to a peculiar Kind. For were every little Fancy, which we may work up into Habit, a sufficient Foundation to constitute an Art, we should make Art one of the lowest and most despicable of things. The meanest Trick of a common Juggler might, in such case, entitle a man to the character of an Artist. I confessed, that without some Limitation, this might be the Consequence. But how limit Intentions to a Kind or Species? What think you, replied he, if we were to do it by the *Number* and *Dignity of the Precepts*, which go to the directing of our Intentions? You must explain, said I, for your Meaning is obscure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sowing? Are there not Precepts in Architecture, about Orders and Proportions? Are there not the same in Medicine, in Navigation, and the rest? There are.

And what is your Opinion of these
several

several Precepts? Are they *arbitrary and capricious*; or *rational and steady*? Are they the *Inventions of a Day*; or *well-approved by long Experience*? I told him I should consider them for the most part as rational, steady, and well-approved by long Experience.

And what, continued he, shall we say to their *Number*? Are they few? Or are they not rather so *numerous*, that in every particular Art, scarce any comprehend them all, but the several Artists themselves; and they only by length of time, with due Attendance and Application?

I replied, it seemed so.

Suppose then We were to pronounce, that *to every Art there was a System of such various and well-approved Precepts*: Should we err? No certainly. And suppose we should say, that the *Intention of every Artist*, in his several Art, *was directed by such a System*: Would you allow this?

Surely.

And will not *this limiting of Intentions* to such only, as are so directed, sufficiently distinguish Art from any thing else which may resemble it?—In other

words,

words, Is it likely, under this Distinction, to be confounded with other Habits of a trifling, capricious and inferior Kind?

I replied, I thought not.

LET us then see, said he, and collect all that we have said, together. We have already agreed, that the *Power of acting* after a certain manner is sufficient to constitute Art, without the *actually operating* agreeably to that Power. And We have now farther held the *Intentions* of every Artist to be directed by a *System of various and well-approved Precepts*. Besides all this, we settled it before, that *all Art was founded in Habit*; and was *peculiar to Man*; and was seen by becoming *the Cause of some Effect*. It should seem then, that the whole Idea of ART was this—AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS.



I replied, That his Account appeared to be probable and just.

§ 2. AND now then, continued he, as we have gone thus far, and have settled between us what we believe Art to be; shall we go a little farther, or is your Patience at an end?

Oh! no, replied I, not if any thing be left. We have walked so leisurely, that much remains of our Way; and I can think of no Method, how we may better amuse ourselves.

My Friend upon this proceeded with saying, that if *Art* were a *Cause*, (as we had agreed it was) it must be the *Cause of something*. Allow it, said I. And if it be the *Cause of something*, it must have a *Subject to operate on*. For every Agent has need of some Patient; the Smith of his Iron, the Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship.

I answered, it was true. If then, said he, the Subjects of particular Arts be thus evident: What Idea shall we form of that *universal Subject, which is common to all Art*? At this Question, it must be confessed, I was a little embarrassed.

THIS induced him to ask me, How many sorts of Subjects I allowed of? Here I could not help hesitating again. There is nothing, continued he, so difficult in the Question. You must needs perceive, that all Natures whatever can be but either contingent or necessary. This may be, replied I; but even yet I do not comprehend you.

Not comprehend me! said he; then answer me a Question: Can you conceive any *Medium* between *Motion* and *No-Motion*, between *Change* and *No-Change*?

I replied, I could not. If not, can you conceive any thing *in the whole Order of Being*, which must not be either *liable* to these, or *not liable*? Nothing.

Call those things therefore, said he, which are *liable to Change and Motion, contingent Natures*; and those which are *not liable, necessary Natures*: And thus you have a *Division, in which all things are included.* We have so, said I.

IN which therefore, said he, of *these Natures* shall we seek for this *common Subject* of Art? To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. Reflect, said he, a little. We have found *Art* to be a *Cause*.

We have. And is it not *essential* to every *Cause* to operate? or can it be a *Cause*, and be the *Cause* of nothing? Impossible.

Wherever therefore there is *Cause*, there is necessarily implied some *Operation*.

There is. And can there possibly be *Operation*, without *Motion* and *Change*?

There cannot. But *Change* and *Motion* must needs be *incompatible* with what is *necessary* and *immutable*. They must. So therefore is *Cause*. It must.

And so therefore *Art*. It must.

Truth therefore, said he, and Knowledge; Principles and Demonstrations; the general and intellectual Essences of Things; in short, *the whole immutable and necessary Nature* is no part of it reducible to a *Subject* of *Art*. It seems so, said I.

IF therefore Art, said he, have nothing to do with the *steady, abstract, and necessary Nature*, it can have only to do with the *transient, the particular, and contingent one*. It is true, said I; for there is no other left. And shall we then say, replied he, it has to do with *all contingent Natures* existing in the Universe?

For aught, replied I, which to me appears contrary. What think you, said he, of those *Contingents of higher Order*? such as the grand Planetary System; the Succession of the Seasons; the regular and uniform Course of all superior Natures in the Universe? Has Art any Ability to intermeddle here? No certainly, said I.

These superior Contingents then, *which move without Interruption*, are, it seems, above it. They are.

And shall we say the same of *those of lower Sort*; those, *whose Course we see often interrupted*; those, *which the Strength and Cunning of Man are able to influence and controul*? Give Instances, said I, of what

you mean. I mean, said he, Earth, Water, Air, Fire; Stones, Trees; Animals; Men themselves. Are these Contingents within the reach of Art, or has Art *here* no Influence? I should think, said I, a very great one.

If this, continued he, be true, it should seem that the COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF ART WAS—ALL THOSE CONTINGENT NATURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH OF THE HUMAN POWERS TO INFLUENCE. I acknowledge, said I, it appears so.

Thus far then, said he, we have advanced with tolerable Success. We have gained some Idea of *Art*, and some Idea of its *Subject*. Our Inquiry, on the whole, has informed us, that ART is—an *habitual Power in Man of becoming a certain Cause*—and that its SUBJECT is—*every such contingent Nature, which lies within the reach of the human Powers to influence.*

§ 3. It is true, said I, this appears to have been the result of our Inquiry, and a full and ample one it seems to have been.

A long one, replied he, if you please, but not a full and ample one. Can any

thing, said I, be wanting, after what you have said already? Certainly, replied

he, a great deal. We have talked much indeed of *Art*, considered as a Cause; and much of the *Subject*, on which it operates; but *what moves* these Operations to *commence*, and *where it is they end*, these are Topics, which we have as yet little thought of. I begged him then, that we might now consider them.

HE was willing, he said, for his Part, and immediately went on by asking, What I thought was the *Beginning of Art*? I mean, said he, by *Beginning*, that Cause for the Sake of which it operates, and which being supposed away, Men would be never moved to follow it. To this, I told him, I was unable to answer. You will not

B think it, said he, so difficult, when you have a little more considered. Reflect with yourself——Was it not the *Absence of Health*, which *excited* Men to cultivate the Art of Medicine? I replied, it was.

What then, said he, if the *Human Body* had been so far *perfect and self-sufficient*, as never to have felt the *Vicissitudes of Well and Ill*: Would not then this Art have been wholly unknown?

I replied, I thought it would. And what, said he, if we extend this Perfection a Degree farther, and suppose the Body not only thus *healthful*, but withal so *robust*, as to have felt no Uneasiness from *all Inclemencies of Weather*: Would not then the Arts of Building also and Cloathing have been as useless as that of Medicine?

I replied, it seemed they would. But what, said he, if we bound not this Perfection of ours even here? What if we suppose, that not only Things *merely necessary*, but that those also *conducive to Elegance and Enjoyment* were of course all implied in the Constitution of Human Nature;

ture; that they were all *steady, constant, and independent from without*, and as inseparable from our Being, as Perspiring, or Circulation: In such case would not the Arts of Music, Painting, and Poetry, with every other Art passing under the Denomination of *Elegant*, have been as useless, as we have held those others of Medicine, Clothing, and Architecture? I replied, It seems they would. It was then the *Absence* of Joys, Elegancies, and Amusements from our *Constitution*, as left by *Nature*, which induced us to seek them in *these Arts of Elegance and Entertainment*.

It was. And what, said he, are Joys, Elegancies, Amusements, Health, Robustness, with those several other *Objects of Desire*, whose *Absence* leads to *Art*, but so many different Names of that *complex Being* called *Good*, under its *various, and multi-form, and popular Appearances*? I replied, it seemed so.

If this then, said he, be granted, it should seem that the *Beginning or Principle*

principle of Art was the Absence of something thought Good; because it has appeared that it is for the Sake of some such absent Good that every Art operates; and because, if we suppose no such Absence to have been, we should never have known any Art.

I confess, said I, it seems so.

BUT how then, continued he? If it be true that *all Art* implies such *Principle*, it is reciprocally true, that every such *Principle* should imply *Art*? I see no Reason, said I, why not. Consider, said he. It might be thought a Good by some perhaps, to be as strong as those Horses, which are ploughing yonder Field; to be as tall as those Elms, and of a Nature as durable.—Yet would the Absence of Goods *like these*, lead to Art? Or is it not *absurd* to suppose, there should be an Art of *Impossibilities*? Absurd, said I, certainly. If so, said he, when we define the *Beginning* or *Principle* of Art, it is not enough to call it the *Absence of Something thought Good*, unless we add, that the *Good* be

be a Good *Possible*; a Thing attainable by Man; a Thing relative to Human Life, and consistent with Human Nature: Or does not this also appear a Requisite? I replied, I thought it did.

BUT still, continued he——Is it a sufficient Motive to Art, that the *Good desired* should be *attainable*? In other Words, does every *Absence of Good attainable* lead to *Art*, or is our Account still *too loose*, and in need of stricter Determination?

Of none, said I, which appears to me.

Reflect, said he; there are some of the *possible* Goods so *obvious* and *easy*, that every Man, in an ordinary *State of common natural Perfection*, is able to acquire them, *without Labour* or Application. You will hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting to eat, may be gathered; or a clear Spring, tempting to drink, may be drank at, by the mere Suggestions of *Will and uninstructed Instinct*. I granted, they might.

It would be therefore impertinent, said he, to suppose that Goods, *like these*, should

should lead to Art, because *Art* would be *superfluous*, and in no respect necessary.

Indeed, said I, it seems so.

If therefore, said he, neither *Impossibles* lead to *Art*, because of *such there can be no Art*; nor Things *easily possible*, because *in such Nature can do without Art*: what is it we have left, to which we may refer it? Or can it indeed be to any other than to that *middle Class of Things*, which, however possible, are still not so easy, but to be beyond the Powers of Will, and Instinct uninstructed? I replied, it seemed so.

That there are many such Things, said he, is evident past Doubt. For what Man would pay Artists so largely for their Arts, were he enabled by Nature to obtain whatever he desired? Or who would study to be skilled in Arts, were Nature's original Powers to be of themselves alone sufficient?

I told him, it was not likely.

It should seem then, said he, according to this Reasoning, that the BEGINNING, *Motive,*

tive, or *Principle of Art*; that *Cause*, which first moves it to *Action*, and, *for the Sake of which* its several Operations are exerted, is—THE WANT OR ABSENCE OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD; RELATIVE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ATTAINABLE BY MAN, BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.

I replied, I could not deny, but that the Account appeared probable.

§ 4. LET this then, said he, suffice, as to the *Beginning* of Art. But how shall we describe its *End*? What is it we shall pronounce this? My Answer, I replied, must be the same as often already; which was indeed, that I could not resolve the Question. It should seem, said he, not so difficult, now we have discovered what *Beginning* is. For if *Beginning* and *End* are *Contraries* and opposed, it is but to *invert*, as it were, the Notion of *Beginning*, and we gain of course the Notion of *End*. I asked him in what Manner?

Thus, said he, the *Beginning* of Art has
been

been held to be *Something, which, if supposed away, Men would be never moved to apply to Art.* By *Inversion* therefore the *End* of Art must be *Something, which, while supposed away, Men would never cease applying to Art;* because, were they to cease, while the *End* was wanting, they would cease with Imperfection, and their Performance would be incomplete. To this I answered, That the Account, however true, was by far too general, to give me much Intelligence.

HE replied, If it was, he would endeavour to be more particular. And what, continued he, should we say, that every Art, according to its Genius, will of course be *accomplished* either in some *Energy*, or in some *Work*; that, besides these two, it can be accomplished in Nothing else; and consequently that *one of these must of necessity be its End?*

I could not here but answer him with a Smile, That the Matter was now much obscurer than ever. I find

then, said he, it is proper we should be more explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our

Reason-

Reasonings from some clearer Point of View. I told him, It was quite necessary, if he intended to be intelligible.

THUS then, said he. You will grant, that every *Art, being a Cause, must be productive of some Effect*; for instance, Music, of a Tune; Dancing, of a Dance; Architecture, of a Palace; and Sculpture, of a Statue.

It is allowed, said I. You will grant also, said he, that *in these Productions they are all accomplished and ended*: Or, in other Words, that as Music produces a Tune, so it is ended and accomplished in a Tune; and as Sculpture produces a Statue, so it is ended and accomplished in a Statue.

It is admitted, said I. Now these Productions, continued he, if you will examine, are not like *Units or Mathematical Points*; but, on the contrary, *all consist of a certain Number of Parts*, from whose accurate Order is derived their *Beauty and Perfection*. For Example; Notes, ranged after such a Manner, make a Tune in Music; and Limbs, ranged after such a Manner, make a
Statue

Statue or a Picture. I replied, They did.

If then the *Productions*, continued he, of every *Art* thus consist of *certain Parts*, it will follow, that *these Parts* will be either *co-existent*, or not; and if *not co-existent*, then of course *successive*. Assist me,

said I, by another Instance, for you are growing again obscure. *Co-existent*, replied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Legs, Body, and Head *all subsist together at one individual Instant*: *Successive*, as in a Tune or Dance, where there is no such Co-existence, but where some *Parts* are *ever passing away*, and others are *ever succeeding* them.

CAN any Thing be said to *exist*, said I, whose *Parts* are *ever passing away*?

Surely, replied he, or how else exist Years and Seasons, Months and Days, with their *common Parent, Time* itself? Or indeed what is *Human Life*, but a *Compound of Parts thus fleeting*; a *Compound of various and multiform Actions*, which succeed each other in a certain Order? The Fact, said I, appears so.

THIS

THIS then, continued he, being the case, and there being this Difference in Productions, call every *Production*, the *Parts of which exist successively*, and whose Nature hath its Being or Essence in a Transition, call it, what it really is, a *Motion* or an *ENERGY*—Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies; thus Riding and Sailing are Energies; and so is Elocution, and so is Life itself. On the contrary, call every *Production*, whose *Parts exist all at once*, and whose Nature depends not on a Transition for its Essence, call it a *WORK*, or *Thing done*, not an *Energy* or *Operation*.—Thus a House is a Work, a Statue is a Work, and so is a Ship, and so a Picture. I seem, said I, to comprehend you.

IF then there be no *Productions*, said he, but must be of *Parts*, either *co-existent* or *successive*; and the one of these be, as you perceive, a *Work*, and the other be an *Energy*; it will follow, there will be no *Production*, but will be either a *Work* or an

D

Energy.

Energy. There will not, said I. But every *Art*, said he, you have granted, is *accomplished and ended in what it produces?*

I replied, I had. And there are *no Productions*, but *Works or Energies?*
None.

IT will follow then, said he, that EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.

To this I answered, That his Reasoning I could not impeach; but that still the Distinction of Work and Energy was what I did not well comprehend. There are several Circumstances, said he, which will serve sufficiently to make it clear. I begged he would mention some.

THUS then, said he——When the Production of any Art is an *Energy*, then the *Perfection of the Art can be only perceived during that Energy*. For instance, the Perfection of a Musician is only known, while he continues playing. But when the Pro-
§ duction

duction of any Art is a *Work*, then *is not the Perfection visible during the Energy, but only after it*. Thus the Perfection of the Statuary is not seen during his Energies as a Statuary, but when his Energies are over, when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, but the Statue is left as *the Result of all*. It is true, said I.

AGAIN, continued he,—in consequence of this, where the Production is an *Energy*, there *the Production is of Necessity co-eval with the Artist*. For how should the Energy survive the Man? the Playing remain, when the Musician is dead? But where the Production is a *Work*, then *is there no such Necessity*. The Work may well remain, when the Artist is forgotten; there being no more reason, that the Statue and the Artist should be co-eval, than the Man and the rude Marble, before it received a regular Figure. You seem now, said I, to have explained yourself.

IF then, said he, WORK and ENERGY be made *intelligible Terms*, you cannot but perceive the Truth of what we before asserted——*that every Art, according to its Genius, must needs be accomplished in one of these ; that, except in these two, it can be accomplished in nothing else ; and consequently that ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY BE ITS END.* I answered, That the Reasoning appeared justly deduced. So much then, replied he, for the *Ending or Accomplishment of Art* ; and so much also for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Disquisition.

§ 5. HE had no sooner said this, than I was beginning to applaud him ; especially on his having treated a Subject so copiously, started, as it were, by Chance, and without any apparent Preparation. But I had not gone far, before he interrupted me, by saying, That as to my Praises they were more than he deserved ; that he could pretend to no great Merit for having been, as I called it,

it, so copious, when he had so often before thought, on what at present we had been talking. In short, says he, to tell you a Secret, I have been a long time amusing myself, in forming an Essay upon this Subject. I could not here forbear reproaching him, for having hitherto concealed his Intentions. My Reproaches produced a sort of amicable Controversy, which at length ended in his offering, That, to make me some amends, he would now recite me (if I pleased) a small fragment of the Piece : a Fragment which he had happened accidentally to have about him. The Proposal, on my part, was willingly accepted, and without farther Delay, the Papers were produced.

As to the Performance itself, it must be confessed, in point of Stile, it was somewhat high and florid, perhaps even bordering upon an Excess. At the time however of recital, this gave me less Offence, because it seemed, as it were, to palliate the Dryness of what had passed before, and in some sort

to supply the Place of an Epilogue to our Conference. Not however to anticipate, he began reading as follows ;

B
 “ O ART! Thou *distinguishing Attribute*
 “ and *Honour* of *Human Kind*! who art
 “ not only able *to imitate Nature* in her
 “ Graces, but (what is more) even *to adorn*
 “ *her* with Graces *of thy own*. Possessed of
 “ Thee, the meanest Genius grows deserv-
 “ ing, and has a just Demand for a Portion
 “ of our Esteem. Devoid of Thee, the
 “ Brightest of our Kind lie lost and useless,
 “ and are but poorly distinguished from
 Lu: “ the most Despicable and Base. When
 “ we inhabited Forests in common with
 “ Brutes, nor otherwise known from them
 “ than by the Figure of our Species; *Thou*
 “ taughtest us to assert *the Sovereignty of our*
 “ *Nature*, and to assume that Empire, for
 “ which Providence intended us. Thou-
 “ sands of Utilities owe their Birth to Thee;
 “ thousands of Elegancies, Pleasures, and
 “ Joys, without which Life itself would be
 “ but an insipid Possession.

“ WIDE

“ WIDE and extensive is the Reach of
“ thy Dominion. No ELEMENT is there
“ either so *violent* or so *subtle*, so *yielding*
“ or so *sluggish*, as by the Powers of its
“ Nature to be superior to thy Direction.
“ Thou darest not the fierce Impetuosity
“ of FIRE, but compellest its Violence to
“ be both obedient and useful. By it Thou
“ softenest the stubborn Tribe of Minerals,
“ so as to be formed and moulded into
“ Shapes innumerable. Hence Weapons,
“ Armour, Coin; and previous to these,
“ and other Thy *Works* and *Energies*,
“ hence all those various Tools and Instru-
“ ments which empower Thee to proceed
“ to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is
“ the subtle AIR less obedient to Thy
“ Power, whether Thou willest it to be a
“ Minister to our Pleasure, or Utility. At
“ Thy Command it giveth Birth to Sounds,
“ which charm the Soul with all the Powers
“ of Harmony. Under thy Instruction it
“ moves the Ship o’er Seas, while that
“ yielding Element, where otherwise we

“ sink, even WATER itself is by Thee
“ taught to bear us; the vast Ocean to pro-
“ mote that Intercourse of Nations, which
“ Ignorance would imagine it was destined
“ to intercept. To say how thy Influence
“ is seen on EARTH, would be to teach
“ the meanest, what he knows already.
“ Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable
“ and Pasture ; Lawns and Groves, and
“ Gardens, and Plantations; Cottages, Vil-
“ lages, Castles, Towns; Palaces, Temples,
“ and spacious Cities.

“ NOR does thy Empire end in *Subjects*
“ thus *in-animate*. Its Power also extends
“ thro’ the various Race of ANIMALS,
“ who either patiently submit to become
“ thy Slaves, or are sure to find Thee an ir-
“ resistible Foe. The faithful Dog, the
“ patient Ox, the generous Horse, and the
“ mighty Elephant, are content all to re-
“ ceive their Instructions from Thee, and
“ readily to lend their natural *Instincts* or
“ *Strength*, to perform those Offices, which
“ thy Occasions call for. If there be found
“ any

“ any Species, which are serviceable when
 “ dead, Thou suggestest the Means to in-
 “ vestigate and take them. If any be so
 “ savage, as to refuse being tamed; or of
 “ Natures fierce enough to venture an At-
 “ tack; Thou teachest us to scorn their
 “ brutal Rage; to meet, repel, pursue, and
 “ conquer.

“ AND such, O ART! is thy amazing
 “ Influence, when Thou art employed only
 “ on these *inferior Subjects*; on Natures In-
 “ animate, or at best *Irrational*. But when-
 “ e’er Thou choolest a *Subject more noble*,
 “ and settest to the cultivating of MIND
 “ itself, then it is Thou becomest truly ami-
 “ able and divine; the ever-flowing Source
 “ of those sublimer Beauties, of which *no*
 “ *Subject* but *Mind alone* is capable. Then
 “ it is Thou art enabled to exhibit to Man-
 “ kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of
 “ Orators; the sacred Train of Patriots and
 “ of Heroes; the godlike List of Philoso-
 “ phers and Legislators; the Forms of *vir-*
 “ *tuous* and *equal* Politics, where *private*
 “ Wel-

B

B

“ Welfare is made the same with *public*;
 “ where Crowds themselves prove dis-
 “ interested and brave, and Virtue is made
 “ a national and popular Characteristic.

“ HAIL! sacred Source of all these
 “ Wonders! *Thyself* instruct me to praise
 “ Thee worthily, thro’ whom whate’er we
 “ do, is done with Elegance and Beauty;
 “ without whom, what we do, is ever grace-
 “ less and deformed.—Venerable Power!
 “ By what Name shall I address Thee?
 “ Shall I call thee *Ornament* of Mind;
 “ or art Thou more truly *Mind itself*?—
 “ IT IS MIND THOU ART, most perfect
 “ Mind; not rude, untaught, but fair and
 “ polished; in such Thou dwellest, of such
 “ Thou art the *Form*; nor is it a Thing
 “ more possible to separate Thee from such,
 “ than it would be to separate Thee from
 “ thy own Existence.”——

My good Friend was now arrived to a
 very exalted Pitch, and was pursuing his
 Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency;
 when

when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk being near finished. The People, as we went along, began to look at us with Surprise; which I, who was less engaged, having leisure to observe, thought it was proper to admonish my Friend, that he should give over. He immediately ceased reading; put his Papers up; and thanked me for stopping him at so seasonable a Time.

§ 6. WHAT remained of our Discourse passed off with less Rapture, and was indeed no more, than a kind of short Recapitulation.

He observed to me, that our Inquiries had furnished out an Answer to four different Questions. For thus, said he, if it be asked us, *What Art is?* We have to Answer, *it is——an habitual Power in Man, of becoming the Cause of some Effect, according to a System of various and well-approved Precepts.* If it be asked us, *On what Subject Art operates?* We can answer,
On

B

On a contingent, which is within the reach of the Human Powers to influence. If it be asked us, For what Reason, for the sake of what, Art operates? We may reply, For the sake of some absent Good, relative to Human Life, and attainable by Man, but superior to his natural and uninstructed Faculties. Lastly, if it be asked, Where it is the Operations of Art end? We may say, Either in some Energy, or in some Work.

HE added, That if he were not afraid of the Imputation of Pedantry, he could be almost tempted to say, That we had been considering Art, with respect to those *four Causes*, so celebrated *once* among Professors in the Schools. By these, upon Inquiry, I found that he meant certain *Causes*, called the * *Efficient*, the † *Material*, the ‡ *Final*, and the || *Formal*.

BUT

* P. 17.

† P. 22.

‡ P. 28, 29.

|| P. 34, 36.

BUT here, without farther explaining, he begged for the present that we might conclude, being sufficiently, as he said, fatigued with the Length of what had passed already. The Request was reasonable I could not but own, and thus ended our Conversation, and soon after it our Walk.

The E N D.

10

TREATISE THE SECOND:

A DISCOURSE

On MUSIC, PAINTING,
and POETRY.

THE HISTORY OF THE

A DISCOVERY

OF THE

OF THE

C O N T E N T S.

CHAPTER the FIRST.

INTRODUCTION—*Design and Distribution of the Whole—Preparation for the following Chapters.*

CHAPTER the SECOND.

ON the Subjects which Painting imitates—
On the Subjects which Music imitates—
Comparison of Music with Painting.

CHAPTER the THIRD.

ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but
imitates only thro' natural Media, or mere
Sounds—Comparison of Poetry in this
Capacity, first with Painting, then with
Music.

E CHAP.

CHAPTER the FOURTH.

ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words significant; the Subjects being such to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is most perfectly adapted.—Its Comparison in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

CHAPTER the FIFTH.

ON the Subjects which Poetry imitates by Words significant, being at the same time Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts——The Nature of these Subjects.——The Abilities of Poetry to imitate them.—Comparison of Poetry in respect of these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

CHAP-

CHAPTER the SIXTH.

ON *Music considered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another Source.——On its joint Operation by this means with Poetry.——An Objection to Music solved.—The Advantage arising to it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.——Conclusion.*

A DISCOURSE
ON MUSIC, PAINTING,
and POETRY.

CHAP. I.

*Introduction.—Design and Distribution of
the Whole.—Preparation for the following
Chapters.*

ALL Arts have this in common, Ch. I.
that *they respect Human Life.*
Some contribute to its *Necessi-*
ties, as Medicine and Agriculture; others
to its *Elegance*, as Music, Painting, and
Poetry.

Now, with respect to these two diffe-
rent *Species*, the *necessary* Arts seem to have
been *prior in time*; if it be probable, that

Ch. I. Men consulted how *to live* and *to support themselves*, before they began to deliberate how *to render Life agreeable*. Nor is this indeed unconfirmed by Fact, there being no Nation known so barbarous and ignorant, as where the Rudiments of these *necessary Arts* are not in some degree cultivated. And hence possibly they may appear to be the *more excellent and worthy*, as having claim to a *Preference*, derived from their *Seniority*.

THE Arts however of *Elegance* cannot be said to want Pretensions, if it be true, that Nature framed us for *something more than mere Existence*. Nay, farther*, if *Well-being* be clearly preferable to *Mere-being*, and this without it be but a thing contemptible, they may have reason perhaps to aspire even to a *Superiority*. But enough of this, to come to our Purpose.

§ 2.

* Οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείους ποιητέον,
Ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν. Plat. in Critone.

§ 2. THE Design of this Discourse is to Ch. I.
 treat of MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY;
 to consider in what they agree, and in
 what they differ; and WHICH UPON THE
 WHOLE, IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE
 OTHER TWO.

In entering upon this Inquiry, it is first
 to be observed, that the MIND is made
 conscious of the *natural World* and its Af-
 fections, and of other *Minds* and their
 Affections, by the several *Organs of the*
Senses (a). By the *same Organs*, these Arts
 exhibit to the Mind *Imitations*, and imitate
 either Parts or Affections of this *natural*
 E 4 *World,*

(a) To explain some future Observations, it will
 be proper here to remark, that the MIND *from these*
Materials thus brought together, and from its own Ope-
rations on them, and in consequence of them, becomes
fraught with IDEAS—and that MANY MINDS *so*
fraught, by a sort of COMPACT assigning to each IDEA
some SOUND to be its MARK or SYMBOL, were the first
 INVENTORS and FOUNDERS of LANGUAGE. See
 Vol. II. or *Hermes*, Lib. iii. cap. 3. 4.

Ch. I. *World*, or else the Passions, Energies, and other Affections of *Minds*. There is this Difference however between these *Arts* and *Nature*; that *Nature* passes to the Percipient thro' *all* the Senses; whereas these *Arts* use *only two* of them, that of Seeing and that of Hearing. And hence it is that the *sensible Objects* or *Media*, thro' which (b) they imitate, can be *such only*, as these two Senses are framed capable of perceiving; and these *Media* are *Motion, Sound, Colour, and Figure*.

PAINT-

(b) To prevent Confusion it must be observed, that in all these *Arts* there is a Difference between the *sensible Media*, thro' which they imitate, and the *Subjects imitated*. The *sensible Media*, thro' which they imitate, must be always *relative to that Sense*, by which the particular *Art* applies to the *Mind*; but the *Subject imitated* may be *foreign to that Sense*, and *beyond the Power of its Perception*. Painting, for instance, (as is shewn in this Chapter) has *no sensible Media*, thro' which it operates, except *Colour and Figure*: But as to *Subjects*, it may have *Motions, Sounds, moral Affections and Actions*; *none of which* are either *Colours* or *Figures*, but which however are *all capable of being imitated thro' them*. See Chapter the second, Notes (b), (c), (d).

PAINTING, having the *Eye* for its *Or-* Ch. I.
gan, cannot be conceived to imitate, but
thro' the Media of *visible* Objects. And
farther, its Mode of imitating being always
motionless, there must be subtracted from
these the Medium of *Motion*. It remains
then, that *Colour* and *Figure* are the only
Media, thro' which Painting imitates.

MUSIC, passing to the Mind thro' the
Organ of the *Ear*, can imitate only by
Sounds and Motions.

POETRY, having the *Ear* also for its
Organ, as far as *Words* are considered to be
no more than *mere Sounds*, can go no far-
ther in Imitating, than may be performed
by *Sound and Motion*. But then, as *these*
its Sounds stand by * *Compact for the various*
Ideas with which the Mind is fraught, it is
enabled by this means to imitate, *as far as*
Lan-

* See Note (a) Page 55.

Ch. I. *Language can express; and that it is evident*
 will, in a manner, include all things.

Now from hence may be seen, how
 these ARTS agree, and how they differ.

THEY agree, by being all MIMETIC,
 or IMITATIVE,

THEY differ, as they imitate by *different*
Media; PAINTING by *Figure and Colour*;
 MUSIC, by *Sound and Motion*; PAINTING
 and MUSIC, by *Media which are Natural*;
 POETRY, for the greatest Part, by a *Medium*
which is Artificial (c).

§ 3.


(c) A Figure painted, or a Composition of Musical Sounds have always a *natural Relation to that, of which they are intended to be the Resemblance*. But a Description in Words has rarely any such *natural Relation to the several Ideas, of which those Words are the Symbols*. None therefore understand the *Description*, but *those who speak the Language*. On the contrary, Musical and Picture-Imitations are *intelligible to all Men*.

§ 3. As to that ART, which upon the whole is *most excellent of the three*; it must be observed, that among these various *Media* of imitating, some will naturally be *more accurate*, some *less*; some will *best* imitate one Subject; some, another. Again, among the Number of *Subjects* there will be naturally also a Difference, as to *Merit* and *Demerit*. There will be some *sublime*, and some *low*; some *copious*, and some *short*; some *pathetic*, and others *void of Passion*; some formed to *instruct*, and others *not capable* of it. Ch. I.

Now, from these *two* Circumstances; that is to say, from the *Accuracy of the Imitation*, and the *Merit of the Subject imitated*, the Question concerning *which Art is most excellent*, must be tried and determined.

THIS

WHY it is said that Poetry is *not universally*, but *only for the greater part* artificial, see below, Chapter the Third, where what *Natural Force* it has, is examined and estimated.

Ch. I.  THIS however cannot be done, without
a *Detail of Particulars*, that so there may
be formed, on every part, just and accurate
Comparisons.

To begin therefore with Painting.

CHAP.

C H A P. II.

On the Subjects which Painting imitates.—

On the Subjects which Music imitates.—

Comparison of Music with Painting.

THE FITTEST SUBJECTS FOR Ch. II.
 PAINTING, are all such THINGS, }
 and INCIDENTS, as are * *peculiarly cha-*
acterised by FIGURE and COLOUR.

OF this kind are the whole Mafs (a) of
Things inanimate and vegetable; such as
 Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landfkips—
 The various Tribes of *Animal Figures*; such
 as Birds, Beasts, Herds, Flocks—The
Motions and Sounds peculiar to each Animal
 Species, when accompanied with *Configura-*
tions, which are obvious and remarkable (b)—
 The

* P. 57.

(a) THE Reason is, that *these* things are almost
wholly known to us by their *Colour* and *Figure*. Be-
 sides, they are as *motionless*, for the most part, in
Nature, as in the *Imitation*.

(b) INSTANCES of this kind are the Flying of
 Birds, the Galloping of Horses, the Roaring of Lions,
 the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reason is, that
 though

Ch. II. *The Human Body* in all its *Appearances* (as Male, Female; Young, Old; Handsome, Ugly;) and in all its *Attitudes*, (as Laying, Sitting, Standing, &c.)—The *Natural Sounds* peculiar to the *Human Species*, (such as Crying, Laughing, Hollowing, &c.) (c)—All *Energies, Passions, and Affections*, of the *Soul*, being in any degree *more intense or violent*

though to paint Motion or Sound be *impossible*, yet the Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an *immediate and natural Connection* with a certain *visible CONFIGURATION of the Parts*, the Mind, from a Prospect of this Configuration, conceives insensibly that which is concomitant; and hence it is that, by a sort of *Fallacy*, the SOUNDS and MOTIONS appear to be painted also. On the contrary, not so in such *Motions*, as the Swimming of many kinds of Fish; or in such *Sounds*, as the Purring of a Cat; because here is no such *special Configuration* to be perceived.—Homer in his Shield describing the Picture of a Bull seized by two Lions, says of the Bull—ὁ δὲ μακρὰ μεμυκὼς ἔλκετο—He, bellowing loudly, was drag'd along. Where Eustathius, in commenting on this Bellowing, says, ὡς εἶδεν τῷ σχήματι, as he (the Bull) made manifest (in the Picture) by his Figure or Attitude. Eust. in J. Σ. p. 1224.

(c) The Reason is of the *same* kind, as that given in the Note immediately preceding; and by the *same* Rule, the Observation must be confined to *natural Sounds* only. In *Language*, few of the *Speakers* know the *Configurations*, which attend it.

violent than ordinary (*d*)——All *Actions* Ch. II.
and *Events*, whose *Integrity* or *Wholeness* }
depends upon a *short* and *self-evident* Suc-
cession of *Incidents* (*e*)——Or if the Suc-
cession be extended, then *such Actions* at
least, whose *Incidents* are *all along*, during
that Succession, *similar* (*f*)——All *Actions*
which being qualified as *above*, open them-
selves into a *large Variety* of *Circumstances*,

con-

(*d*) THE Reason is still of the *same* kind, *viz.*
from their *Visible* Effects on the Body. They natu-
rally produce either to the *Countenance* a particular
Redness or *Paleness*; or a particular *Modification* of its
Muscles; or else to the *Limbs*, a particular *Attitude*.
Now all these Effects are *solely referable* to COLOUR
and FIGURE, the two grand sensible Media, *peculiar*
to Painting. See *Raphael's* Cartoons of *St. Paul* at
Athens, and of his striking the Sorcerer *Elymas* blind :
See also the Crucifixion of *Polycrates*, and the Suffer-
ings of the Consul *Regulus*, both by *Salvator Rosa*.

(*e*) FOR of necessity every PICTURE is a *Punctum*
Temporis or INSTANT.

(*f*) SUCH, for instance, as a Storm at Sea; whose
Incidents of Vision may be nearly all included in foam-
ing Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their erect
Posture, and Men hanging upon the Ropes.——
Or as a Battle; which from Beginning to End pre-
sents nothing else, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and
Disorder. Now *such Events* may be well imitated
all

Ch. II. *concurring all in the same Point of Time (g).*

— *All Actions which are known, and known universally, rather than Actions newly invented or known but to few (h).*

AND

all at once; for how long soever they last, they are but Repetitions of the same — *Nicias, the Painter, recommended much the same Subjects, viz. a Sea-fight or a Land-battle of Cavalry. His reasons too are much the same with those mentioned in Note (g). He concludes with a Maxim, (little regarded by his Successors, however important,) that the Subject itself is as much a Part of the Painter's Art, as the Poet's Fable is a Part of Poetry. See Demetrius Phal. p. 53. Edit. Ox.*

(g) FOR PAINTING is not bounded in EXTENSION, as it is in DURATION. Besides, it seems true in every Species of Composition, that, as far as Perplexity and Confusion may be avoided, and the Wholeness of the Piece may be preserved clear and intelligible; the more ample the Magnitude, and the greater the Variety, the greater also, in proportion, the Beauty and Perfection. Noble instances of this are the Pictures above-mentioned in Note (d). See *Aristot. Poet. cap. 7.* 'Ο δὲ καὶ αὐτὴν φύσιν τῆς ποικιλίας ὅρῃ, αὐτὴ μὲν, &c. See also *Characteristicks*, V. I. p. 143. and *Bossu*, B. I. cap. 16. *L' Achille d' Homère est si grand, &c.*

(h) THE Reason is, that a Picture being (as has been said) but a Point or Instant, in a Story well known the Spectator's Memory will supply the previous and the subsequent. But this cannot be done, where

AND thus much as to the Subjects of Ch. II.
Painting.

§ 2. IN MUSIC, THE FITTEST SUBJECTS OF IMITATION are all such THINGS
and

where such Knowledge is wanting. And therefore it may be justly questioned, whether the most celebrated Subjects, borrowed by Painting from History, would have been any of them intelligible thro' the Medium of Painting only, supposing History to have been silent, and to have given no additional Information.

It may be here added, that *Horace*, conformably to this Reasoning, recommends even to Poetic Imitation a known Story, before an unknown.


—————Tuque
*Rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus,
Quam si proferres ignota, indictaque primus.*
Art. Poet. v. 128.

AND indeed as the being understood to others, either Hearers or Spectators, seems to be a common *Requisite* to all *Mimetic Arts* whatever; (for to those, who understand them not, they are in Fact no *Mimetic Arts*) it follows, that *Perspicuity* must be *Essential* to them all; and that no prudent Artist would neglect, if it were possible, any just Advantage to obtain this End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than the *Notoriety of the Subject imitated*.

Ch. II. and INCIDENTS, *as are most eminently* characterised by MOTION and SOUND.*

MOTION may be either *slow* or *swift*, *even* or *uneven*, *broken* or *continuous*.—
SOUND may be either *soft* or *loud*, *high* or *low*. Wherever therefore any of these Species of *Motion* or *Sound* may be found in an *eminent* (not a *moderate* or *mean*) *degree*, there will be room for MUSICAL IMITATION.

THUS, in the *Natural* or *Inanimate World*, MUSIC may imitate the Glidings, Murmurings, Toffings, Roarings, and other *Accidents of Water*, as perceived in Fountains, Cataracts, Rivers, Seas, &c.—The same of Thunder—the same of Winds, as well the stormy as the gentle.—In the *Animal World*, it may imitate the *Voice* of some Animals, but *chiefly* that of singing Birds.—It may also *faintly copy* some of their *Motions*.—In the *Human Kind*, it can
also

also imitate some *Motions*(i) and *Sounds*(k); Ch. II.
and of Sounds those *most perfectly*, which 
are expressive of *Grief* and *Anguish* (l).

AND thus much as to the Subjects,
which Music imitates.

§ 3. IT remains then, that we *compare*
these two ARTS together. And here in-
deed, as to *Musical Imitation in general*, it
must be confessed that—as it can, from its
Genius, imitate *only* Sounds and Motions—
as there are not *many* Motions either in the
Animal

(i) As the *Walk* of the Giant *Polypheme*, in the
Pastoral of *Acis* and *Galatea*.—See what ample *Strides*
he takes, &c.

(k) As the *Shouts* of a Multitude, in the Corona-
tion Anthem of, *God save the King*, &c.

(l) THE Reason is, that *this Species* of Musical
Imitation *most nearly* approaches *Nature*. For *Grief*,
in most Animals, declares itself by *Sounds*, which are
not unlike to *long Notes* in the *Chromatic System*.
Of this kind is the Chorus of *Baal's Priests* in
the Oratorio of *Deborah*, *Doleful Tidings*, how ye
wound, &c.

Ch. II. *Animal* or in the *Inanimate* World, which
 are *exclusively peculiar* even to any *Species*
 and scarcely any to an *Individual*——as
 there are no *Natural* Sounds, which cha-
 racterise at least *lower than a Species* (for
 the *Natural* Sounds of *Individuals* are in
 every *Species* the *same*)——farther, as
 Music does but *imperfectly* imitate even
 these Sounds and Motions (*m*)——On the
 contrary, as Figures, Postures of Figures,
 and Colours characterise not only *every sen-*
sible Species, but even *every Individual*; and
 for the most part also *the various** *Energies*
 and *Passions* of every *Individual*——and
 farther, as Painting is able, *with the highest*
Accuracy and Exactness, to imitate all these
 Colours and Figures; and while Musical
 Imita-

(*m*) THE Reason is from the *Diffimilitude* be-
 tween the Sounds and Motions of *Nature*, and those
 of *Music*. *Musical Sounds* are all produced from *Even*
Vibration, most *Natural* from *Uneven*; *Musical Mo-*
tions are chiefly *D.finite* in their Measure, most
Natural are *Indefinite*.

* See Note (*d*) of this Chapter.

Imitation pretends *at most* to no more, than Ch. II.
the raising of Ideas *similar*, itself aspires to
raise Ideas *the very same*——in a word, as
Painting, in respect of *its Subjects*, is equal
to the *noblest* Part of Imitation, *the Imitating regular Actions consisting of a Whole and Parts*; and of *such* Imitation, Music is *utterly incapable*——FROM ALL THIS it must be confessed, that MUSICAL IMITATION IS GREATLY BELOW THAT OF PAINTING, and that *at best* it is but an imperfect thing.

As to the *Efficacy* therefore of MUSIC, it must be derived from *another* Source, which must be left for the present, to be considered of hereafter *.

THERE remains to be mentioned Imitation by Poetry.

* Ch. VI.

C H A P. III.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, but imitates only thro' natural Media, or mere Sounds——Comparison of Poetry in this Capacity, first with Painting, then with Music.

Ch. III.

POETIC IMITATION *includes every thing in it, which is performed either by* PICTURE-IMITATION *or* MUSICAL; *for its Materials are Words, and Words are* * *Symbols by Compact of all Ideas.*

FARTHER as *Words*, beside their being *Symbols by Compact*, are also *Sounds variously distinguished* by their Aptness to be *rapidly or slowly pronounced*, and by the respective Prevalence of *Mutes, Liquids, or Vowels* in their Composition; it will follow that, beside their *Compact-Relation*, they will

* See Note (a) Chap. I.

will have likewise a *Natural Relation* to all such Things, between which and themselves there is any *Natural Resemblance*. Thus, for instance, there is *Natural Resemblance* between all sorts of *harsh* and *grating* Sounds. There is therefore (exclusive of its Signification) a *Natural Relation* between the Sound of a vile Hautboy, and of that Verse in * *Virgil*,

Stridenti miserum stipulâ disperdere Carmen.

or of that other in † *Milton*.

*Grate on their Scrannel Pipes of wretched
Straw.*

So also between the *smooth swift* Gliding of a River, and of that Verse in || *Horace*,

——— *at ille*

Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis ævum.

AND thus in part even *Poetic Imitation* has its Foundation in *Nature*. But then

F 4

this

* Ecl. 3. ver. 27. † In his *Lycidas*.

|| Epist. 2. l. 1. ver. 42, 43.

B Ch. III. this Imitation goes not far: and taken without the *Meaning* derived to the Sounds from *Compact*, is but little intelligible, however perfect and elaborate.

§ 2. If therefore POETRY be *compared* with PAINTING, in respect of this its *merely Natural and Inartificial* Resemblance, it may be justly said that——In as much as of *this sort* of Resemblance, Poetry (like Music) has no other Sources, than *those two* of *Sound* and *Motion*——in as much as it often wants these Sources *themselves* (for Numbers of Words neither *have*, nor *can have* any Resemblance to *those Ideas*, of which they are the *Symbols*)——in as much as *Natural* Sounds and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates, are themselves but * *loose* and *indefinite Accidents* of those *Subjects*, to which they belong, and consequently do but *loosely* and *indefinitely* characterise them——lastly, in as much as *Poetic* Sounds and Motions do
but

* P. 67, 68.

but faintly resemble those of *Nature*, which are *themselves* confessed to be so imperfect and *vague*.—FROM ALL THIS it will follow (as it has *already* followed of Music) that—POETIC IMITATION FOUNDED IN MERE NATURAL RESEMBLANCE IS MUCH INFERIOR TO THAT OF PAINTING, and at best but very imperfect.

§ 3. As to the Preference, which such POETIC IMITATION may claim before MUSICAL, or MUSICAL IMITATION before THAT; the Merits on each Side may appear perhaps *equal*. They both fetch their Imitations from † *Sound* and *Motion*. Now MUSIC seems to imitate *Nature* better as to *Motion*, and POETRY as to *Sound*. The Reason is, that in *Motions* (a) *Music* has

† P. 57.

(a) MUSIC has no less than *five different Lengths of Notes* in ordinary use, reckoning from the Semi-brief to the Semi-quaver; all which may be *infinitely*

has a greater *Variety*; and in *Sounds*, those of *Poetry* approach nearer to *Nature* (b).

IF therefore in *Sound* the *one* have the Preference, in *Motion* the *other*, and the *Merit* of *Sound* and *Motion* be supposed nearly *equal*; it will follow, that THE MERIT OF THE TWO IMITATIONS WILL BE NEARLY EQUAL ALSO.

nitely compounded, even in any *one* Time, or Measure—POETRY, on the other hand, has but *two* Lengths or Quantities, a *long* Syllable and a *short*, (which is its Half) and *all the Variety of Verse* arises from such Feet and Metres, as these *two Species* of Syllables, by being compounded, can be made produce.

(b) MUSICAL Sounds are produced by *even* Vibrations, which *scarcely any Natural* Sounds are—on the contrary, *Words* are the Product of *uneven* Vibration, and so are *most Natural* Sounds—Add to this, that *Words* are far more numerous, than *Musical Sounds*. So that Poetry, as to imitation by *Sound*, seems to exceed Music, not only in *nearness of Resemblance*, but even in *Variety* also,

C H A P. IV.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates, not by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by Words significant; the Subjects at the same time being such, to which the Genius of each of the other two Arts is most perfectly adapted—Its Comparifon in thefe Subjects, firft with Painting, then with Music.

THE *Mimetic* Art of POETRY has Ch. IV.
 been hitherto confidered, as fetching its Imitation from mere Natural Re-
 femblance. In this it has been fhewn much *inferior* to PAINTING, and nearly equal to MUSIC.

IT remains to be confidered, what its Merits are, when it imitates not by mere *Natural Sound*, but by Sound *significant*; by Words, the *compact Symbols* of all kinds of Ideas. From hence depends its genuine
 Force,

Ch. IV. Force. And here, as it is able to find Sounds expressive of *every* Idea, so is there *no Subject* either of Picture-Imitation, or Musical, to which it does not aspire; all Things and Incidents whatever being, in a manner, to be described by Words.

Whether *therefore* POETRY, in *this* its proper sphere, be equal to the Imitation of the other two ARTS, is the question at present, which comes in order to be discussed.

Now as *Subjects* are *infinite*, and the other two Arts are *not* equally adapted to imitate *all*; it is proposed, first to compare POETRY with them in such SUBJECTS, to which they are most perfectly adapted.

§ 2. To begin therefore with PAINTING. A SUBJECT, in which the Power of this Art may be *most fully* exerted, (whether it be taken from the *Inanimate*, or the *Animal*, or the *Moral World*) must be a SUBJECT, which is principally and eminently characterised by certain Colours, Figures,

Figures, and Postures of Figures——whose Ch. IV.
Comprehension depends not on a Succession of
Events; or at least, if on a Succession, on a
short and self-evident one——which admits a
large Variety of such Circumstances, as all
concur in the same individual Point of Time,
and relate all to one principal Action.

As to such a Subject therefore——In as much as POETRY is forced to pass thro' the Medium of *Compact*, while PAINTING applies immediately thro' the Medium of *Nature*; the one being understood to all, the other to the Speakers of a certain Language * only——in as much as *Natural* Operations must needs be more *affecting*, than *Artificial*——in as much as Painting helps *our own rude* Ideas by *its own*, which are *consummate* and wrought up to the Perfection of Art; while Poetry can raise *no other* (a) than what every Mind is furnished with

* Note (c) p. 58.

(a) WHEN we read in MILTON of EVE, that
Grace was in all her Steps, Heav'n in her Eye,
In ev'ry Gesture Dignity and Love;

Ch. IV. with *before*—in as much as Painting shews all the *minute and various concurrent Circumstances* of the Event in the *same* individual Point of Time, as they appear in *Nature*; while Poetry is forced to *want* this Circumstance of Intelligibility, by being ever obliged to enter into some degree of *Detail*——in as much as this Detail creates often the Dilemma of either becoming *tedious*, to be *clear*; or if *not tedious*, then *obscure*——lastly, in as much as all Imitations more *similar*, more *immediate*,

we have an Image *not* of that EVE, which MILTON conceived, but of *such an EVE only*, as every one, by his own proper Genius, is able to represent, from reflecting on those *Ideas*, which he has annexed to these several *Sounds*. The greater Part, in the mean time, have never perhaps bestowed one accurate Thought upon what *Grace, Heaven, Love, and Dignity* mean; or ever enriched the Mind with *Ideas* of Beauty, or asked *whence* they are to be acquired, and by what *Proportions* they are *constituted*. On the contrary, when we view EVE as painted by an *able Painter*, we labour under no such Difficulty; because we have exhibited before us the *better Conceptions* of an ARTIST, the *genuine Ideas* of perhaps a TITIAN or a RAPHAEL.

diate, and more *intelligible*, are preferable to those which are *less* so; and for the Reasons above, the Imitations of *Poetry* are *less similar*, *less immediate*, and *less intelligible* than those of *Painting*—From ALL THIS it will follow, that—in ALL SUBJECTS WHERE PAINTING CAN FULLY EXERT ITSELF, THE IMITATIONS OF PAINTING ARE SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF POETRY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IN ALL SUCH SUBJECTS THAT PAINTING HAS THE PREFERENCE.

§ 3. AND now to compare POETRY with MUSIC, allowing to *Music* the same Advantage of a *well-adapted* Subject, which has already been allowed to *Painting* in the Comparison just preceding.

WHAT such a SUBJECT is, has already been * described. And as to *Preference*, it
* must

* See Chap. II. § 2.

Ch. IV. must be confessed, that—In as much as
 MUSICAL IMITATIONS, tho' *Natural*,
 aspire not to raise the *same* Ideas, but only
 Ideas || *similar* and analogous; while POETIC
 IMITATION, tho' *Artificial*, raises Ideas
 the very *same*—in as much as the *Definite*
 and *Certain* is ever preferable to the *Indefi-*
nite and *Uncertain*; and that more espe-

(b) Delight is in recognizing the Thing
imitating

|| P. 68, 69.

(b) THAT there is an eminent Delight in *this*
 very RECOGNITION *itself*, abstract from any thing
 pleasing in the *Subject* recognized, is evident from
 hence——that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be
highly charmed with *Imitations*, at whose *Originals* in
 Nature we are *shocked* and *terrified*. Such, for in-
 stance, as Dead Bodies, Wild Beasts, and the like.

THE Cause, assigned for this, seems to be of
 the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in
 the *Sanity* and *Perfection*, but also in the *just* and *na-*
tural Energies of our several *Limbs* and *Faculties*.
 And hence, among others, the Joy in REASONING;
 as being the *Energy* of that principal Faculty, our IN-
 TELLECT or UNDERSTANDING. This Joy extends,
 not only to the Wise, but to the Multitude. For
 all Men have an *Aversion* to *Ignorance* and *Error*,
 and

imitated—it will follow from hence that—
EVEN IN SUBJECTS THE BEST ADAPTED
TO MUSICAL IMITATION, THE IMITA-
TION OF POETRY WILL BE STILL MORE
EXCELLENT.

Ch. IV.

and in some degree, however moderate, are glad to
learn and to *inform* themselves:

HENCE therefore the *Delight*, arising from these
Imitations; as we are enabled, in each of them, to
exercise the REASONING FACULTY; and, by *com-*
paring the Copy with the Archetype in our Minds, to
INFER that THIS is SUCH a THING; and, THAT,
ANOTHER; a Fact remarkable among Children,
even in their first and earliest Days.

Τὸ, τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι, σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδῶν
ἔστι, καὶ τὴν διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν
ἐστὶ, καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας·
καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. Σημεῖον δὲ τὸ τῆς
συμψαίνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων. Ἄ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρῶμεν,
τῶν τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριωμένους, χαίρομεν θεω-
ρῶντες· οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀγριωτάτων, καὶ νεκρῶν.
Ἄλλιον δὲ καὶ τὸ, ὅτι μαθάνειν ἔ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
ἡδιστον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινοῦν-
σιν αὐτῶν. Διὰ γὰρ τὸ χαίρειν τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρῶντες, ὅτι
συμψαίνει θεωρῶντας μαθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι, τί ἐκαστὸν
οἶον, ὅτι ἐστὶ ἐκεῖν. Arist. Poet. c. 4.

C H A P. V.

On the Subjects which Poetry imitates by Words significant, being at the same time Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either of the other Arts—The Nature of those Subjects—The Abilities of Poetry to imitate them—Comparison of Poetry in these Subjects, first with Painting, then with Music.

Ch. V.

THE MIMETIC ART of POETRY has now been considered in *two* Views—First, as imitating by *mere natural MEDIA*: and in this it has been placed on a *level* with MUSIC, but *much inferior* to PAINTING—It has been since considered as imitating thro' *Sounds significant by Compact*, and that in *such* Subjects respectively, where PAINTING and MUSIC have the *fullest Power* to exert themselves.

Here to Painting it has been held *inferior*, Ch. V.
but to Music it has been *preferred*. B

It remains to be considered——what
other Subjects Poetry has left, to which the
Genius of the other two Arts is less *per-*
fectly adapted——How far Poetry is *able* to
imitate them——and whether from the
Perfection of its Imitation, and the *Nature*
of the Subjects themselves, it ought to be
called no more than *equal* to its Sister Arts;
or whether, on the whole, it should not
rather be called *superior*. B

§ 2. To begin, in the first place, by
comparing it with Painting. B

THE *Subjects of Poetry*, to which the
Genius of *Painting* is *not adapted*, are—
all Actions, whose (a) *Whole* is of so
G 2 *lengthened*

(a) For a just and accurate Description of *Whole-*
ness and *Unity*, see *Arist. Poet.* Ch. 7 & 8. and *Bossu*,
his best Interpreter, in his *Treatise on the Epic Poem*.
B. II. ch. 9, 10, 11.

Ch. V. *lengthened* a Duration, that *no Point of Time*, in any part of that Whole, can be given *fit for Painting*; neither in its *Beginning*, which will teach what is *Subsequent*; nor in its *End*, which will teach what is *Previous*; nor in its *Middle*, which will declare both the *Previous* and the *Subsequent*.——Also all Subjects so framed, as to lay open the *internal Constitution of Man*, and give us an *Insight into* (b) *Characters, Manners, Passions, and Sentiments*.

THE

(b) FOR a Description of CHARACTER, see below, Note (d) of this Chapter.

As for MANNERS, it may be said in general, that a *certain System of them* makes a *Character*; and that as these Systems, by being *differently compounded*, make each a *different Character*, so is it that *one Man truly differs from another*.

PASSIONS are obvious; *Pity, Fear, Anger, &c.*

SENTIMENTS are discoverable in all those Things, which are the *proper Business and End of SPEECH or DISCOURSE*. The chief Branches of this *End* are to *Assert and Prove*; to *Solve and Refute*; to express or excite *Passions*; to *amplify Incidents*,

THE *Merit* of these Subjects is obvious. Ch. V.
 They must necessarily of all be the most *affecting*; the most *improving*; and such of which the Mind has the *strongest Comprehension*.

FOR as to the *affecting Part*—if it be true, that all *Events* more or less *affect* us, as the *Subjects*, which they respect, are more or less nearly *related* to us; then surely those *Events* must needs be *most affecting*, to whose *Subjects* we are of all the *most intimately related*. Now such is the Relation, which we bear to *Mankind*; and Men and Human Actions are the Subjects, here proposed for Imitation.

G 3

As

cidents, and to *diminish* them. It is in these things therefore, that we must look for *Sentiment*. See *Arist. Poet.* c. 19.—ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν Διάνοιαν ταῦτα ὅσα ὑπὸ τῆς λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι. Μέγεθος δὲ τῶν, τό, τε ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ τὸ λύειν, καὶ τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, —καὶ ἔτι μέγεθος, καὶ σμικρότης.

Ch. V. As to *Improvement*—there can be none surely (to *Man* at least) so great, as that which is derived from a just and decent Representation of *Human Manners*, and *Sentiments*. For what can more contribute to give us that Master-Knowledge (c), without

(c) ΕΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΤΤΟΝ. But farther, besides obtaining this *moral Science* from the Contemplation of Human Life; an End common both to Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry; there is a peculiar End to *Tragedy*, that of eradicating the Passions of *Pity* and *Fear*. Ἔστιν ἐν τραγωδίᾳ μίμησις πράξεως σπινδαίας καὶ τελείας—δι' ἐλέν καὶ φόβον περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. Arist. Poet. c. 6. TRAGEDY is the Imitation of an Action important and perfect, thro' PITY and FEAR working the PURGATION OF SUCH-LIKE PASSIONS.

THERE are none, it is evident, so devoid of these two Passions, as those perpetually conversant, where the Occasions of them are most frequent; such, for instance, as the Military Men, the Professors of Medicine, Chirurgery, and the like. Their Minds, by this Intercourse, become as it were callous; gaining an Apathy by Experience, which no Theory can ever teach them.

Now

out which, *all other* Knowledge will prove of little or no Utility. Ch. V. B

G 4

As

Now that, which is wrought in *these* Men by the *real Disasters of Life*, may be supposed wrought in others by the *Fictions of Tragedy*; yet with this happy Circumstance in favour of Tragedy, that, without the Disasters being *real*, it can obtain the *same End*.

It must however, for all this, be confessed, that an Effect of this kind cannot reasonably be expected, except among Nations, like the *Athenians* of old, who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon these Theatrical Representations. For it is not a *single* or *occasional* Application to these Passions, but a *constant* and *uninterrupted*, by which alone they may be lessened or removed.

It would be improper to conclude this Note, without observing, that the Philosopher in this place by PITY means not PHILANTHROPY, *Natural Affection, a Readiness to relieve others in their Calamities and Distress*; but, by Pity, he means that SENSELESS EFFEMINATE CONSTERNATION, which seizes weak Minds, on the sudden Prospect of any thing disastrous; which, in its more violent Effects, is seen in Shriekings, Swoonings, &c. a Passion, so far from laudable, or from operating to the Good of others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who labours under its Influence, of all Capacity to do the least good Office.

Ch. V.

As to our *Comprehension*——there is nothing certainly, of which we have so *strong* Ideas, as of that which happens in the *Moral* or *Human* World. For as to the *Internal Part*, or *Active Principle* of the *Vegetable*, we know it but *obscurely*; because there we can discover neither *Passion*, nor *Sensation*. In the *Animal* World indeed this *Principle* is more seen, and that from the *Passions* and *Sensations* which *there* declare themselves. Yet all still rests upon the mere Evidence of *Sense*; upon the Force only of *external* and *unassisted Experience*. But in the *Moral* or *Human* World, as we have a Medium of *Knowledge* far more *accurate* than this; so from hence it is, that we can comprehend *accordingly*.

WITH regard therefore to the various *Events* which happen *here*, and the various *Causes*, by which they are produced——in other Words, of all Characters, Manners, Human Passions, and Sentiments; besides the Evidence of *Sense*, we have the *highest Evidence*

PAINTING, and POETRY.

89

Evidence additional, in having an express Ch. V.
Consciousness of something *similar within* ;
of something *homogeneous* in the *Recesses* of
our own *Minds* ; in that, which constitutes
to each of us *his true and real Self* ,

THESE therefore being the Subjects, *not*
adapted to the Genius of Painting, it comes
next to be considered, *how far Poetry can*
imitate them .

AND here, that it has *Abilities* clearly
equal, cannot be doubted ; as it has *that*
for the *Medium* of its Imitation, through
which *Nature* declares herself in the *same*
Subjects. For the *Sentiments* in *real Life*
are only known by Men's * *Discourse*.
And the *Characters, Manners, and Passions*
of Men being the *Prompters* to what they
say ; it must needs follow, that their *Dis-*
course will be a *constant Specimen* of those
Characters, Manners, and Passions .

Format

* P. 84, Note (b).

Ch. V. * *Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad omnem*

Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad iram :

Post effert Animi Motus, INTERPRETE LINGUA.

NOT only therefore *Language* is an adequate Medium of Imitation, but in *Sentiments* it is the *only* Medium; and in *Manners* and *Passions* there is no other, which can exhibit them to us after that *clear, precise, and definite Way*, as they in *Nature* stand allotted to the various sorts of Men, and are found to constitute the *several Characters* of each (*d*).

§ 3.

* *Hor. de Arte Poet. vers. 108.*

(*d*) IT is true indeed that (besides what is done by *Poetry*) there is some Idea of *Character*, which even *Painting* can communicate. Thus there is no doubt, but that such a *Countenance* may be found by *Painters* for *Æneas*, as would convey upon view a
mild,

§ 3. To compare therefore Poetry, in Ch. V. *these Subjects*, with Painting—In as much as no Subjects of Painting are * *wholly superior*

* P. 57, 58. 75, 76.

mild, humane, and yet a brave Disposition. But then this Idea would be vague and general. It would be concluded, only in the gross, that the Hero was Good. As to that System of Qualities peculiar to Æneas only, and which alone properly constitutes his true and real Character, this would still remain a Secret, and be no way discoverable. For how deduce it from the mere Lineaments of a Countenance? Or, if it were deducible, how few Spectators would there be found so sagacious? It is here, therefore, that Recourse must be had, not to Painting, but to Poetry. So accurate a Conception of Character can be gathered only from a Succession of various, and yet consistent Actions; a Succession, enabling us to conjecture, what the Person of the Drama will do in the future, from what already he has done in the past. Now to such an Imitation, Poetry only is equal; because it is not bounded, like Painting, to short, and as it were, instant Events, but may imitate Subjects of any Duration whatever. See Arist. Poet. cap. 6. Ἔστι δὲ ἥθος μὲν τὸ τοῖστον, ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποιά τις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἔκ ἐστι δῆλον, εἰ προαιρεῖται ἢ φέυγει ὁ λέγων. See also the ingenious and learned Bossu, Book 4. ch. 4.

Ch. V. *perior* to Poetry; while the Subjects, here described, *far exceed the Power* of Painting—in as much as they are of *all* Subjects the most † *affecting*, and *improving*, and such of which we have the *strongest Comprehension*—further, in as much as Poetry can *most* ‡ *accurately* imitate them—in as much as, besides all Imitation, there is a *Charm* in Poetry, arising from its very *Numbers* (e); whereas Painting has Pre-
tence

† P. 85, &c.

‡ P. 89, &c.

(e) That there is a *Charm* in *Poetry*, arising from its *Numbers* only, may be made evident from the five or six first Lines of the *Paradise Lost*; where, without any Pomp of Phrase, Sublimity of Sentiment, or the *least Degree of Imitation*, every Reader must find himself to be sensibly delighted; and that, only from the graceful and simple *Cadence* of the *Numbers*, and that artful *Variation* of the *Cæsura* or *Pause*, so essential to the Harmony of every good Poem.

AN *English Heroic Verse* consists of ten *Semipeds*, or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned
the

PAINTING, and POETRY.

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tence to no Charm, except that of Imitation only——lastly, (which will soon be * shewn) in as much as Poetry is able to *associate Music*, as a most powerful Ally; of which Assistance, Painting is utterly incapable——FROM ALL THIS it may be fairly concluded, that——POETRY *is not only Equal, but that it is in fact FAR SUPERIOR TO ITS SISTER ART OF PAINTING.*

Ch. V.

§ 4. BUT if it exceed *Painting* in *Subjects*, to which Painting is *not adapted*; no doubt *will it exceed MUSIC in Subjects to Music*

* Chap. VI.

the *Pauses* are varied upon *different Semipeds* in the Order, which follows; as may be seen by any, who will be at the Pains to examine.

PARADISE LOST, B. I.

Verse		Semiped
1		7
2	} has its Pause fall upon	6
3		6
4		5
5		3
6		4

Ch. V. Music *not adapted*. For here it has been
 * *preferred*, even in those Subjects, which
 have been held *adapted the best of all*.

§ 5. POETRY IS THEREFORE, ON THE
 WHOLE MUCH SUPERIOR TO EITHER OF
 THE OTHER MIMETIC ARTS; *it having*
been shewn to be equally excellent IN THE
 † ACCURACY OF ITS IMITATION; *and to*
imitate SUBJECTS, WHICH FAR SURPASS,
 AS WELL IN ‡ UTILITY, AS IN || DIG-
 NITY.

* Ch. IV. § 3.

† P. 89.

‡ P. 86.

|| See p. 83, 84. and p. 64, Note (g). See also
 p. 59.

C H A P.

C H A P. VI.

On Music considered not as an Imitation, but as deriving its Efficacy from another Source.——On its joint Operation by this means with Poetry.——An Objection to Music solved.——The Advantage arising to it, as well as to Poetry, from their being united.——Conclusion.

IN the above Discourse, MUSIC has Ch. VI. been mentioned as an * *Ally* to Poetry. It has also been said to derive its † *Efficacy* from *another Source*, than *Imitation*. It remains, therefore, that these things be explained.

Now, in order to this, it is first to be observed, that there are various *Affections*, which may be raised by the Power of *Music*.

* P. 93.

† P. 69.

B Ch. VI. *Music.* There are Sounds to make us *cheerful*, or *sad*; *martial*, or *tender*; and so of almost every other Affection, which we feel.

IT is also further observable, that there is a *reciprocal Operation* between our *Affections*, and our *Ideas*; so that, by a sort of *natural Sympathy*, certain *Ideas* necessarily tend to raise in us certain *Affections*; and those *Affections*, by a sort of Counter-Operation, to raise the *same Ideas*. Thus *Ideas* derived from Funerals, Tortures, Murders, and the like, naturally generate the Affection of *Melancholy*. And when, by any *Physical Causes*, that *Affection* happens to prevail, it as naturally generates the *same doleful Ideas*.

AND hence it is, that *Ideas*, derived from *external Causes*, have at *different* times, upon the *same Person*, so *different* an Effect. If they happen to suit the *Affections*, which *prevail within*, then is their Impression *most sensible*, and their Effect
most

most lasting. If the contrary be true, then Ch. VI. is the Effect contrary. Thus, for instance, a Funeral will much more affect the same Man, if he see it when melancholy, than if he see it when chearful.

Now this being premised, it will follow, that whatever happens to be the *Affection* or *Disposition* of Mind, which ought naturally to result from the Genius of any *Poem*, the *same* probably it will be in the Power of some Species of *Music* to excite. But whenever the *proper Affection* prevails, it has been allowed that then *all kindred Ideas*, derived from external Causes, make the *most sensible Impression*. The Ideas therefore of Poetry must needs make the most sensible Impression, when the (a) Affections, peculiar to them, are already

(a) QUINTILIAN elegantly, and exactly apposite to this Reasoning, says of *Music*——*Namque & voce & modulatione grandia elatè, jucunda dulciter, moderata*

Ch. VI. ready excited by the Music. For here a *double Force is made co-operate to one End.* A Poet, *thus assisted*, finds not an Audience in a Temper, averſe to the Genius of his Poem, or perhaps at beſt under a cool *Indifference*; but by the Preludes, the Symphonies, and *concurrent Operation* of the Music in all its Parts, roused into *thoſe very Affections*, which he would moſt deſire.

AN Audience, ſo diſpoſed, not only embrace with Pleaſure the Ideas of the Poet, when exhibited; but, in a manner, even *anticipate* them in their ſeveral Imaginations. The Superſtitious have not a more previous Tendency to be frightened at the ſight of Spectres, or a Lover to fall into Raptures at the ſight of his Miſtreſs; than a Mind, thus tempered by the Power of Music,

moderata leniter canit, totâque arte conſentit cum eorum, quæ dicuntur, AFFECTIBUS. Inſt. Orator. l. I. cap. 10.

PAINTING, and POETRY.

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Musick, to enjoy all Ideas, which are suitable to that Temper.

Ch. VI.

B

AND hence the *genuine* Charm of Music, and the *Wonders* which it works, thro' its great Professors (*b*). A Power, which consists not in Imitations, and the raising *Ideas*; but in the raising *Affections*, to which Ideas may correspond. There are few to be found so insensible, I may even say so inhumane, as when GOOD POETRY IS JUSTLY SET TO MUSIC, not in some degree to feel the Force of so *amiable an Union*. But to the Muses Friends it is a Force *irresistible*, and pene-

H 2


trates

(*b*) SUCH, above all, is *George Frederick Handel*; whose Genius, having been cultivated by continued Exercise, and being itself far the sublimest and most universal now known, has justly placed him without an Equal, or a Second. This transient Testimony could not be denied so excellent an Artist, from whom this Treatise has borrowed such eminent Examples, to justify its Assertions in what it has offered concerning Music.

B

B

B

Ch. VI.  trates into the deepest Reccesses of the Soul.

— * *Pectus inaniter angit,
Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet.*

 § 2. Now this is *that Source*, from whence Music was † said formerly to *derive its greatest Efficacy*. And here indeed, not in (c) Imitation, ought it to be chiefly cultivated. On this account also it has been called a ‡ *powerful Ally* to Poetry. And farther, it is by the help of this Reasoning, that the *Objection* is solved, which is raised against the *Singing of Poetry* (as in Opera's, Oratorio's, &c.) from the want of

* *Horat. Epist. 1. l. 2. vers. 211.*

† P. 69.

‡ P. 93.

 (c) For the *narrow Extent* and *little Efficacy* of MUSIC, considered as a MIMETIC or IMITATIVE Art, see Ch. II. § 3.

of *Probability* and *Resemblance to Nature*. Ch. VI.

To one indeed, who has no musical Ear, this Objection may have Weight. It may even perplex a Lover of Music, if it happen to surprise him in his Hours of *Indifference*. But when he is feeling the Charm of Poetry *so accompanied*, let him be angry (if he can) with that which serves only to interest him *more feelingly* in the Subject, and support him in a *stronger* and *more earnest* Attention; which enforces, by its Aid, the several Ideas of the Poem, and gives them to his Imagination with unusual Strength and Grandeur. He cannot surely but confess, that he is a *Gainer in the Exchange*, when he *barters* the want of a single Probability, that of *Pronunciation* (a thing merely arbitrary and every where different) for a *noble Heightening of Affections* which are suitable to the Occasion, and enable him to enter into the Subject with double *Energy* and *Enjoyment*.

Ch. VI.

§ 3. FROM what has been said it is evident, that these two Arts can never be so powerful *singly*, as when they are *properly united*. For *Poetry*, when alone, must be necessarily forced to *waste* many of its richest *Ideas*, in the mere raising of Affections, when, to have been properly relished, it should have *found* those Affections in their highest Energy. And *Musick*, when alone, can only raise *Affections*, which soon *languish* and *decay*, if not maintained and fed by the nutritive Images of Poetry. Yet must it be remembered, in this Union, that *Poetry* ever have the *Precedence*; its * *Utility*, as well as *Dignity*, being by far the more considerable.

§ 4. AND thus much, for the present, as to † MUSIC, PAINTING, and POETRY, the

* Ch. V. § 2. p. 83.

† P. 55.

PAINTING, *and* POETRY.

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the Circumstances, in which they *agree*, Ch. VI.
and in which they *differ*; and the PRE-
FERENCE, DUE TO ONE OF THEM ABOVE
THE OTHER TWO.

The E N D.

TREATISE THE THIRD:

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,
A DIALOGUE.


PART THE FIRST.

J. H. to F. S.

NATURE seems to treat Man, Part I.
as a painter would his disciple,
to whom he commits the out-
lines of a Figure lightly sketched, which
the Scholar for himself is to colour and
complete. Thus from Nature we derive
Senses, and Passions, and an Intellect,
which each of us *for himself* has to model
into a Character. And hence (the reverse

x

of



Part I. of every Species beside) Human Characters alone are infinitely various; as various indeed, as there are Individuals to form them. Hence too, the great Diversity of Systems, and of Doctrines, respecting the Laws and Rules, and Conduct of Human Life.

It is in the History of these, my Friend, you have so successfully employed yourself. You have been studious to know, not so much what *Greeks, Romans, or Barbarians* have *done*; as what they have *reasoned*, and what they have *taught*. Not an Epicure has more Joy in the Memory of a delicious Banquet, than I feel in recollecting, what we have discoursed on these Subjects.

AND here you cannot forget (for we were both unanimous) the Contempt, in which we held those superficial Censurers, who profess to refute, what they want even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the Faith of their own Boasting (could that be credited)

credited) Sentiments are exposed, Opinions demolished, and the whole Wisdom of Antiquity lies vanquished at their Feet. Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage, they can with ease dispatch a Lion, or discomfit a whole Legion. But alas! were they to encounter, not the Shadow, but the Substance, what think you would be the Event then?—Little better, I fear, than was the Fortune of poor *Priam*, when the feeble Old Man durst attack the Youthful *Pyrrhus*.

—— * *Telum imbelle sine ictu*

Conjecit: rauco quod protenus ære repulsum.

Et summo Clypei nequicquam umbone pendit.

AMONG the many long exploded and obsolete Systems, there was one, you may remember, for which I professed a great Esteem. Not in the least degree convinced by all I had heard against it, I durst

• *Æneid.* l. 2. vers. 544.

*1 Allusion to the Cardinal
Virtue*

Part I. durst venture to affirm, that no System was more *plausible*; that grant but its *Principles*, and the *rest followed of course*; that none approached nearer to the *Perfection of our own RELIGION*, as I could prove, were there occasion, by *Authority not to be controverted*. As you, I knew, were the Favourer of an Hypothesis somewhat † *different*; so I attempted to support my own, by reciting you a certain Dialogue. Not succeeding however so happily in the Recollection, as I could wish, I have since endeavoured to transcribe, what at that time I would have rehearsed. The result of my Labour is the following Narrative, which I commit with Confidence to your Friendship and Candour.

§ 2. IT was at a time, when a certain Friend, whom I highly value, was my Guest. We had been sitting together,
enter-

† *Viz.* the PLATONIC.

entertaining ourselves with *Shakespear*. Part I.

Among many of his Characters, we had looked into that of *Woolsey*. How soon, says my Friend, does the Cardinal in Disgrace abjure that Happiness, which he was lately so fond of? Scarcely out of Office, but he begins to exclaim

**Vain Pomp and Glory of the World! I hate ye.*

So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary with the Season; and that in Adversity we are of one Mind, in Prosperity, of another.

As for his mean Opinion, said I, of Human Happiness, it is a Truth, which small Reflection might have taught him long before. There seems little need of Distress to inform us of this. I rather commend the seeming Wisdom of that † Eastern Monarch, who in the Affluence of Prosperity, when he was proving every Pleasure, was yet so sensible of their Emptiness, their Insufficiency to make him happy, that he
pro-

* SHAKESPEAR's *Henry the Eighth*.

† *Tusc. Disp.* v. 7.

Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who should invent a new Delight. The Reward indeed was proclaimed, but the Delight was not to be found. If by Delight, said he, you mean some *Good; something conducive to real Happiness*; it might have been found perhaps, and yet not hit the Monarch's Fancy.

Is that, said I, possible? It is possible, replied he, tho' it had been *the Sovereign Good itself*—And indeed what wonder? Is it probable that such a Mortal, as an Eastern Monarch; such a pampered, flattered, idle Mortal; should have Attention, or Capacity to a Subject so delicate? A Subject, enough to exercise the Subtlest and most Acute?

WHAT then is it you esteem, said I, the *Sovereign Good* to be? It should seem, by your Representation, to be something very uncommon. Ask me not the Question, said he, you know not where it will carry us. Its *general Idea* indeed is easy and plain; but the *Detail of Particulars* is perplexed

perplexed and long—Passions, and Opinions for ever thwart us——a Paradox Part I.

appears in almost every Advance. Besides, did our Inquiries succeed ever so happily, the very Subject itself is always enough to give me Pain.

That, replied I, seems a Paradox indeed.

It is not, said he, from any Prejudice, which I have conceived against it; for to Man I esteem it the noblest in the World. Nor is it for being a Subject, to which my Genius does not lead me; for no Subject at all times has more employed my Attention. But the Truth is, I can scarce ever think on it but an unlucky Story still occurs to my Mind. “A certain Star-gazer, with his
“ Telescope was once viewing the Moon;
“ and describing her Seas, her Mountains,
“ and her Territories. Says a Clown to
“ his Companion, *Let him spy what he*
“ *pleases; we are as near to the Moon, as*
“ *he and all his Brethren.*” So fares it
alas! with these, our moral Speculations.
Practice too often creeps, where Theory
can soar. The *Philosopher* proves as weak,

I

as

*I wonder with your Opinion
of it!*

B Part I. as those, *whom he most contemns*. A mortifying Thought to such as well attend it.

Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your *general Idea of the Sovereign Good*. This is easy from your own Account, however intricate the Detail.

B Thus then, said he, since you are so urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS US HAPPY.

And how, said I, do we possess it? Is it *Sensual*, or *Intellectual*? There you are entering, said he, upon the *Detail*. This is beyond your Question. Not

a small Advance, said I, to indulge poor Curiosity? Will you raise me a Thirst, and be so cruel not to allay it? It is not, replied he, of my raising, but your own. Besides I am not certain, should I attempt to proceed, whether you will admit such

B 2 *Authorities*, as it is possible I may vouch.

That, said I, must be determined
2 by their Weight, and Character. Suppose,

pose, said he, it should be MANKIND; Part I.
 the *whole Human Race*. Would you not
 think it something strange, to seek of *those*
 concerning Good, who pursue it a *thou-*
sand Ways, and many of them *contra-*
dictory? I confess, said I, it seems so.

And yet, continued he, were there
 a Point, in which such *Dissentients* ever
 agreed, this *Agreement* would be no mean
Argument in favour of its *Truth* and *Just-*
ness.

But where, replied I, is this
 Agreement to be found?

HE answered me by asking, What if
 it should appear, that there were certain
 ORIGINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRE-
 CONCEPTIONS OF GOOD, *which were NA-*
TURAL, UNIFORM AND COMMON TO ALL
MEN; which all recognized in their various
Pursuits; and that the Difference lay only
 IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS?

This requires, said I, to be
 illustrated.

As if, continued he, a
 Company of Travellers, in some wide
 Forest, were all intending for one City,

I 2

but

/ Solomon does this

Part I. but each by a Route peculiar to himself.

The Roads indeed would be *various*, and many perhaps *false*; but all who travelled, would have *one End in view*. It is

evident, said I, they would. So fares it then, added he, with Mankind in pursuit of *Good*. The Ways indeed are *Many*, but what they seek is *ONE*.

FOR instance: Did you ever hear of any, who in pursuit of their *Good*, were for living the Life of a Bird, an Insect, or a Fish? None. And why not?

It would be inconsistent, answered I, with their Nature. You see then,

said he, they *all agree* in this—that what they pursue, ought to be *consistent*, and *agreeable to their proper Nature*. So

ought it, said I, undoubtedly. If so,

I continued he, one *Pre-conception* is discovered, which is *common to Good in general*—It is, that *all Good is supposed something agreeable to Nature*. This indeed, replied I, seems to be agreed on all hands.

*1 Your Principle of the Car. BUT
Mortal Fortunes is not agreeable
to Nature*

BUT again, said he,——Is there a Man Part I.
 scarcely to be found of a Temper so truly
 mortified, as to acquiesce in the *lowest*, and
shortest Necessaries of Life? Who aims not,
 if he be able, at something *farther*, some-
 thing *better*? I replied, Scarcely one.

Do not Multitudes pursue, said he,
infinite Objects of Desire, acknowledged,
 every one of them, to be in no respect
Necessaries?——Exquisite Viands, deli-
 cious Wines, splendid Apparel, curious Gar-
 dens; magnificent Apartments adorned with
 Pictures and Sculpture; Music and Poetry,
 and the whole Tribe of *Elegant Arts*?

It is evident, said I. If it be,
 continued he, it should seem that they *all*
 considered the *Chief or Sovereign Good*, not
 to be that, *which conduces to bare Existence*
or mere Being; for to this the *Necessaries*
alone are adequate. I replied they were.

But if not this, it must be somewhat
conducive to that, which is superior to mere
Being. It must. And what, con-
 tinued he, can this be, but *Well-Being*?

Part I. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in which *differing* Opinions paint it? Or can you suggest any thing else? I replied, I could not. Mark here, then, continued he, another *Pre-conception*, in which they *all* agree——the *Sovereign Good* is somewhat *conducive*, *not to mere Being*, but *to Well-Being*. I replied, it had so appeared.

· AGAIN, continued he. What labour, what expence, to procure those rarities, which our own poor country is unable to afford us? How is the world ransacked to its utmost Verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter?——Nay more——How do we baffle *Nature* herself; invert her Order; seek the Vegetables of Spring in the rigours of Winter, and Winter's Ice, during the heats of Summer? I replied, We did. And what disappointment, what remorse, when endeavours fail? It is true. If this then be evident, said he, it should seem, that whatever we desire as our *Chief* and

Sovereign Good, is something *which, as far* Part I.
as possible, we would accommodate to all Places
and Times. I answered, so it appeared.

See then, said he, another of its Cha- II
raacteristics, another Pre-conception.

BUT farther still——What contests for
Wealth? What scrambling for *Property?*
 What perils in the pursuit; what solicitude
 in the maintenance?—And why all this?
 To what *Purpose*, what *End?*—Or is not
 the reason plain? Is it not that *Wealth*
 may *continually* procure us, whatever we
 fancy *Good*; and make that *perpetual*,
 which would otherwise be *transient*?

I replied, it seemed so. Is it not far-
 ther desired, as *supplying us from ourselves*;
 when, without it, we must be beholden to
 the benevolence of *others*, and *depend on*
their caprice for all that we enjoy?

It is true, said I, this seems a reason.

AGAIN——Is not *Power* of every degree
 as much contested for, as *Wealth*? Are not
 magistracies, honours, principalities, and

Part I. empire, the subjects of strife, and everlasting contention? I replied, They were.

And why, said he, this? To obtain what End?—Is it not to *help* us, like wealth, to the *Possession of what we desire*? Is it not farther to *ascertain*, to *secure* our enjoyments; that when *others* would deprive us, we may be *strong enough to resist them*? I replied, it was.

OR to invert the whole—Why are there, who seek recesses the most distant and retired? fly courts and power, and submit to *Parcimony* and *Obscurity*? Why all this, but from the *same* intention? From an Opinion that *small* possessions, used moderately, are *permanent*—that *larger* possessions raise envy, and are more frequently *invaded*—that the *Safety of Power and Dignity is more precarious, than that of Retreat*; and that therefore they have chosen, what is *most eligible upon the whole*? It is not, said I, improbable, that they act by some such motive.

Do

Do you not see then, continued he, two Part I.
 or three more *Pre-conceptions* of the *Sove-*
reign Good, which are sought for by all, as
 essential to constitute it? And what,
 said I, are these? That it should
not be transient, nor *derived from the* III, IV,
Will of others, nor in their Power to take V,
away; but be *durable, self-derived*, and (if
 I may use the Expression) *indeprivable*.

I confess, said I, it appears so.
 But we have already found it to be con-
 sidered, as *something agreeable to our Nature*;
conducive, not to mere Being, but to *Well-*
Being; and what we aim to have *accommo-*
date to all Places and Times. We have.

THERE may be *other* Characteristics,
 said he, but these I think sufficient. See
 then its Idea; behold it, as collected from
 the *Original, Natural, and Universal Pre-*
conceptions of all Mankind. THE SOVE-
 REIGN GOOD, they have taught us, ought
 to be something—AGREEABLE TO OUR
 NATURE; CONDUCTIVE TO WELL-BEING;
 ACCOM-

B Part I. ACCOMMODATE TO ALL PLACES AND TIMES; DURABLE, SELF-DERIVED, AND INDEPRIVABLE. Your account, said I, appears just.

B IT matters, continued he, little, how they *err* in the *Application*—if they covet that as *agreeable to Nature*, which is in itself most *Contrary*—if they would have that as *Durable*, which is in itself most *Transient*—that as *Independent*, and their own, which is most precarious and *Servile*. It is enough for us, if we know their *Aim*—enough, if we can discover, what it is they propose—the *Means* and *Method* may be *absurd*, as it happens. I answered, their Aim was sufficient to prove what he had asserted.

IT is true, replied he, it is abundantly sufficient. And yet perhaps, even tho' this were ever so certain, it would not be altogether foreign, were we to examine, how they act; how they succeed in applying these *Universals* to *Particular Subjects*.

jects. Should they be found *just* in the Part I.

Application, we need look no farther——

The true *Sovereign Good* would of course be *Plain* and *Obvious*; and we should have no more to do, than to follow the beaten road.

It is granted, replied I. But what if they *err*?

Time enough for that, said he, when we are satisfied that they do. We ought first to inform ourselves, whether they may not possibly be in the right. I submitted, and begged him to proceed his own way.

§ 3. WILL you then, said he, in this disquisition into Human Conduct, allow me this——That such, as is the Species of Life, which every one *chooses*; such is his *Idea* of *Happiness*, such his *Conception* of the *Sovereign Good*?

I seem, said I, to comprehend You, but should be glad You would illustrate.

His Meaning, he answered, was no more than this——

If a Man prefer a Life of *Industry*, it is because he has an *Idea* of *Happiness* in *Wealth*; if he prefers a Life of *Gaiety*, it is from a

like

Part I. like *Idea* concerning *Pleasure*. And the same, we say, holds true in every other Instance. I told him, it must certainly,

AND can you recollect, said he, any Life, but what is a Life of *Business*, or of *Leisure*? I answered, None. And is not the great *End* of *Business* either *Power* or *Wealth*? It is. Must not every *Life* therefore of *Business* be either *Political* or *Lucrative*? It must.

Again—Are not *Intellect* and *Sense*, the *Soul's* leading *Powers*? They are.

And in *Leisure* are we not ever seeking, to gratify one or the other?

We are. Must not every *Life* therefore of *Leisure* be either *Pleasurable*, or *Contemplative*? If you confine *Pleasure*, said I, to *Sense*, I think it necessarily must.

If it be not so confined, said he, we confound all Inquiry. Allow it.

MARK then, said he, the two grand Genera, the LIVES of BUSINESS and of LEISURE

LEISURE———mark also the *subordinate* Part I.
Species; the POLITICAL and LUCRA-
TIVE, the CONTEMPLATIVE and
PLEASURABLE———Can you think of any
 other, which *these* will not include?

I replied, I knew of none. It is pos-
 sible indeed, said he, that there may be
other Lives framed, by the blending of
these, two or more of them together.
 But if we separate with accuracy, we
 shall find that here they all terminate.


I replied, so it seemed probable.

If then, continued he, we would be
exact in our Inquiry, we must examine
these four Lives, and mark their Conse-
quences. It is thus only we shall learn,
 how far those, who embrace them, find
 that *Good* and *Happiness*, which we know
 they all pursue.

I made answer, it
 seemed necessary, and I should willingly
 attend him.

§ 4. To begin then, said he, with the I
POLITICAL LIFE. Let us see the Good,
 usually

Part I. usually sought after here. To a *private Man*, it is the favour of some Prince, or Commonwealth; the honours and emoluments derived from this favour; the court and homage of mankind; the power of commanding others——To a *Prince*, it is the *same* thing nearly, only *greater in Degree*; a larger command; a stricter and more servile homage; glory, conquest, and extended empire——Am I right in my description? I replied, I thought he was. Whether then, said he, *all this* deserves the Name of *Good* or not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or the other, it affects not our Inquiry. All that I would ask concerning it, is this——Do you not think it a *Good* (if it really be one) *derived from Foreign and External Causes*? Undoubtedly, replied I. It cannot come then from *ourselves*, or be *self-derived*. It cannot. And what shall we say as to its *Duration* and *Stability*? Is it so *firm* and *lasting*, that we cannot be *deprived* of it? I should imagine, said I, quite otherwise. You insist not then,

then, said he, on my appealing to *History*. Part I.
 You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, 
 of Empires, and their Owners. I re-
 plied, I did.

IF so, said he, it should seem that this
Political Good, which they seek, corresponds
 not to the *Pre-conceptions* of being *Durable*,
 and *Indeprivable*. Far from it. But
 it appeared just before, not to be *self-de-*
rived. It did. You see then,
 said he, that *in three of our Pre-conceptions*
it intirely fails. So indeed, said I, it
 appears.

BUT farther, said he—We are told of
 this *Good*, that in the *Possession* it is attended
 with *Anxiety*; and that when *lost*, it is
 usually *lost* with *Ignominy* and *Disgrace*;
 nay, often with prosecutions and the bit-
 tereft resentments; with mulcts, with
 exile, and death itself. It is frequently,
 said I, the case. How then, said he,
 can it answer that other *Pre-conception*, of
contributing to our Well-Being? Can that
 contribute

Part I. contribute to *Well-Being*, whose *Consequences* lead to *Calamity*, and whose *Presence* implies *Anxiety*? This, it must be confessed, said I, appears not probable.

BUT once more, said he——There are certain *Habits* or *Dispositions of Mind*, called Sincerity, Generosity, Candour, Plain-dealing, Justice, Honour, Honesty, and the like. There are. And it has been generally believed, that these are agreeable to Nature. Assuredly.

But it has been as generally believed, that the *Political Good*, we speak of, is often not to be acquired but by *Habits*, contrary to these; and which, if these are Natural, must of necessity be unnatural. What

Habits, said I, do you mean? Flattery, answered he, Dissimulation, Intrigue: upon occasion, perhaps Iniquity, Falshood, and Fraud.

It is possible, indeed, said I, that these may sometimes be thought necessary.

How then, said he, can that Good be agreeable to Nature, which cannot be acquired, but by *Habits* contrary to Nature?

Nature?
seems just.

Your Argument, said I, Part I.

If then, said he, we have reasoned rightly, and our Conclusions may be depended on; it should seem that the SUPPOSED GOOD, which the POLITICAL LIFE pursues, corresponds not, in any Instance, to our Pre-conceptions of the SOVEREIGN GOOD.

I answered, So it appeared.

§ 5. LET us quit then, said he, the Political Life, and pass to the LUCRATIVE. The II
Object of this is WEALTH. Admit it.

And is it not too often, said he, the Case, that *to acquire this*, we are tempted to employ some of *those Habits*, which we have just condemned as *Unnatural*? Such, I mean, as Fraud, Falshood, Injustice, and the like? It must be owned, said I, too often.

BESIDES, continued he——What shall we say to the *Esteem*, the *Friendship*, and *Love of Mankind*? Are they worth having?

K

Is

Part I. Is it *agreeable*, think you, *to Nature*, to endeavour to *deserve* them? Agreeable, said I, to Nature, beyond dispute. If so, then to merit *Hatred* and *Contempt*, said he, must needs be *contrary to Nature*.

Undoubtedly. And is there any thing which so certainly merits *Hatred* and *Contempt*, as a mere *Lucrative Life*, spent in the uniform Pursuit of *Wealth*?

I replied, I believed there was nothing.

If so, said he, then as to *corresponding with our Pre-conceptions*, the *Lucrative Good*, in this respect, fares no better than the *Political*. It appears not.

AND what shall we say as to *Anxiety*? Is not both the *Possession* and *Pursuit* of Wealth, to those who really love it, ever *anxious*? It seems so. And why *anxious*, but from a Certainty of its *Instability*; from an Experience, how obnoxious it is to every cross Event; how easy to be lost and transferred to others, by the same Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to ourselves?—This is indeed the tritest of all

all Topics. The Poets and Orators have long ago exhausted it. It is true, said I, they have. May we not venture then, said he, upon the whole, to pass the *same* Sentence on the LUCRATIVE LIFE, as we have already on the *Political*—*that it proposes not A GOOD, correspondent to those Pre-conceptions, by which we would all be governed in THE GOOD, which we are all seeking?* I answered, we might justly.

§ 6. IF then neither the *Lucrative Life*, nor the *Political*, said he, procure that *Good* which we desire: shall we seek it from the PLEASURABLE? Shall we make PLEASURE our *Goddeſs*? III

——— *Pleasure,*
Whom Love attends, and soft Desire, and
Words
Alluring, apt the steadiest Heart to bend.

So says the Poet, and plausible his Doctrine. Plausible, said I, indeed.

K 2

LET

Part I.

LET it then, continued he, be a *pleasurable World*; a Race of *harmless, loving Animals*; an *Elysian Temperature* of Sunshine and Shade. Let the *Earth, in every Quarter*, resemble our own dear Country; where never was a Frost, never a Fog, never a Day, but was delicious and serene.

I was a little embarrassed at this unexpected Flight, 'till recollecting myself, I told him, (but still with some Surprise) that, in no degree to disparage either my Country or my Countrymen, I had never found Either so exquisite, as he now supposed them. There are then, it seems, said he, in the *Natural World*, and even in our own beloved Country, such Things as *Storms and Tempests*; as pinching *Colds*, and scorching *Heats*.

I replied, there were. And *consequent to these, Disease, and Famine, and infinite Calamities*. There are.

And in the *Civil or Human World*, we have *Discord and Contention*; or (as the Poet

Poet better * describes it)

Part I.

*Cruel Revenge, and rancorous Despise,
Disloyal Treason, and heart-burning Hate.*

We have. Alas! then, poor
Pleasure! Where is that Good, accommo-
date to every Time; suited to every Place;
self-derived, not dependent on Foreign Ex-
ternal Causes? Can it be PLEASURE, on
such a *changeable*, such a *turbulent Spot*, as
this? I replied, I thought not.

AND what indeed, were the *World*,
said he, modelled to a *Temperature the most
exact?* Were the Rigours of the Seasons
never more to be known; nor Wars, De-
vastations, Famines, or Diseases? Admit-
ting all this, (which we know to be im-
possible) can we find still in *Pleasure* that
lengthened Duration, which we consider as
an Essential, to constitute the Sovereign
Good?—Ask the Glutton, the Drinker,

K 3

the

* SPENCER'S *Fairy Queen*, B. 2. Cant. 7. Stanz. 22.


Part I. the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether they know any *Enjoyment*, not to be cancelled by *Satiety*? Which does not hastily pass away into the tedious Intervals of *Indifference*?——Or yielding all this too, (which we know *cannot be yielded*) where are we to find our *Good*, how possess it in *Age*? In that Eve of Life, declining Age, when *the Power of Sense, on which all depends*, like the setting Sun, is *gradually forsaking us*?

I SHOULD imagine, said I, that *Pleasure* was no mean Adversary, since you employ, in attacking her, so much of your *Rhetoric*. Without heeding what I said, he pursued his Subject——Beside, if this be our *Good*, our *Happiness*, and our *End*; to what purpose *Powers*, which bear no *Relation* to it?——Why *Memory*? Why *Reason*? *Mere Sensation* might have been as exquisite, had we been Flies or Earth-worms——Or can it be proved otherwise?

I replied, I could not say. *No Animal, continued he, possesses its Faculties in vain.*

vain. And shall Man derive no Good Part I.
 from his *best*, his most *eminent*? From
 That, which of all is *peculiar* to himself?
 For as to *Growth* and *Nutrition*, they are
 not wanting to the meanest *Vegetable*; and
 for *Senses*, there are *Animals*, which per-
 haps *exceed us* in them all.

§ 7. THIS seems, said I, no mean Ar-
 gument in favour of CONTEMPLATION. IV
 The CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE gives *Reason*
 all the Scope, which it can desire. And
 of all Lives, answered he, would it surely
 be the best, did we dwell, like *Milton's*
Uriel, in the *Sun's bright Circle*. Then
 might we plan indeed the most *Romantic*
Kind of Happiness. Stretched at Ease,
 without Trouble or Molestation, we might
 pass our Days, *contemplating* the Uni-
 verse; tracing its Beauty; lost in Wonder;
 ravished with Ecstasy, and I know not
 what—But here alas! on this *sublunary*,
 this *turbulent* Spot, (as we called it not
 long since) how little is this, or any thing
 like it, *practicable*?—Fogs arise, which

Part I.  dim our Prospects—the *Cares of Life* perpetually molest us—Is *Contemplation* suited to a Place, like this? It must be owned, said I, not extremely. How then is it the *Sovereign Good*, which should be *Accommodate to every Place*? I replied, it seemed not probable.

BUT farther, said he——Can we enjoy the *Sovereign Good*, and be at the same time *vexed, and agitated by Passion*? Does not this seem a Paradox? I answered, it did. Suppose then an *Event* were to happen—not an *Inundation*, or *Massacre*—but an Acquaintance only drop a *disrespectful Word*; a Servant chance to break a *favourite Piece of Furniture*—What would instruct us to indure this?——*Contemplation*, Theory, Abstractions? Why not, said I? No, replied he with Warmth, (quoting the Poet) not

———* *Tho' all the Stars*
Thou know'st by Name; and all the Etherial
Powers. For

* *Par. Loss*, B. 12. ver. 576.

For does not *Experience* teach us, abundantly teach us, that our deepest Philosophers, as to *Temper and Behaviour*, are as very *Children* for the most part, as the meanest and most illiterate? A little more Arrogance perhaps, from Presumption of what they know, but not a grain more of *Magnanimity*, of *Candour* and *calm Indurance*.

You are somewhat too severe, said I, in censuring of all. There are better and worse among Them, as among Others.

The *Difference* is no way *proportioned*, said he, to the *Quantity of their Knowledge*; so that whatever be its Cause, it can't be imputed to their *Speculations*.— Besides, can you really imagine, we came here only to *Think*? Is *Acting* a Circumstance, which is *foreign to our Character*? — Why then so many *Social Affections*, which all of us feel, even in *spite of ourselves*? Are we to suppress them All, as *useless and unnatural*? The Attempt, replied I, must needs be found impracticable.

Great allowance for a Stoic!

Part I.

cable. Were they once *suppressed*, said he, the Consequences would be somewhat strange. We should hear no more of Father, Brother, Husband, Son, Citizen, Magistrate, and *Society itself*. And were this ever the Case, ill (I fear) would it fare with even *Contemplation* itself. It would certainly be but bad *Speculating*, among lawless Barbarians——Unassociated Animals——where *Strength* alone of *Body* was to constitute *Dominion*, and the Contest came to be (as * *Horace* describes it)

——*glandem atque cubilia propter,
Unguibus & pugnīs, dein fustibus*——

Bad enough, replied I, of all conscience.

IT should seem then, said he, that not even the BEST CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE, however noble its *Object*, was AGREEABLE TO OUR PRESENT NATURE, or *consistent with*

* Sat. 3. l. 1. ver. 99.

with our present Situation. I confess, Part I.

said I, you appear to have proved so.

But if this be allowed true of the *Best*,
the most *Excellent*; what shall we say to
the Mockery of *Monkery*; the Farce of *209*
Friars; the ridiculous Mummery of being
sequestered in a *Cloyster*? This surely is too
low a Thing, even to merit an Examina-
tion.

I have no Scruples here, said I,
you need not waste your Time.

§ 8. IF that, said he, be your Opinion,
let us look a little backward. For our
memory's sake it may be proper to reca-
pitulate. I replied, it would be highly
acceptable.

Thus then, said he—

We have examined the *four grand Lives*,
which we find the Generality of Men em-
brace; the *Lucrative*, and the *Political*;
the *Pleasurable*, and the *Contemplative*.

And we have aimed at proving that—

to such a Being as MAN, with such a Body,
such Affections, such Senses, and such an In-
telleſt—placed in such a WORLD, ſubject
to ſuch Incidents—not one of theſe LIVES is

pro-

Part I. productive of that GOOD, which we find all Men to recognize thro' the same uniform PRE-CONCEPTIONS; and which thro' one or other of these Lives they all of them pursue.

§ 9. You have justly, said I, collected the Sum of your Inquiries. And

happy, said he, should I think it, were they to terminate here. I asked him,

Why? Because, replied he, to in-

sinuate first, that *all Mankind* are in the wrong; and then to attempt afterwards, to shew *one's self* only to be right; is a Degree of Arrogance, which I would not willingly be guilty of. I ventured here

to say, That I thought he need not be so diffident—that a Subject, where *one's own Interest* appeared concerned so *nearly*, would well justify every *Scruple*, and even the severest *Inquiry*. There, said he,

you say something—there you encourage me indeed. For what;—Are we not cautioned against *Counterfeits*, even in Matters of meanest Value? If a Piece of Metal be tendered us, which seems doubtful, do

we

we not hesitate? Do we not try it by the *Test*, before we take it for *Current*?—And is not this deemed *Prudence*? Are we not censured, if we act otherwise?—How much more then does it behove us not to be imposed on *here*? To be diffident and scrupulously exact, where *Imposture*, if once admitted, may tempt us to far worse Bargain, than ever *Glaucus* made with *Diomed*?

What Bargain, said I, do you mean?

The Exchange, replied he, not of *Gold* for *Brass*, but of *Good* for *Evil*, and of *Happiness* for *Misery*—But enough of this, since you have encouraged me to proceed—We are seeking that *Good*, which we think *others* have not found. Permit me thus to pursue my Subject.

§ 10. EVERY Being on this our *Terrestrial Dwelling*, exists *encompassed with infinite Objects*; exists among Animals *tame*, and Animals *wild*; among Plants and Vegetables of a thousand *different Qualities*, among Heats and Colds, Tempests and Calms, the Friendships and Discords of
betero-

Part I. *heterogeneous Elements*—What say you?

Are all these Things exactly the *same* to it; or do they *differ*, think you in their *Effects* and *Consequences*?

They differ, said I, widely.

Some perhaps then, said he, are *Apt, Congruous, and Agreeable to its Natural State*.

I replied, they were.

Others are *In-apt, Incongruous, and Disagreeable*.


They are.

And others again are *Indifferent*. They are.

IT should seem then, said he, if this be allowed, that *to every individual Being, without the least Exception, the whole Mass of things External, from the greatest to the meanest, stood in the Relations of either Agreeable, Disagreeable, or Indifferent*.

I replied, so it appeared.

BUT tho' this, continued he, be true *in the general*, it is yet as certain when we descend to Particulars, that what is *Agreeable to one Species* is *Disagreeable to another*; and not only so, but perhaps *Indifferent to*

a *third*. Instances of this kind, he said, Part I. were too obvious to be mentioned. 

I REPLIED, it was evident. Whence then, said he, this *Diversity*?—It cannot arise from the Externals—for Water is *equally Water*, whether to a *Man*, or to a *Fish*; whether, operating on the one, it *suffocate*, or on the other, it *give Life and Vigour*.

I replied, it was. So is Fire, said he, the *same Fire*, however *various* in its Consequences; whether it *harden* or *soften*, give *Pleasure* or *Pain*.

I replied, it was. But if this *Diversity*, continued he, be not derived from the *Externals*, whence can it be else?—Or can it possibly be derived otherwise than from the *péculiar Constitution*, from the *Natural State* of every Species itself?

I replied, it appeared probable.

THUS then, said he, is it that *Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all things in the Universe*—that *as Things vary their Relations to it, they*
vary

Part I.

B

vary too in their Value——and that if their Value be ever doubtful, it can no way be adjusted, but by recurring with Accuracy to the Natural State of the Species, and to those several Relations, which such a State of course creates. I answered, he argued justly.

B

§ 11. To proceed then, said he—Tho' it be true, that every Species has a *Natural State*, as we have asserted; it is not true, that every Species has a *Sense* or *Feeling* of it. This Feeling or Sense is a *Natural Eminence* or *Prerogative*, denied the *Vegetable* and *Inanimate*, and imparted only to the *Animal*. I answered, it was.

B

AND think you, continued he, that as many as have this *Sense* or *Feeling* of a Natural State, are *alienated* from it, or *indifferent* to it? Or is it not more probable, that they are *well-affected* to it?

Experience, said I, teaches us, how well they are all affected. You are right, replied he. For what would be more absurd,

absurd, than to be *indifferent* to their own *Welfare*; or to be *alienated* from it, as tho' it was *Foreign* and *Unnatural*? I replied, Nothing could be more.

But, continued he, if they are *well-affected* to this their proper *Natural State*, it should seem too they must be *well-affected* to all those *Externals*, which appear *apt, congruous, and agreeable* to it.

I answered, They must.

And if so, then *ill-affected* or *averse* to such, as appear the *contrary*.

They must. And to such as appear *indifferent, indifferent*.

They must.


But if this, said he, be allowed, it will follow, that in consequence of these *Appearances*, they will think some *Externals* worthy of *Pursuit*; some worthy of *Avoidance*; and some worthy of *neither*.

It was probable, said I, they should.

HENCE then, said he, *another Division* of Things *external*; that is, into *Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent*—a Division only belonging to Beings Sensitive and Animate, because all, *below these*, can neither avoid


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nor

 Part I. *nor pursue.*
 not.

I replied, They could

 If, then, said he, *Man* be allowed in the Number of these *Sensitive* Beings, this Division will affect MAN—or to explain more fully, *the whole Mass of Things external will, according to this Division, exist to the Human Species in the Relations of Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indifferent.* I replied, They would.

 SHOULD we therefore desire, said he, to know what these things truly are, we must first be informed, what is MAN's truly NATURAL CONSTITUTION. For thus, you may remember, it was settled not long since—that *every Species was its own Standard, and that when the Value of Things was doubtful, the Species was to be studied; the Relations to be deduced, which were consequent to it; and in this manner the Value of Things to be adjusted and ascertained.* I replied, We had so agreed it.

I fear then, said he, we are engaged

gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, a Part I.
 Task of more difficulty, than we were at
 first aware of—But *Fortuna Fortes*—we
 must endeavour to acquit ourselves as well
 as we are able.

§ 12. THAT MAN therefore has a
Body, of a Figure and internal Structure
peculiar to itself; capable of certain De-
 grees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the
 like; this I believe is evident, and hardly
 wants a Proof.

I answered, I was
 willing to own it. That he is capable
 too of *Pleasure* and *Pain*; is possessed of
Senses, Affections, Appetites, and Aversions;
 this also seems evident, and can scarcely be
 denied.

I replied, it was admitted.

We may venture then to range HIM
in the Tribe of ANIMAL BEINGS.

I replied, We might.

AND think you, said he, without *Society*,
 you or any Man could have been *born*?

Most certainly not. Without
Society, when born, could you have been

Part I. *brought to Maturity?* Most certainly not.

Vid.
Jambl.
Protrept.
56.

Had your Parents then had no *Social Affections* towards you in that *perilous* State, that *tedious* Infancy, (so much longer than the *longest* of *other* Animals) you must have inevitably perished thro' Want and Inability. I must. You perceive then that to *Society* you, and every Man are indebted, not only for the *Beginning of Being*, but for the *Continuance*. We are.

SUPPOSE then we pass from this *Birth* and *Infancy* of Man, to his *Maturity* and *Perfection*—Is there *any Age*, think you, so *self-sufficient*, as that in it he feels no *Wants*? What Wants, answered I, do you mean? In the first and principal place, said he, that of *Food*; then perhaps that of *Raiment*; and after this, a *Dwelling*, or Defence against the Weather. These Wants, replied I, are surely Natural at all Ages. And is it not agreeable to *Nature*, said he, that they should at *all Ages* be supplied? As-

uredly.

furedly. And is it not *more* agreeable Part I.
to have them *well* supplied, than *ill*?

It is. And *most* agreeable, to have
them *best* supplied? Certainly.

If there be then any *one* State, *better than*
all others, for the supplying these *Wants*;
this State, of all others, must needs be most
Natural. It must.

AND what *Supply*, said he, of these
Wants, shall we esteem the *meanest*, which
we can conceive?—Would it not be some-
thing like this? Had we nothing beyond
Acorns for *Food*; beyond a rude Skin, for
Raiment; or beyond a Cavern, or hollow
Tree, to provide us with a *Dwelling*?
Indeed, said I, this would be bad enough.

And do you not imagine, *as far as*
this, we might *each* supply *ourselves*, tho'
we lived in Woods, mere solitary Savages?

I replied, I thought we might.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, that our
Supplies were to be mended—for instance,
that we were to exchange Acorns for

Part I. Bread—Would our *Savage* Character be sufficient *here*? Must we not be a little better disciplined; Would not some Art be requisite?—The *Baker's*, for example,

It would. And *previously* to the *Baker's* that of the *Miller's*? It would. And *previously* to the *Miller's* that of the *Husbandman's*? It would

Three Arts then appear *necessary*, even upon the *lowest* Estimation. It is admitted.

BUT a Question farther, said he—Can the *Husbandman* work, think you, without his *Tools*? Must he not have his *Plough*, his *Harrow*, his *Reap-hook*, and the like? He must. And must not those other Artists too be furnished in the same manner? They must. And whence must they be furnished? From *their own Arts*?—Or are not the *making Tools*, and the *using* them, two different Occupations? I believe, said I, they are. You may be convinced, continued he, by small Recollection. Does *Agriculture*

ture make its own Plough, its own Harrow? Part I.
Or does it not apply to *other Arts*, for all
Necessaries of this kind? It does.


Again——Does the Baker build *his own*
Oven; or the Miller frame *his own* Mill?

It appears, said I, no part of their
Business.

WHAT a *Tribe* of Mechanics then, said
he, are advancing upon us?—Smiths, Car-
penters, Masons, Mill-wrights——and all
these to provide the *single Necessary of*
Bread. Not less than *seven or eight Arts*,
we find, are wanting at the *fewest*. It
appears so. And what if to the pro-
viding a *comfortable Cottage*, and *Raiment*
suitable to an industrious Hind, we allow a
dozen Arts more? It would be easy, by
the same Reasoning, to prove the Number
double. I admit the Number, said I,
mentioned.

If so, continued he, it should seem, that
towards a tolerable Supply of the three Pri-
mary and Common Necessaries, Food, Raiment,

 Part I. *and a Dwelling, not less than twenty Arts were, on the lowest Account, requisite. It appears so.*

 AND is one Man equal, think you, to the *Exercise of these twenty Arts*? If he had even *Genius*, which we can scarce imagine, is it possible he should find *Leisure*?

I replied, I thought not. If so, then a *solitary, unsocial State* can never supply tolerably the common *Necessaries of Life*. It cannot.

 BUT what if we pass from the *Necessaries of Life*, to the *Elegancies*? To Music, Sculpture, Painting, and Poetry?—What if we pass from all *Arts* whether *Necessary* or *Elegant*, to the large and various Tribe of *Sciences*? To Logic, Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics?—Can one Man, imagine you, master all this? Absurd, said I, impossible. And yet in *this Cycle of Sciences and Arts*, seem included all the *Comforts*, as well as *Ornaments of Life*; included all conducive, either to *Being*, or to *Well-Being*.
It

It must be confessed, said I, it has Part I.
the Appearance.

WHAT then, said he, must be done?
In what manner must we be supplied?

I answered, I knew not, unless we made a *Distribution*—Let one exercise *one Art*; and another a *different*—Let this Man study *such* a Science; and that Man, *another*—Thus the whole *Cycle* (as you call it) may be carried easily into Perfection.

It is true, said he, it may; and every Individual, *as far as his own Art or Science*, might be supplied *completely*, and as well as he could wish. But what avails a Supply in a *single* Instance? What in this case are to become of all his *numerous other Wants*? You conceive, replied I, what I would have said, but partially. My Meaning was, that *Artist trade with Artist*; each supply where he is *deficient*, by exchanging where he *abounds*; so that a *Portion of every thing may be dispersed throughout all*. You intend then a *State*,
said

B Part I. said he, of *Commutation* and *Traffic*.
 I replied, I did.

B If so, continued he, I see a new Face of things. The Savages, with thair Skins and their Caverns, disappear. In their place I behold a fair *Community* rising. No longer Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is *Social*, *Civil*, and *Cultivated*—And can we doubt any farther, whether *Society* be *Natural*? Is not this evidently the *State*, which can best supply the *Primary Wants*? It has appeared so.

And did we not agree some time since, that this *State*, whatever we found it, would be certainly of all others the most agreeable to our *Nature*? We did.

And have we not added, since this, to the Weight of our Argument, by passing from the *Necessary Arts* to the *Elegant*; from the *Elegant* to the *Sciences*?

We have. The more, said he, we consider, the more shall we be convinced, that *All these*, the noblest Honours and Ornaments of the Human Mind, without that *Leisure*, that *Experience*, that *Emulation*,

lation, that *Reward*, which the *Social State* alone we know is able to provide them, could never have found *Existence*, or been in the least recognized. Indeed, said I, I believe not, Part I.

LET it not be forgot then, said he, in favour of *Society*, that to it we owe, not only the *Beginning* and *Continuation*, but the *Well-being*, and (if I may use the Expression) the very *Elegance and Rationality of our Existence.* I answered, It appeared evident.

AND what then? continued he.—If *Society* be thus agreeable to our *Nature*, is there nothing, think you, *within* us, to excite and lead us to it? No *Impulse*, no *Preparation of Faculties*? It would be strange, answered I, if there should not.

It would be a singular *Exception*, said he, with respect to all other *herding* Species—Let us however examine—Pity, Benevolence, Friendship, Love; the general Dislike of Solitude, and Desire of Com-

*

pany;

Part I. pany; are they Natural Affections, which come of themselves; or are they taught us by Art, like Music and Arithmetic?

I should think, replied I, they were *Natural*, because in every Degree of Men some Traces of them may be discovered.

And are not the Powers and Capacities of *Speech*, said he, the same? Are not all Men *naturally* formed, to express their *Sentiments* by some kind of *Language*? I replied, They were,

If then, said he, these several *Powers*, and *Dispositions* are *Natural*, so should seem too their *Exercise*. Admit it. And if their *Exercise*, then so too that *State*, where alone they can be exercised. Admit it. And what is this *State*, but the *Social*? Or where else is it possible to converse, or use our *Speech*; to exhibit Actions of Pity, Benevolence, Friendship or Love; to relieve our *Aversion to Solitude*, or gratify our *Desire of being with others*? I replied, It could be no where else.

You

You see then, continued he, a *Preparation of Faculties* is not wanting. We are fitted with Powers and Dispositions, which have only Relation to *Society*; and which, out of Society, *can no where else be exercised*.

I replied, it was evident. You have seen too the *superior Advantages* of the *Social State*, above all others. I have.

LET this then be remembered, said he, throughout all our future Reasonings, remembered as a first Principle in our *Ideas of Humanity*, that *MAN by Nature is truly a SOCIAL ANIMAL*. I promised it should.

§ 13. LET us now, said he, examine, what farther we can learn concerning Him. As *Social* indeed, He is distinguished from the *Solitary* and *Savage Species*; but in no degree from the rest, of a *milder* and *more friendly* Nature. It is true, replied I, He is not. Does He then differ no more from these

Part I.

B

B

B

B

Part I.

these several *Social* Species, than they, each of them, differ *from one another*? Must we range them *all*, and *Man* among the rest, under the same *common* and *general Genus*?

I see no Foundation, said I, for making a Distinction.

PERHAPS, said he, there may be none; and it is possible too there may. Consider a little—Do you not observe in all *other* Species, a *Similarity among Individuals*? a surprizing *Likeness*, which runs thro' each *Particular*? In one Species they are all *Bold*; in another, all *Timorous*; in one all *Ravenous*; in another, all *Gentle*. In the Bird-kind only, what a *Uniformity of Voice*, in each Species, as to their notes; of *Architecture*, as to building their Nests; of *Food*, both for themselves, and for supporting their Young? It is true, said I.

And do you observe, continued he, the *same Similarity among Men*? Are these all as *Uniform*, as to their *Sentiments* and *Actions*? I replied, by no means.

ONE

ONE Question more, said he, as to the Character of Brutes, if I may be allowed the Expression—Are *these*, think you, *what we behold them*, by *Nature* or *otherwise*? Part I.

Explain, said I, your Question, for I do not well conceive you. I mean, replied he, is it by *Nature* that the Swallow builds her Nest, and performs all the Offices of her Kind: Or is she taught by *Art*, by *Discipline*, or *Custom*? She acts, replied I, by *pure Nature* undoubtedly.

And is not the *same* true, said he, of *every other* Bird and Beast in the Universe?

It is. No wonder then, continued he, as they have so *wise* a Governess, that a *uniform Rule of Action* is provided for each Species. For what can be more worthy the Wisdom of *Nature*, than *ever to the same Substances to give the same Law*? It appears, said I, reasonable.

BUT what, continued he, shall we say as to Man? Is He too actuated by *Nature purely*? I answered, Why not?

IF

Part I. If He be, replied he, it is strange in *Nature* that with respect to *Man alone*, she should follow so *different* a Conduct. The Particulars in other Species, we agree, she renders *Uniform*; but in *Our's*, every *Particular* seems a sort of *Model by himself*. If Nature, said I, do not actuate us, what can we suppose else? Are *Local Customs*, said he, *Nature*? Are the *Polities* and *Religions* of particular Nations, *Nature*? Are the *Examples* which are set before us; the *Preceptors* who instruct us; the *Company and Friends*, with whom we converse, all *Nature*?

No surely, said I. And yet, said he, it is evident that by these, and a thousand *incidental* Circumstances, equally *foreign* to Nature, our Actions, and Manners, and Characters are adjusted. Who then can imagine, we are actuated by *Nature only*?

I confess, said I, it appears contrary.

You see then, said he, one remarkable Distinction between *Man* and *Brutes* in general—In the *Brute*, *Nature* does all; in *Man*,

Man, but Part only.
said I.

It is evident, Part I.

BUT farther, continued he—Let us consider the *Powers* or *Faculties*, possessed by each—Suppose I was willing to give a *Brute* the *same Instruction* which we give a *Man*. A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might arrive to some small Degree of *Mimicry*; but do you think, upon the whole, they would be much *profited* or *altered*?

I replied, I thought not. And do you perceive the *same*, said he, with respect to *Man*? Or does not Experience shew us the very reverse? Is not Education capable of moulding us into any thing——of making us greatly *Good*, or greatly *Bad*; greatly *Wise*, or greatly *Absurd*? The Fact, said I, is indisputable.

MARK then, said he, the Difference between Human Powers and Brutal—The Leading Principle of BRUTES appears to tend in each Species to *one single Purpose*—to this, in general, it *uniformly arrives*; and
M here,

Part I. here, in general, it as *uniformly stops*—it needs no *Precepts* or *Discipline* to instruct it; nor will it easily be *changed*, or *admit a different Direction*. On the contrary, the Leading Principle of MAN is capable of *infinite Directions*—is convertible to *all sorts of Purposes*—equal to *all sorts of Subjects*—neglected, remains ignorant, and void of every Perfection——cultivated, becomes adorned with *Sciences* and *Arts*—can raise us to excel, not only *Brutes*, but *our own Kind*—with respect to our *other Powers* and *Faculties*, can instruct us how to *use* them, as well as *those* of the *various Natures*, which we see existing around us. In a word, to oppose the two Principles to each other—The Leading Principle of *Man*, is *Multiform, Originally Uninstructed, Pliant* and *Docil*—the Leading Principle of *Brutes* is *Uniform, Originally Instructed*; but, in most Instances afterward, *Inflexible* and *Indocil*——Or does not Experience plainly shew, and confirm the Truth of what we assert? I made answer, it did.

You

You allow then, said he, the *Human* Part I. Principle, and the *Brutal*, to be things of different Idea. Undoubtedly. Do they not each then deserve a different Appellation? I should think so. Suppose therefore we call the *Human Principle* REASON; and the *Brutal*, INSTINCT: would you object to the Terms? I replied, I should not. If not, continued he, then *Reason being peculiar to Man*, of all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may we not affirm of Him, by way of Distinction, that He is a *Rational Animal*? I replied, We might justly.

LET this too then be remembered, said he, in the Course of our Inquiry, that MAN is by Nature a RATIONAL ANIMAL. I promised it should.

§ 14. IN consequence of this, said he, as often as there is Occasion, I shall appeal as well to *Reason*, as to *Nature*, for a Standard.

What, said I, do you mean by *Nature*?

M 2

Its

Part I.

Its Meanings, replied he, are many and various. As it stands at present opposed, it may be enough perhaps to say, that *Nature* is *that, which is the Cause of every thing, except those Things alone, which are the immediate Effects of Reason*. In other words, whatever is not *Reason*, or the *Effect* of Reason, we would consider as *Nature*, or the *Effect* of Nature. I answered, as he so distinguished them, I thought he might justly appeal to either.

AND yet, continued he, there is a remarkable *Difference* between the Standard of *Reason*, and that of *Nature*; a Difference, which at no time we ought to forget. What Difference, said I, do you mean? It is this, answered he—In *Nature*, the Standard is sought from among the *Many*; in *Reason*, the Standard is sought from among the *Few*. You must explain, said I, your Meaning, for I must confess you seem obscure.

THUS

THUS then, said he——Suppose, as an Part I.
 Anatomist, you were seeking the Structure
 of some internal Part——To discover this,
 would you not inspect a *Number* of Indi-
 viduals? I should. And would you
 not inform yourself, what had been dis-
 covered by others? I should. And
 suppose, after all, you should find a *Mul-*
titude of Instances for *one* Structure, and a
few singular for a *different*: By which
 would you be governed? By the Mul-
 titude, said I, undoubtedly. Thus then,
 continued he, in Nature the Standard, you
see, exists among the many, I replied,
 it had so appeared,

AND what, said he, were we to seek
 the Perfection of Sculpture, or of Paint-
 ing?—Where should we inquire then?—
 Among the *numerous* common Artists, or
 among the *few* and celebrated? Among
 the Few, said I. What if we were to
 seek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory—
 Where then? Among the Few still.

M 3

What


Part I.

What if we were to seek the Perfection of true Argument, or a sound Logic—Where then? Still among the Few. And is not true Argument, or a sound Logic, one of *Reason's* greatest Perfections? It is, You see then, continued he, whence the Standard of *Reason* is to be sought—It is from among the Few, as we said before, in contradiction to the Standard of Nature. I confess, said I, it appears so.


AND happy, said he, for us, that Providence has so ordered it—happy for us, that what is *Rational*, depends not on the *Multitude*; or is to be tried by so pitiful a Test, as the bare counting of Noses. It is happy, said I, indeed—But whence pray the Difference? Why are the *Many* to determine in Nature, and the *Few* only, in *Reason*?

To discuss this at large, said he, would require some time. It might insensibly perhaps draw us from our present Inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the Reason, in as few words as possible; which should they chance to be obscure, be not too

too solicitous for an Explanation.
 begged him to proceed his own way.

I Part I. 

The Case, said he, appears to be this—
 In *Natural Works* and *Natural Operations*,
 we hold but *one Efficient Cause*, and that
 consummately *wise*. This Cause in *every*
Species recognizing *what is best*, and work-
 ing ever *uniformly* according to this *Idea of*
Perfection, the *Productions* and *Energies*, in
 every *Species* where it acts, are for the
 most part *similar* and exactly *correspondent*.
 If an *Exception* ever happen, it is from
 some *hidden higher Motive*, which tran-
 scends our *Comprehension*, and which is
 seen *so rarely*, as not to injure the *general*
Rule, or render it doubtful and precarious.
 On the contrary, in the *Productions* and
Energies of Reason, there is not *one Cause*
 but *infinite*—as many indeed, as there are
Agents of the *Human Kind*. Hence *Truth*
 being but *one*, and *Error* being *infinite*, and
Agents infinite also: what wonder they
 should oftener miss, than hit the *Mark*?—
 that *Multitudes* should fail, where *one* alone



B Part I. succeeds, and Truth be only the Possession of the *chosen, fortunate Few*? You seem to have explained the Difficulty, said I, with sufficient Perspicuity.

LET us then go back, said he, and recollect ourselves; that we may not forget, what it is we are seeking. I replied, Most willingly. We have been seeking, continued he, the *Sovereign Good*. In consequence of this Inquiry, we have discovered—that *all Things whatever exist to the Human Species in the Relations of either Pursuable, Avoidable, or Indifferent*. To determine these Relations with Accuracy we have been scrutinizing the Human Nature; and that, upon this known Maxim, that *every Species was its own proper Standard; and that where the Value of Things was dubious, there the Species was to be studied, and the Relations to be deduced, which naturally flow from it*. The Result of this Scrutiny has been—that we have first agreed Man to be a *Social Animal*; and since, to be a *Rational*. So that if we
can

can be content with a descriptive, concise Part I.
 Sketch of *Human Nature*, it will amount
 to this—that MAN IS A SOCIAL RA-
TIONAL ANIMAL, I answered, it
 had appeared so,

§ 15. IF then, said he, we pursue our
 Disquisitions, agreeably to this Idea of Hu-
 man Nature, it will follow that all Things
 will be *Pursuable, Avoidable, and Indiffe-*
rent to Man, as they respect the Being
 and Welfare of such a *Social, Rational*
Animal. I replied, They must,

NOTHING therefore in the first place,
 said he, can be Pursuable, which is *de-*
structive of Society. It cannot.

Acts therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and
 all acquired by them, whether Wealth,
 Power, Pleasure, or any thing, are evi-
 dently from their very Character not fit
 to be pursued. They are not.

But it is impossible not to pursue many
 such things, unless we are furnished with
 some *Habit or Disposition* of Mind, by
 which

Part I. which we are induced to render to all Men
their own, and to regard the Welfare, and
 Interest of Society. It is impossible.

But the *Habit or Disposition of rendering to all their own*, and of regarding the Welfare and Interest of Society, is JUSTICE. It is. We may therefore fairly conclude, that *Nothing is naturally Pursuable, but what is either correspondent to Justice, or at least not contrary.*

I confess, said I, so it appears.

BUT farther, said he,—It is possible we may have the best Disposition to Society; the most upright Intentions; and yet thro' *Want of Ability to discern*, and know the Nature of Particulars, we may pursue many things inconsistent, as well with our Private Interest, as the Public. We may even pursue what is *Right*, and yet pursue it in such a manner, as to find our Endeavours *fruitless*, and our Purposes to fail,

I answered, it was possible.

But this would ill besit the Character of a *Rational Animal*. It would. It is

neces-

necessary therefore, we should be furnished with some *Habit or Faculty*, instructing us how to discern the *real difference of all Particulars*, and suggesting the proper Means, by which we may either *avoid* or *obtain* them. It is. And what is

this, think you, but PRUDENCE?

I believe, said I, it can be no other.

If it be, said he, then it is evident from this Reasoning, that *Nothing can be pursuable which is not correspondent to Prudence*.

I replied, He had shewn it could not,

BUT farther still, said he—It is possible we may neither want *Prudence*, nor *Justice* to direct us; and yet the *Impulses of Appetite*, the *Impetuosities of Resentment*, the *Charms and Allurements* of a thousand flattering Objects, may tempt us, in spite of ourselves, to pursue what is both *Imprudent*, and *Unjust*. They may. But

if so, it is necessary, would we pursue as *becomes our Character*, that we should be furnished with some *Habit*, which may *moderate our Excesses*; which may temper
our

Part I. our Actions to the Standard of a *Social State*, and to the Interest and Welfare, not of a *Part*, but of the *Whole Man*.

Nothing, said I, more necessary. And what, said he, can we call this *Habit*, but the Habit of TEMPERANCE? You name it, said I, rightly. If you think so, replied he, then *Nothing can be Pursuable, which is not either correspondent to Temperance, or at least not contrary*, I replied, so it seemed,

ONCE more, continued he, and we have done—It is possible that not only *Resentment* and *Appetite*, not only the *Charms and Allurements* of external Objects, but the *Terrors* too, and *Dread* of them may marr the *Rectitude of our Purposes*. It is possible,

Tyranny and Superstition may assail us on one hand; the Apprehensions of Ridicule, and a *False Shame* on the other—It is expedient, to withstand these, we should be armed with some *Habit*, or our wisest, best Pursuits may else at all times be defeated. They may. And what is that

that generous, manlike and noble *Habit*, Part I. which sets us at all times above *Fear* and *Danger*; what is it but FORTITUDE?

I replied, it was no other. If so then, continued he, besides our former Conclusions, *Nothing farther can be pursuable*, as our Inquiries now have shewn us, *which is not either correspondent to Fortitude, or at least not contrary*. I admit, said I, it can not,

OBSERVE then, said he, the Sum, the Amount of our whole Reasoning—*Nothing is truly Pursuable to such an Animal as Man, except what is correspondent, or at least not contrary, to JUSTICE, PRUDENCE, TEMPERANCE and FORTITUDE*. I allow, said I, it appears so. But if nothing *Pursuable*, then nothing *Avoidable* or *Indifferent*, but what is tried and estimated after the *same* manner. For *Contraries are ever recognized thro' the same Habit*, one with another. The same Logic judges of Truth and Falshood; the same Musical Art, of Concord and Discord. So the same
Mental

Part I. *Mental Habitudes*, of Things *Avoidable* and *Pursuable*. I replied, it appeared probable.

To how unexpected a Conclusion then, said he, have our Inquiries insensibly led us?—In tracing the Source of Human Action, we have established it to be those FOUR GRAND VIRTUES, which are esteemed, for their Importance, the very HINGES OF ALL MORALITY. We have.

BUT if so, it should follow, that a *Life*, whose *Pursuings* and *Avoidings* are governed by these *Virtues*, is that *True and Rational Life*, which we have so long been seeking; that *Life*, where the *Value of all things* is justly measured by those *Relations*, which they bear to the *Natural Frame and real Constitution of Mankind*—in fewer Words, A LIFE OF VIRTUE appears to be THE LIFE ACCORDING TO NATURE. It appears so.

1 Of all the ²Heathen, but the ^{BUT} Christian enlarges Virtue into Duty
Intra 245

BUT in *such* a Life every Pursuit, every Part I. Avoiding, (to include all) every Action will of course admit of being *rationaly justified*.

It will. But *That, which being Done, admits of a Rational Justification*, is the Essence or genuine Character of an Office, or MORAL DUTY. For thus long ago it has been defined by the best * Au-^{thorities}. Admit it. If so, then

A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, is A LIFE ACCORDING TO MORAL OFFICES OR DUTIES. It appears so.

But we have already agreed it, to be a *Life according to Nature*. We have.

Observe then: A LIFE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE, ACCORDING TO MORAL OFFICES, and ACCORDING TO NATURE, mean all THE SAME THING, tho' *varied* in the Expression. Your Remark, said I, seems just.

§ 16. WE need never therefore, replied he, be at a loss how to choose, tho' the

* By Tully in his Offices, and by other Authors of Antiquity.

Part I. the Objects of Choice be ever so infinite and diversified. *As far as nothing is inconsistent with such a Life and such a Character,* we may justly set Existence before Death; prefer Health to Sickness; Integrity of the Limbs, to being maimed and debilitated; Pleasure to Pain; Wealth to Poverty; Fame to Dishonour; Free Government to Slavery; Power and Magistracy, to Subjection and a private State—Universally, whatever tends either to *Being*, or to *Well-Being*, we may be justified, when we prefer to whatever appears the contrary. And when our several Energies, exerted according to the Virtues just mentioned, have put us in Possession of all that we require: when we enjoy, *subjoined to a right and honest Mind, both Health of Body, and Competence of Externals*: what can there be wanting to complete our Happiness; to render our State perfectly consonant to Nature; or to give us a more Sovereign Good, than that which we now enjoy?

Nothing, replied I, that I can at present think of.

THERE

THERE would be nothing indeed, said Part I.
he, *were our Energies never to fail*; were {
all our Endeavours to be ever crowned with
due *Success*. But suppose the contrary—
Suppose the *worst Success* to the *most up-*
right Conduct; to the wisest Rectitude of
Energies and Actions. It is possible, nay
Experience teaches us it is too often fact,
that not only the Pursuers of what is *con-*
trary to Nature, but that those who pursue
nothing but what is *strictly congruous to it*,
may *miss of their Aims*, and be *frustrated*
in their Endeavours. Inquisitors and Monks
may detest them for their Virtue, and
pursue them with all the Engines of
Malice and Inhumanity. Without these,
Pests may afflict their Bodies; Inunda-
tions o'erwhelm their Property; or what
is worse than Inundations, either Ty-
rants, Pirates, Heroes, or Banditti. They
may see their Country fall, and with
it their bravest Countrymen; themselves
pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or
N perishing

Part I. perishing with the rest in the general
 { Massacre.

—* *cadit & Ripheus, justissimus unus*
Qui fuit in Teucris, & servantissimus æqui.

It must be owned, said I, this has too often
 been the Case.

OR grant, continued he, that these
greater Events never happen—that the
 Part allotted us, be not in the *Tragedy* of
 Life, but in the *Comedy*. Even the *Comic*
Distresses are abundantly irksome—
 Domestic Jars, the ill Offices of Neigh-
 bours—Suspensions, Jealousies, Schemes
 defeated—The Folly of Fools; the
 Knavery of Knaves; from which, as Mem-
 bers of Society, it is impossible to detach
 ourselves.

WHERE

* *ÆNEID*, l. 2. ver. 426.

WHERE then shall we turn, or what Part I.
have we to imagine? We have at length
placed HAPPINESS, after much Inquiry, in
ATTAINING *the primary and just Requisites*
of our Nature, by a Conduct suitable to Virtue
and Moral Office. But as to *corresponding*
with our Pre-conceptions (which we have
made the Test) does this System correspond
better, than those *others*, which we have
rejected? Has it not appeared from various
Facts, too obvious to be disputed, that in
many *Times and Places* it may be absolutely
unattainable? That in many, where it
exists, it may *in a moment be cancelled*, and
put irretrievably out of our Power, by
Events *not to be resisted*? If this be certain,
and I fear it cannot be questioned, our
specious long Inquiry, however accurate
we may believe it, has not been able to
shew us a *Good*, of that Character which
we require; a *GOOD Durable, Indepri-*
able, and Accommodate to every Circum-
stance—Far from it—Our Speculations

Part I. (I think) rather lead us to that *low Opinion* of Happiness, which you may remember

you * expressed, when we first began the subject. They rather help to prove to us, that instead of a *Sovereign Good*, it is the more probable sentiment, *there is no such Good at all*. I should indeed, said I,

fear so. For where, continued he, lies the difference, whether we pursue what is *congruous* to Nature, or not *congruous*; if the *Acquisition* of one be as *difficult*, as of the *other*, and the *Possession* of both equally *doubtful and precarious*? If *Cæsar* fall, in attempting his Country's Ruin; and *Brutus* fare no better, who only fought in its Defence? It must be

owned, said I, these are melancholy Truths, and the Instances, which you alledge, too well confirm them.

WE were in the midst of these serious Thoughts, descanting upon the Hardships
and

* See p. III.

and Miseries of Life, when by an Incident, not worth relating, our Speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more unluckily——our Question perplexed——its Issue uncertain——and myself impatient to know the Event. Necessity however was not to be resisted, and thus for the present our Inquiries were postponed.

Part I.
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
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24

CONCERNING HAPPINESS,

A DIALOGUE.

PART the SECOND.

B RUTUS *perished untimely, and* Part II.
Cæsar *did no more*—These Words 

I was repeating the next Day to myself, when my Friend appeared, and cheerfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could not return his Compliment with an equal Gaiety, being intent, somewhat more than usual, on what had passed the day before. Seeing this, he proposed a Walk into the Fields. The Face of Nature, said he, will perhaps dispel these Glooms. No Assistance, on my part, shall be wanting,

Part II. you may be assured. I accepted his Proposal; the Walk began; and our former Conversation insensibly renewed.

BRUTUS, said he, *perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more.*—It was thus, as I remember, not long since you were expressing yourself. And yet suppose their Fortunes to have been exactly *parallel*—Which would you have preferred? Would you have been *Cæsar* or *Brutus*?

Brutus, replied I, beyond all Controversy. He asked me, Why? Where was the Difference, when their Fortunes, as we now supposed them, were considered as the *same*?

There seems, said I, abstract from their *Fortunes*, something, I know not what, *intrinsically preferable* in the Life and Character of *Brutus*. If that, said he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the *Success* of his Endeavours, but from their *Truth* and *Rectitude*. He had the Comfort to be conscious, that his Cause was a just one. It was impossible the other should

Q.:

B

/ What Assassination just have?

have any such Feeling.

I believe, Part II.

said I, you have explained it.

SUPPOSE then, continued he, (it is but merely an Hypothesis) suppose, I say, we were to place the SOVEREIGN GOOD in such a Rectitude of Conduct—in the CONDUCT merely, and not in the EVENT. Suppose we were to fix our HAPPINESS, *not in the actual Attainment* of that Health, that Perfection of a Social State, that fortunate Concurrence of Externals, which is congruous to our Nature, and which we have a Right all to pursue; but solely fix it *in the mere DOING whatever is correspondent to such an End*, even tho' we never attain, or are near attaining it. In fewer words—What if we make our Natural State *the Standard only to determine our Conduct*; and place our Happiness *in the Rectitude of this Conduct alone*?—On such an Hypothesis (and we consider it as nothing farther) we should not want a Good perhaps, *to correspond to our Pre-conceptions*; for this, it is evident, would be correspondent to them
all.

Part II. *all.*

Your Doctrine, replied I, is so new and strange, that tho' you have been copious in explaining, I can hardly yet comprehend you.

IT amounts all, said he, but to this—Place your *Happiness*, where your *Praise* is. I asked, Where he supposed that? Not, replied he, in the Pleasures which you feel, more than your Disgrace lies in the Pain—not in the casual Prosperity of Fortune, more than your Disgrace in the casual Adversity—but in *just complete Action throughout every Part of Life, what ever be the Face of Things, whether favourable or the contrary.*

BUT why then, said I, such *Accuracy* about *Externals*? So much Pains to be informed, what are *Pursuable*, what *Avoidable*? It behoves the Pilot, replied he, to know the Seas and the Winds; the Nature of Tempests, Calms, and Tides. They are the *Subjects*, about which his Art

is conversant. Without a just Experience Part II.
of them, he can never *prove* himself an
Artist. Yet we look not for his *Reputa-*
tion either in *fair* Gales, or in *adverse*;
but in the *Skilfulness of his Conduct*, be these
Events as they happen. In like manner
fares it with this the Moral Artist. He, for
a *Subject* has *the Whole of Human Life*—
Health and Sicknes; Pleasure and Pain;
with every other possible Incident, which
can befall him during his Existence. If his
Knowledge of all these be accurate and *ex-*
act, so too must his *Conduct*, in which *Qu:*
we place his *Happiness*. But if this *Know-*
ledge be defective, must not his *Conduct* be
defective also? I replied, so it should
seem. And if his *Conduct*, then his
Happiness? It is true.

You see then, continued he, even tho' /
Externals were as nothing; tho' it was true,
in their own Nature, they were neither
Good nor *Evil*; yet an *accurate Knowledge*
of them is, from our Hypothesis, absolutely /
necessary.

Part II. *necessary.*
 { proved it.

Indeed, said I, you have

HE continued—Inferior Artists may be at a stand, because they *want* Materials. From their *Stubbornness* and *Intractability*, they may often be disappointed. But as long as *Life* is passing, and *Nature* continues to operate, the Moral Artist of Life has at all times, all he desires. He can never want a *Subject* fit to exercise him in his proper Calling; and that, with this happy Motive to the Constancy of his Endeavours, *that*, the crosser, the harsher, the more untoward the *Events*, the greater his *Praise*, the more illustrious his *Reputation*.

ALL this, said I, is true, and cannot be denied. But one Circumstance there appears, where your Similes seem to fail. The *Praise* indeed of the Pilot we allow to be in his *Conduct*; but it is in the *Success* of that Conduct, where we look for his *Happiness*. If a Storm arise, and the Ship
 be

be lost, we call him not *happy*, how well Part II.
 soever he may have conducted. It is then
 only we congratulate him, when he has
 reached the desired Haven. Your
 Distinction, said he, is just. And it is here
 lies the *noble Prerogative of Moral Artists*,
 above all others—But yet I know not how
 to explain myself, I fear my Doctrine will
 appear so strange. You may proceed,
 said I, safely, since you advance it but as an
Hypothesis.

THUS then, continued he—The *End*
 in other Arts is ever *distant* and *removed*.
 It consists not in the *mere Conduct*, much
 less in a *single Energy*; but is *the just Re-*
sult of many Energies, each of which are
 essential to it. Hence, by Obstacles un-
 avoidable, it may often be *retarded*: Nay
 more, may be so embarrassed, as *never pos-*
sibly to be attained. But in the *Moral Art*
 of Life, the very CONDUCT is the END;
 the very *Conduct*, I say, itself, throughout
 every its *minute* Energy; because *each* of
 these, however *minute*, partake as truly of

8

Rectitude,

I As well say a Man's Journey is
his End *Intra 200 I,*

Part II. *Rectitude*, as the *largest Combination of them*, when considered collectively. Hence of all Arts is this the only one *perpetually complete in every Instant*, because it needs not, like other Arts, *Time* to arrive at that Perfection, at which in *every Instant* it is arrived already. Hence by *Duration* it is not rendered either *more* or *less* perfect; *Completion*, like Truth, admitting of no Degrees, and being in no sense capable of either *Intension* or *Remission*. And hence too by necessary Connection (which is a greater Paradox than all) even that *Happiness* or *Sovereign Good*, the End of this Moral Art, is itself too, in *every Instant*, *Consummate and Complete*; is neither *heightened* or *diminished* by the Quantity of its *Duration*, but is the same to its Enjoyers, for a *Moment* or a *Century*.

UPON this I smiled. He asked me the Reason. It is only to observe, said I, the Course of our Inquiries—A new Hypothesis has been advanced—Appearing somewhat strange, it is desired to be explained—

/ Curious

plained—You comply with the Request, Part II.
 and in pursuit of the Explanation, make
 it ten times more *obscure* and *unintelligible*,
 than before.

It is but too often the
 Fate, said he, of us Commentators. But
 you know in such cases what is usually
 done. When the Comment will not ex-
 plain the Text, we try whether the Text
 will not explain itself. This Method, it is
 possible, may assist us here. The Hypo-
 thesis, which we would have illustrated,
 was no more than this—That the *Sove-
 reign Good lay in Rectitude of Conduct*; and
 that *this Good corresponded to all our Pre-
 conceptions*. Let us examine then, whether,
 upon trial, this Correspondence will appear
 to hold; and, for all that we have advanced
 since, suffer it to pass, and not perplex us.

Agreed, said I, willingly, for now
 I hope to comprehend you.

§ 2. RECOLLECT then, said he. Do you
 not remember that *one Pre-conception* of the
Sovereign Good was, to be *accommodate to
 all Times and Places*?

I remember it.

And

Part II.

And is there any *Time*, or any *Place*, whence *Rectitude of Conduct* may be excluded? Is there not a right Action in Prosperity, a right Action in Adversity?—May there not be a decent, generous, and laudable *Behaviour*, not only in Peace, in Power, and in Health; but in War, in Oppression, in Sickness and in Death? There may.

AND what shall we say to those *other Pre-conceptions*—to being *Durable*, *Self-derived*, and *Indeprivable*? Can there be any *Good* so *Durable*, as the Power of always doing right? Is there any *Good* conceivable, so intirely *beyond the Power of others*? Or, if you hesitate, and are doubtful, I would willingly be informed, into what Circumstances may Fortune throw a brave and honest Man, where it shall not be in his Power to *act bravely and honestly*? If there are no such, then *Rectitude of Conduct*, if a *Good*, is a *Good Indeprivable*. I confess, said I, it appears so.

BUT

BUT farther, said he——Another *Pre-* Part II.
conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be
Agreeable to Nature. It was. And
 can any thing be more agreeable to a
Rational and Social Animal, than Rational
and Social Conduct? Nothing. But
Rectitude of Conduct is with us *Rational*
and Social Conduct. It is.

ONCE more, continued he——Another
Pre-conception of this Good was, to be Con-
ducive, not to Mere-being, but to Well-
being. Admit it. And can any
 thing, believe you, conduce so probably to
 the *Well-being* of a Rational Social Animal,
 as the right *Exercise* of that *Reason*, and of
 those *Social Affections?* Nothing.
 And what is this same *Exercise*, but the
highest Rectitude of Conduct? Certainly.

§ 3. You see then, said he, how well
 our Hypothesis, being once admitted, tal-
 lies with our *Original Pre-conceptions* of
 the *Sovereign Good.* I replied, it in-

O

deed

B Part II. deed appeared so, and could not be denied.
But who, think you, ever dreamt of a
Happiness like this? A Happiness depen-
dent, not on the *Success*, but on the *Aim*?

Even common and ordinary Life,
replied he, can furnish us with Examples.
Ask of the Sportsman where lies his En-
joyment? Ask whether it be in the *Possession*
of a slaughtered Hare, or Fox? He
would reject, with Contempt, the very
Supposition—He would tell you, as well
as he was able, that the Joy was in the
Pursuit—in the Difficulties which are ob-
viated; in the Faults, which are retrieved;
in the *Conduct* and Direction of the Chace
thro' all its Parts—that the *Completion* of
their Endeavours was so far from giving
them Joy, that instantly at that Period all
their Joy was at an End. For Sportf-
men, replied I, this may be no bad Rea-
soning. It is not the Sentiment, said he,
of Sportsmen alone. The Man of Gal-
lantry not unoften has been found to think
after the same manner.

—*Meus est amor huic similis; nam*

I None but a Horse

Transf-

*Transvolat in medio posita, & fugientia
captat *.* Part II.

To these we may add the Tribe of Builders and Projectors. Or has not your own Experience informed you of Numbers, who, in the *Building* and *Laying-out*, have expressed the highest *Delight*; but shewn the utmost Indifference to the *Result* of their Labours, to the Mansion or Gardens, when once finished and complete?

THE Truth, said I, of these Examples is not to be disputed. But I could wish your Hypothesis had better than these to support it. In the *serious View of Happiness*, do you ever imagine there were any, who could fix it (as we said before) not on the *Success*, but on the *Aim*?

More, even in this light, said he, than perhaps at first you may imagine. There are Instances innumerable of Men, *bad* as well as *good*, who having fixed, as their *Aim*, a *certain Conduct* of their own, have

O 2

so

* HOR. Sat. II. L. I. v. 107.

Part II. so far attached their Welfare and *Happiness* to it, as to deem *all Events* in its Prosecution, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to be mean, contemptible, and *not worthy their Regard*. I called on him for Examples.

WHAT think you, said he, of the *Assassin*, who slew the first *Prince of Orange*; and who, tho' brought by his Conduct to the most exquisite Tortures, yet *conscious of what he had done*, could bear them all unmoved? Or (if you will have a better Man) what think you of that sturdy *Roman*, who would have dispatched *Porfenna*; and who, full of his Design, and superior to all Events, could thrust a Hand into the Flames with the steadiest Intrepidity?

I replied, That these indeed were very uncommon Instances.

ATTEND too, continued he, to *Epicurus* dying, the Founder of a Philosophy, little favouring of *Enthusiasm* — “ *This I write you* (says he, in one of his Epistles) “ *while the last Day of Life is passing, and* “ *that*

“ *that a HAPPY One. The Pains indeed of* Part II
 “ *my Body are not capable of being heigh-*
 “ *tened. Yet to these we oppose that Joy of*
 “ *the Soul, which arises from the Memory*
 “ *of our past Speculations.*”——Hear him,
 consonant to this, in another Place asserting,
 that a *Rational Adversity* was better
 than an *Irrational Prosperity*.

AND what think you?——Had he not
 placed his *Good and Happiness* in the sup-
 posed *Rectitude of his Opinions*, would he
 not have preferred *Prosperity*, at all rates,
 to *Adversity*? Would not the Pains, of
 which he died, have made his *Happiness*
 perfect *Misery*?——And yet, you see, he
 disowns any such thing. The Memory of
 his past Life, and of his Philosophical In-
 ventions were, even in the Hour of Death
 it seems, a Counterpoise to support him.

It must be owned, said I, that you
 appear to reason justly.

PASS from *Epicurus*, continued he, to
Socrates. What are the Sentiments of that

Part II. divine Man, speaking of his own unjust
 Condemnation ; “ O Crito, says he, *if it*
“ be pleasing to the Gods this way, then be
“ it this way.” And again——“ Anytus
“ and Melytus, I grant, can kill me; but
“ to hurt or injure me, is beyond their
“ Power.” It would not have been be-
 yond it, had he thought his Welfare de-
 pendent on any thing they could do; for
 they were then doing their worst ——
 Whence then was it beyond them ?——
 Because his Happiness was derived not
 from *without*, but from *within*; not from
 the *Success*, which perhaps was due to the
 Rectitude of his Life, but from that *Recti-*
tude alone, every other thing disregarded.
 He had not, it seems, so far renounced his
 own Doctrine, as not to remember his
 former Words ; that——“ *To whom ever*
“ all things, conducive to Happiness, are de-
“ rived solely, or at least nearly from him-
“ self, and depend not on the Welfare or
“ Adversity of others, from the Variety of
“ whose Condition his own must vary also :
“ He it is, who has prepared to himself the

“ *most excellent of all Lives—He it is, who* Part II.
 “ *is the Temperate, the Prudent, and the*
 “ *Brave—He it is, who, when Wealth or*
 “ *Children either come or are taken away,*
 “ *will best obey the Wise Man’s Precept—*
 “ *For neither will he be seen to grieve, nor*
 “ *to rejoice in excess, from the Trust and*
 “ *Confidence which he has reposed in himself.”*
 —You have a Sketch at least of his Mean-
 ing, tho’ far below his own *Attic* and truly
 elegant Expression. I grant, said I,
 your Example; but this and the rest are
 but single Instances. What are three or
 four in Number, to the whole of Human
 Kind?

IF you are for Numbers, replied he,
 what think you of the numerous Race of
 Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have
 joyfully met Death, rather than desert their
 Country, when in danger? They must
 have thought surely on *another* Happiness
 than *Success*, when they could gladly go,
 where they saw Death often inevitable.
 Or what think you of the many Martyrs

O 4

for

/ Irrelevant

B Part II. for Systems wrong as well as right, who have dared defy the worst, rather than swerve from their Belief? You have brought indeed, said I, more Examples than could have been imagined.

B BESIDES, continued he, what is that *Comfort of a GOOD CONSCIENCE*, celebrated to such a height in the Religion which we profess, but the Joy arising from a Conscience of right *Energies*; a Conscience of having done nothing, but what is consonant to our Duty? I replied, It indeed appeared so.

B EVEN the Vulgar, continued he, recognize a *Good* of this very Character, when they say of an Undertaking, tho' it *succeed not*, that they are *contented*; that they have *done their best*, and can accuse themselves of nothing. For what is this, but placing their *Content*, their *Good*, their *Happiness*, not in the *Success* of Endeavours, but in the *Rectitude*? If it be not the Rectitude which contents them, you must tell

§ The Hope of an Hereafter

tell me what it is else.

It appears, Part II.

replied I, to be that alone.

I HOPE then, continued he, that tho' you accede not to this Notion of Happiness, which I advance; you will at least allow it not to be such a Paradox, as at first you seemed to imagine. That indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you.

§ 4. GRANTING me this, said he, you encourage me to explain myself—We have supposed the *Sovereign Good* to lie in *Rectitude of Conduct*. We have. And

think you there can be Rectitude of Conduct, if we do not *live consistently*?

In what Sense, said I, would you be understood? *To live consistently*, said he,

is the same with me, as *To live agreeably to some one single and consonant Scheme or Purpose*.

Undoubtedly, said I, without this, there can be no Rectitude of Conduct.

All Rectitude of Conduct then, you say, implies such *Consistence*. It does.

And does all *Consistence*, think you, imply such

2 May, In the Consequence

Part II. such *Rectitude*?

I asked him, Why

not?

It is possible, indeed it may, said he, for aught we have discovered yet, to the contrary. But what if it should be found that there may be numberless Schemes, each in particular *consistent with itself*, but yet all of them *different*, and some perhaps *contrary*? There may, you know, be a *consistent* Life of Knavery, as well as a *consistent* Life of Honesty; there may be a *uniform* Practice of Luxury, as well as of Temperance, and Abstemiousness. Will the Consistence, *common to all of these Lives*, render the *Conduct* in each, *right*?

It appears, said I, an Absurdity, that there should be the same Rectitude in two Contraries. If so, said he,

we must look for something more than *mere Consistence*, when we search for that *Rectitude* which we at present talk of.

A *consistent* Life indeed is requisite, but that alone is not enough. We must determine its *peculiar Species*, if we would be accurate and exact.

It indeed appears, said I, necessary.

NOR

NOR is any thing, continued he, more Part II.
easy to be discussed. For what can that
peculiar Consistence of Life be else, than a
Life, whose several Parts are not only con-
sonant to *each other*, but to the *Nature*
also of the Being, by whom that Life has
been adopted? Does not this *last* Degree
of Consistence appear as requisite as the
former? I answered, it could not be
otherwise.

You see then, said he, the true Idea
of right Conduct. It is not, merely *To*
live consistently; but it is *To live consistently*
with Nature. Allow it.

BUT what, continued he, Can we live
consistently with Nature, and be at a loss
how to behave ourselves? We cannot.

And can we know how to behave
ourselves, if we know nothing of *what*
befals us; nothing of those *Things* and
Events, which perpetually surround, and
affect us? We cannot.

You see
then,

Part II. then, continued he, how we are again fallen insensibly into that Doctrine, which proves the Necessity of *scrutinizing* and *knowing the Value of Externals*. I replied, it was true. If you assent, said he, to this, it will of course follow, that, *To live consistently with Nature, is, To live agreeably to a just Experience of those Things, which happen around us.* It appears so.

BUT farther still, said he.—Think you any one can be deemed to live agreeably to such *Experience*, if he *select* not, as far as possible, the things most *congruous to his Nature*? He cannot. And by the same Rule, as far as possible, must he not *reject* such as are *contrary*? He must. And that not occasionally, as Fancy happens to prompt; but *steadily, constantly*, and without Remission.

I should imagine so. You judge, said he, truly. Were he to act otherwise in the least instance, he would falsify his Professions; he would not live according to that Experience, which we now suppose

pose him to possess.
would not.

I replied, He Part II.

IT should seem then, said he, from hence, as a natural Consequence of what we have admitted, that the *Essence of right Conduct* lay in SELECTION and REJECTION.

So, said I, it has appeared.

And that such *Selection* and *Rejection* should be *consonant with our proper Nature*.

It is true. And be *steady and perpetual*, not occasional and interrupted.

It is true. But if this be the *Essence of Right Conduct*, then too it is the *Essence of our Sovereign Good*; for in such *Conduct* we have supposed this Good to consist.

We have.

SEE then, said he, the Result of our Inquiry.—The SOVEREIGN GOOD, as constituted by *Rectitude of Conduct*, has, on our strictest Scrutiny, appeared to be this—

TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS

CON-

B Part II. CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAT
SELECTING AND THAT REJECTING
ONLY. It is true, said I, so it appears.

§ 5. BEFORE we hasten then farther, said he, let us stop to recollect, and see whether our present Conclusions accord with our former.—We have now supposed the *Sovereign Good* to be *Rectitude of Conduct*, and this *Conduct* we have made consist in a certain *Selecting* and *Rejecting*.

We have. And do you not imagine that the *Selecting* and *Rejecting*, which we propose, as they are purely governed by the *Standard of Nature*, are capable in every instance of being *rationaly justified*?

I replied, I thought they were.

But if they admit a *rational Justification*, then are they *Moral Offices* or *Duties*; for thus * you remember yesterday a *Moral Office* was defined. It was. But if so, *To live in the Practice of them*, will
 be

* Sup. p. 175.

be *To live in the Discharge of Moral Offices.* Part II.

It will. But *To live in the Discharge of these*, is the same as *Living according to Virtue*, and *Living according to Nature*. It is. So therefore is *Living in that Selection, and in that Rejection, which we propose.* It is.

WE need never therefore be at a loss, said he, for a Description of the SOVEREIGN GOOD.—WE may call it, RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT.—If that be too contracted, we may enlarge and say, it is—
 TOLIVEPERPETUALLYSELECTINGAND
 REJECTING ACCORDING TO THE STANDARD OF OUR BEING.—If we are for still different Views, we may say it is—
 TO LIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES—TO LIVE ACCORDING TO NATURE—TO LIVE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE—TO LIVE ACCORDING TO JUST EXPERIENCE OF THOSE THINGS, WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.—Like some finished Statue, we may behold it every way; it is the same Object, tho' variously

B Part II. variously viewed; nor is there a View, but is natural, truly graceful, and engaging.

§ 6. I CANNOT deny, said I, but that as you now have explained it, your Hypothesis seems far more plausible, than when first it was proposed. You will believe it, said he, more so still, by considering it with more Attention.—In the first place, tho' perhaps it esteem nothing *really* GOOD but VIRTUE, nothing *really* EVIL, but VICE, yet it in no manner takes away the *Difference*, and *Distinction* of *other Things*. So far otherwise, it is for establishing their Distinction to the greatest Accuracy. For were this neglected, what would become of *Selection* and *Rejection*, those important Energies, which are its very Soul and Essence? Were there no DIFFERENCE, there could be no CHOICE.

It is true, said I, there could not.

B AGAIN, said he. It is no meagre, mortifying System of *Self-denial*—It suppresses

no

no Social and Natural Affections, nor takes away any Social and Natural Relations— It prescribes no Abstainings, no Forbearances *out of Nature*; no gloomy, sad, and lonely Rules of Life, without which it is evident Men may be as honest as with, and be infinitely more useful and worthy Members of Society.—It refuses no Pleasure, not inconsistent with *Temperance*— It rejects no Gain, not inconsistent with *Justice*—Universally, as far as *Virtue* neither *forbids* nor *dissuades*, it endeavours to render Life, even in the *most vulgar* Acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and easy as possible. Nay, could it mend the Condition of Existence in any the *most trivial* Circumstance, even by adding to the amplest Possessions the poorest meanest Utensil, it would in no degree condemn an Addition even so mean. Far otherwise—It would consider, that to neglect the least Acquisition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall short of that *perfect* and *accurate Conduct*, which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends.

P

AND

Part II.  AND yet, tho' thus exact in every the minutest Circumstance, it gives us no Solitude as to what *Rank* we maintain in Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor; whether merged in Business, or confined to Inactivity, it is *equally consistent with every Condition*, and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed choose its own Life, it would be always that, where most social Affections might extensively be exerted, and most done to contribute to the Welfare of Society. But if Fate order otherwise, and this be denied; its Intentions are the same, its Endeavours are not wanting; nor are the *Social, Rational Powers* forgotten, even in Times and Circumstances, where they can least become conspicuous.

 IT teaches us to consider *Life*, as one great important *Drama*, where we have each our *Part* allotted us to act. It tells us that our *Happiness*, as *Actors* in this *Drama*, consists not in the *Length* of our

4 Providence is annihilated by your Doctrine

A D I A L O G U E.

211

Part, nor in the *State* and *Dignity*, but in Part II. *the just, the decent, and the natural Performance.* B

IF its Aims are successful, it is thankful ⁴ to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, derived from their *Success*, and feels them as fully, as those who know *no other Happiness*. The only Difference is, that having *a more excellent Good* in view, it fixes not, like the Many, its *Happiness* on *Success* alone, well knowing that in such case, if Endeavours *fail*, there can be nothing left behind but Murmurings and Misery. On the contrary, when this happens, it is then it retires into itself, and reflecting on what is *Fair*, what is *Laudable* and *Honest* (the ² *truly beatific Vision*, not of *mad Enthusiasts*, but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wise and the Good) it becomes *superiour to all Events*; it acquiesces in the *Consciousness* of *its own Rectitude*; and, like that Mansion founded, not on the Sands, but on the ³ Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Tempest and Inundation.

P 2

§ 7.

2 Of the Stoic

3 Your Doctrine is founded not on the Rock, but on the Sand

Part II.

Stuff

Stuff

Stuff

B

§ 7. HERE he paused, and I took the Opportunity to observe, how his Subject had warmed him into a degree of Rapture; how greatly it had raised both his Sentiments and his Stile, . No wonder, said he. Beauty of every kind excites our Love and Admiration; the Beauties of Art, whether *Energies* or *Works*; the Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or Inanimate. And shall we expect less from *this Supreme Beauty*; this *moral, mental,* and *original Beauty*; of which all the rest are but as *Types* or *Copies*?—Not however by high Flights to lose Sight of our Subject, the whole of what we have argued, may be reduced to this—

ALL MEN PURSUE GOOD, and would be *happy*, if they knew how; not happy for Minutes, and miserable for Hours, but *happy*, if possible, *thro' every Part of their Existence*. Either therefore *there is a GOOD of this steady durable Kind*, or *there is none*. If none, then *all Good must be transient*

transient and uncertain; and if so, an *Object of lowest Value*, which can little deserve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But if there be a *better Good*, such a Good as we are seeking; like every other thing, *it must be derived from some Cause*; and that Cause must be either *external, internal, or mixt*, in as much as except these three, there is no other possible. Now a *steady, durable Good*, cannot be derived from an *external Cause*, by reason all derived from *Externals must fluctuate, as they fluctuate*. By the same Rule, not from a *Mixture of the Two*; because the *Part which is external will proportionally destroy its Essence*. What then remains but the *Cause internal*; the very Cause which we have supposed, when we place the Sovereign Good in Mind; in Rectitude of Conduct; in just Selecting and Rejecting? There seems indeed no other Cause, said I, to which we can possibly assign it. 2

FORGIVE me then, continued he, *Min:*
should I appear to boast—We have
P 3 proved,

2 Thou art a perfect ignoramus

The subject - self - sufficiency

Part II. proved, or at least there is an Appearance
 we have proved, that either there is no
Good except this of our own; or that, if
there be any other, it is not worthy our Re-
gard. It must be confessed, said I,
 you have said as much, as the Subject seems
 to admit.

More

Moral Endeavour. Stuff

§ 8. By means then, said he, of our Hypothesis, behold one of the fairest, and most amiable of Objects, behold THE TRUE AND PERFECT MAN: that Ornament of Humanity; that Godlike Being; who, *without regard either to Pleasure or Pain, uninfluenced equally by either Prosperity or Adversity, superiour to the World and its best and worst Events, can fairly rest his All upon the Rectitude of his own Conduct; can constantly, and uniformly, and manfully maintain it; thinking that, and that alone, wholly sufficient to make him happy.*

AND do you seriously believe, said I, there ever was such a Character? And what, replied he, if I should admit, *there never*

never was, is, or will be such a Character?— Part II.
 that we have been talking the whole time
 of a Being, not to be found;

*A faultless Monster, which the World ne'er
 saw?*

Supposing, I say, we admit this, what then?

Would not your System in such a case,
 said I, a little border upon the chimerical?
 I only ask the Question. You need
 not be so tender, he replied, in expressing
 yourself. If it be false, if it will not en-
 dure the Test, I am as ready to give it up,
 as I have been to defend it. He must be a
poor Philosopher indeed, who, when he sees
Truth and a System at variance, can ever
be solicitous for the Fate of a System.

BUT tell me, I pray——Do you object
 to mine, from its *Perfection*, or from its
Imperfection? From its being too excel-
 lent for Human Nature, and *above* it; or
 from its being too base, and *below* it?
 It seems to require, said I, a *Perfection*,
 to which no *Individual* ever arrived.

That very *Transcendence*, said he, is an

Part II. Argument on its behalf. Were it of a Rank inferior, it would not be that Perfection, which we seek. Would you have it, said I, *beyond Nature*? If you mean, replied he, *beyond any particular or individual Nature*, most undoubtedly I would.—As you are a Lover of Painting, you shall hear a Story on the Subject.

“ IN ancient days, while Greece was
 “ flourishing in Liberty and Arts, a cele-
 “ brated Painter, having drawn many ex-
 “ cellent Pictures for a certain free State,
 “ and been generously and honourably re-
 “ warded for his Labours, at last made
 “ an Offer to paint them a *Helen*, as a
 “ Model and Exemplar of the most ex-
 “ quisite Beauty. The Proposal was rea-
 “ dily accepted, when the Artist informed
 “ them, that in order to draw *one* Fair,
 “ it was necessary he should contemplate
 “ *many*. He demanded therefore a Sight
 “ of all their finest Women. The State,
 “ to assist the Work, assented to his Re-
 “ quest. They were exhibited before

“ him;

*I Take all the separate Qua-
 -lities of fallen Nature, you cannot make a
 perfect Character* Intra 218

“him; he selected the most beautiful; Part II.
“and from these formed his *Helen*, more
“beautiful than them all.”——

YOU have heard the Fact, and what are we to infer?—Or can there be any other Inference than this—that the *Standard of Perfection, with respect to the Beauty of Bodies, was not* (as this Artist thought) *to be discovered in any Individual; but being dispersed by Nature in Portions thro’ the many, was from thence, and thence only, to be collected and recognized?*

It appears, said I, he thought so. The Picture, continued he, is lost, but we have Statues still remaining. If there be Truth in the Testimony of the best and fairest Judges, no Woman ever equalled the Delicacy of the *Medicean Venus*, nor Man the Strength and Dignity of the *Farnesian Hercules*. It is generally, said I, so believed.

AND will you, said he, from this unparalleled and transcendent Excellence, deny these

Part II. these Works of Art to be truly and strictly
Natural?

Their Excellence, replied I, must be confessed by All; but how they can be called so strictly *Natural*, I must own a little startles me.

That the *Limbs* and their *Proportions*, said he, are selected from *Nature*, you will hardly I believe doubt, after the Story just related.

I replied, it was admitted. The *Parts* therefore of these Works are *Natural*. They are.

And may not the same be asserted, as to the *Arrangement* of these Parts? Must not *this* too be *natural*, as it is analogous we know to *Nature*?

It must. If so, then is the *Whole Natural*.

So indeed, said I, it should seem. It cannot, replied he, be otherwise, if it be a Fact beyond dispute, that the *Whole* is nothing more, than the *Parts under such Arrangement*.

Enough, said I, you have satisfied me,

If I have, said he, it is but to *transfer* what we have asserted of this *subordinate* Beauty, to Beauty of a *higher Order*; it is
 but

but to pass from the *External*; to the *Part II.*
Moral and Internal. For here we say, by
 parity of Reason, that no where in any
particular Nature is the *perfect Character*
 to be seen intire. Yet one is *brave*; an-
 other is *temperate*; a third is *liberal*; and
 a fourth is *prudent*. So that in the *Multitude*
of mixed imperfect Characters, as be-
 fore in the *Multitude of imperfect Bodies*, is
 expressed *that IDEA, that MORAL STAND-*
DARD OF PERFECTION, by which *all* are
 tried and compared to one another, and at
 last upon the whole are either justified or
 condemned—that Standard of Perfection,
 which cannot be but *most Natural*, as it is
 purely collected from *Individuals of Na-*
ture, and is the Test of all the Merit to
 which they aspire. I acknowledge,
 said I, your Argument.

I MIGHT add, said he, if there were
 Occasion, other Arguments which would
 surprize you. I might inform you of the
 natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of
Specific Ideas;—that every *Individual* was
 but

Part II. but their *Type*, or *Shadow*;—that the
 { Mind or *Intellect* was the *Region of Possibles*;—that whatever is *Possible*, to the
 Min: Mind, actually *Is*; nor any thing a *Non-*
entity, except what implies a *Contradiction*;—that the genuine *Sphere* and genuine *Cylinder*, tho' *Forms* perhaps too
perfect, ever to exist conjoined to *Matter*, were yet as *true and real* Beings, as the
grossest Objects of Sense; were the *Source* of infinite *Truths*, which wholly depend on them, and which, as *Truths*, have a Being
 most *unalterable and eternal*. But these are Reasonings, which rather belong to another
 Philosophy; and if you are satisfied without them, they are at best but superfluous.

HE waited not for my Answer, but proceeded as follows. It is thus, said he, have I endeavoured, as far as in my power, to give you an Idea of the *perfect*
 2 Character: a Character, which I am neither so absurd, as to impute to myself; nor so rigorous and unfair, as to require of others.

Stuff We have proposed it only, as AN EXEMPLAR

1 Another Hypothesis
 2 A very different One

PLAR OF IMITATION, which tho' *None* Part II.
 we think can *equal*, yet *All* at least may ~~3~~
follow—an Exemplar of Imitation, which
 in proportion as we approach, so we ad-
 vance proportionably in *Merit* and in *Worth*—an Exemplar, which, were we
Stu ff
 more *selfish*, we should be Fools to reject; if
 it be true, that *to be Happy*, is *the ultimate*
Wish of us all, and that *Happiness* and *Moral*
Worth so reciprocally correspond, that there
 can be no degree of *the one*, without an
 equal Degree of *the other*. If there be 4
 Truth, said I, in your Reasonings, it can-
 not certainly be otherwise.

HE continued, by saying—The *Pro-*
ficiency of *Socrates*, and indeed of every
 honest Man, was sufficient to convince us,
 could we be steadfast to our Purpose, that
some Progress at least might be made toward
 this *Perfection*—How far, we knew not—
 The Field was open—The Race was free
 and common to All—Nor was the Prize,
 as usual, reserved only to the First; but
 All, who run, might depend on a Reward,

3 *None but a Fool will* ^{having}
attempt it.

4 *That y the Question*

Min: Part II. having the Voice of Nature, would they
but listen, to assure them,

* *Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatus
abit.*

§ 9. HERE he paused, and left me to meditate on what he had spoken. For some time we passed on in mutual Silence, till observing me on my part little inclined to break it, What, said he, engages you with an Attention so earnest? I was wondering, said I, whence it should happen, that in a Discourse of such a nature, you should say so little of *Religion*, of *Providence*, and a *Deity*. I have not, replied he, omitted them, because not *intimately united to Morals*; but because what ever we treat accurately, should be treated separately and apart. Multiplicity of Matter naturally tends to Confusion. They are weak Minds indeed, which dread a rational Suspence; and much more so, when in the Event, it only leads to a surer Knowledge,

* ÆNEID. I. v. N. 305.

ledge, and often strengthens the very Subject, on which we suspend. Could I however repeat you the Words of a venerable Sage, (for I can call him no other) whom once I heard differting on the Topic of Religion, and whom still I hear, whenever I think on him; you might accept perhaps my *Religious* Theories as candidly, as you have my *Moral*. I pressed him to repeat them, with which he willingly complied.

THE Speaker, said he, whose Words I am attempting to relate, and whom for the present I name *Theophilus*, was of a Character truly amiable in every part. When young, he had been fortunate in a liberal Education; had been a Friend to the Muses, and approved himself such to the Public. As Life declined, he wisely retired, and dedicated his Time almost wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he never forget the Muses, whom once he loved. He retained in his Discourse (and so in the Sequel you will soon find) a large Portion

Part II.

Part II. Portion of that rapturous, anti-prosaic Stile, in which those Ladies usually choose to express themselves,

WE were walking, not (as now) in the chearful Face of Day, but late in the Evening, when the Sun had long been set. Circumstances of Solemnity were not wanting to affect us; the Poets could not have feigned any more happy—a running Stream, an ancient Wood, a still Night, and a bright Moonshine.—I, for my own part, induced by the Occasion, fell insensibly into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the Moon. From thence I wandered to other heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, and Empires, and I know not what.

WHO lives in the Moon, said he, is perhaps more than we can well learn. It is enough, if we can be satisfied, by the help of our best Faculties, that *Intelligence* is not confined to this little Earth, which we inhabit; that tho' Men were not, the World would not want Spectators, to contemplate

its

its Beauty, and adore the Wisdom of its Author. Part II. 

“ THIS whole UNIVERSE itself is but
 “ ONE CITY OF COMMONWEALTH—
 “ *a System of Substances variously formed,*
 “ and variously *actuated* agreeably to those
 “ *forms—*a System of Substances both
 “ immensely great and small, *Rational,*
 “ *Animal, Vegetable, and Inanimate.*


“ As many Families make one Village,
 “ many Villages one Province, many Pro-
 “ vinces one Empire; so many Empires,
 “ Oceans, Waistes, and Wilds, combined,
 “ compose that Earth on which we live.
 “ Other Combinations make a Planet or a
 “ Moon; and these again, united, make
 “ one Planetary System. What higher
 “ Combinations subfist, we know not,
 “ their Gradation and Ascent it is impos-
 “ sible we should discover. Yet the ge-
 “ nerosus Mind, not deterred by this Im-
 “ mensity, intrepidly passes on, thro’ Re-
 “ gions unknown, from greater System

Q

“ to

Part II. “ to greater, till it arrive at *that greatest*,
“ where Imagination stops, and can ad-
“ vance no farther. In this last, this
“ mighty, this stupendous Idea, it beholds
“ the UNIVERSE itself, of which every
“ Thing is a Part, and with respect to
“ which not the smallest Atom is either
“ foreign or detached.

“ WIDE as its Extent, is the Wisdom
“ of its Workmanship, not bounded and
“ narrow, like the humbler Works of Art.
“ These are all of Origin no higher than
“ *Human*. We can readily trace them to
“ their utmost Limit, and with accuracy
“ discern both their Beginning and their
“ End. But where the Microscope that
“ can shew us, from what Point Wisdom
“ begins in Nature? Where the Telescope
“ that can descry, to what Infinitude it
“ extends? The more diligent our Search,
“ the more accurate our Scrutiny, the
“ more only are we convinced, that our
“ Labours can never finish; that Subjects

" inexhaustible remain behind, still un- Part II.
 " explored. 

" HENCE the Mind truly wise, quit-
 " ting the Study of *Particulars*, as know-
 " ing their *Multitude* to be *infinite* and in-
 " *comprehensible*, turns its intellectual Eye
 " to what is general and comprehensive,
 " and thro' *Generals* learns to see, and re-
 " cognize whatever exists.

" IT perceives in this view, that every
 " Substance, of every degree, has its *Na-*
 " *ture*, its proper Make, Constitution or
 " Form, by which it *acts*, and by which
 " it *suffers*. It perceives it so to fare with
 " every natural Form around us, as with
 " those Tools and Instruments by which
 " *Art* worketh its Wonders. The Saw is
 " destined to one Act; the Mallet, to an-
 " other; the Wheel answers this Purpose;
 " and the Lever answers a different. So
 " *Nature* uses the *Vegetable*, the *Brute*,
 " and the *Rational*, agreeably to the proper
 " *Form and Constitution of every Kind*. The

Q 2

" Vegetable

Part II.



“ *Vegetable* proceeds with perfect *Insensi-*
 “ *bility*. The *Brute* possesses a Sense of
 “ what is pleasurable and painful, but stops
 “ at mere *Sensation*, and is unable to go far-
 “ ther. The *Rational*, like the *Brute*, has
 “ all the Powers of mere *Sensation*, but en-
 “ joys superadded a farther transcendent
 “ *Faculty*, by which it is made conscious,
 “ not only of *what it feels*, but of *the*
 “ *Powers themselves*, which are the Sources
 “ of those very Feelings; a *Faculty*, which
 “ recognizing both *itself* and *all Things*
 “ *else*, becomes a *Canon*, a *Corrector*, and
 “ a *Standard Universal*.

“ HENCE to the *Rational alone* is im-
 “ parted that MASTER-SCIENCE, of *what*
 “ they are, *where* they are, and *the End*
 “ to which they are destined.



“ HAPPY, too happy, did they know
 “ their own Felicity; did they reverence
 “ the Dignity of their own superior Cha-
 “ racter, and never wretchedly degrade
 “ themselves into Natures to them subor-
 “ dinate.

"dinate. And yet alas! it is a Truth too Part II.
 "certain, that as the Rational only are
 "susceptible of a Happiness truly excel-
 "lent, so these only merge themselves
 "into Miseries past Indurance.

"ASSIST us then, THOU POWER
 "DIVINE, with the Light of that REA-
 "SON, by which Thou lightenest the
 "World; by which Grace and Beauty is
 "diffused thro' every Part, and the Wel-
 "fare of the Whole is ever uniformly up-
 "held; that Reason, of which *our own* is
 "but a *Particle* or *Spark*, like some *Pro-*
 "*methean* Fire, caught from Heaven above.
 "So teach us *to know ourselves*, that we
 "may attain that Knowledge, which
 "alone is worth attaining. Check our
 "vain, our idle Researches into the Laws,
 "and Natures, and Motions of other Be-
 "ings, till we have learnt and can prac-
 "tise those, which peculiarly respect our-
 "selves. Teach us to be fit Actors in
 "that general Drama, where Thou hast
 "allotted every Being, great and small, its

Q 3

" pro-

B Part II. “ proper Part, *the due Performance of which*
 “ *is the only End of its Existence.*

B “ ENABLE US to curb DESIRE within
 “ the Bounds of what is *Natural*. Enable
 “ us even to *suspend* it, till we can employ
 “ it to our Emolument. Be our *first*
 “ Work to have escaped from *wrong Opi-*
 “ *nion, and bad Habit*; that the Mind,
 “ thus rendered sincere and incorrupt, may
 “ with Safety proceed to seek its genuine
 “ Good and Happiness.

B “ WHEN we are thus previously ex-
 “ ercised, thus duly prepared, let not our
 “ LOVE there stop, where it first begins;
 “ but insensibly conduct it, by thy invi-
 “ sible Influence, from lower Objects to
 “ higher, till it arrive at that *Supreme*,
 “ where only it can find what is adequate
 “ and full. Teach us to love THEE, and
 “ THY DIVINE ADMINISTRATION—
 “ to regard the Universe itself as our true
 “ and genuine Country, not that little ca-
 “ sual Spot, where we first drew vital
 “ Air.

“ Air. Teach us each to regard *Himself*, Part II.
 “ but as a PART of this great WHOLE ;
 “ a Part which for its Welfare we are as
 “ patiently to resign, as we resign a single
 “ Limb for the Welfare of our whole
 “ Body. Let our Life be a continued
 “ Scene of ACQUIESCENCE and of GRATI-
 “ TUDE ; of Gratitude, for what we *enjoy* ;
 “ of Acquiescence, in what we *suffer* ; as
 “ both can only be referable to that
 “ concatenated Order of Events, which
 “ cannot but be *best*, as being by Thee
 “ approved and chosen.

“ IN as much as Futurity is hidden
 “ from our Sight, we can have no other
 “ *Rule of Choice*, by which to govern our
 “ Conduct, than *what seems consonant to*
 “ *the Welfare of our own particular Na-*
 “ *tures*. If it appear not contrary to Duty
 “ and moral Office, (and how should we /
 “ judge, but from what appears ?) Thou
 “ canst not but forgive us, if we prefer
 “ Health to Sickness ; the Safety of Life
 “ and Limb, to Maiming or to Death.

“ But

Q 4
 / From the Scripture

Part II.

“ But did we know that these Incidents,
 “ or any other were appointed us; were
 “ fated in that Order of incontrollable
 “ Events, by which Thou preservest and
 “ adornest the Whole, it then becomes
 “ our Duty, to meet them with Magna-
 “ nimity; to co-operate with Chearfulness
 “ in what ever Thou ordainest; that so
 “ we may know no other Will, than thine
 “ alone, and that the Harmony of our
 “ *particular* Minds with thy *Universal*,
 “ may be steady and uninterrupted thro’
 “ the Period of our Existence.

“ YET, since to attain this Height, this
 “ transcendent Height, is but barely pos-
 “ sible, if possible, to the most perfect
 “ Humanity: regard what within us is
 “ *Congenial to Thee*; raise us above our-
 “ selves, and warm us into *Enthusiasm*.
 “ But let our Enthusiasm be such, as befits
 “ the Citizens of Thy Polity; liberal,
 “ gentle, rational, and humane—not such
 “ as to debase us into poor and wretched
 “ *Slaves*, as if Thou wert our Tyrant,
 “ not

Optimism

“ not our kind and common Father ; Part II.
“ much less such as to transform us into
“ savage *Beasts of Prey*, fullen, gloomy,
“ dark, and fierce; prone to persecute, to
“ ravage, and destroy, as if the Lust of
“ Massacre could be grateful to thy Good-
“ ness. Permit us rather madly to avow
“ Villainy in thy Defiance, than impiously
“ to assert it under colour of thy Service.
“ Turn our Mind’s Eye from every Idea
“ of this Character; from the Servile, Ab-
“ ject, Horrid and Ghastly, to the Gene-
“ rous, Lovely, Fair and Godlike.

“ HERE let us dwell;—be here our
“ Study and Delight. So shall we be en-
“ abled, in the silent Mirrour of *Contem-*
“ *plation*, to behold those *Forms*, which
“ are hidden to Human Eyes—that ani-
“ mating WISDOM, which pervades and
“ rules the Whole—that LAW irresistible,
“ immutable, supreme, which leads the
“ Willing, and compels the Averse, to co-
“ operate in their Station to the general
“ Welfare—that MAGIC DIVINE, which
“ by

Part II. “ by an Efficacy past Comprehension, can
 “ transform every Appearance, the most
 “ hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit *all*
 “ things FAIR and GOOD to THEE,
 “ ESSENCE INCREATE, *who art of purer*
 “ Eyes, than ever to behold Iniquity.

“ BE these our Morning, these our
 “ Evening Meditations—with these may
 “ our Minds be unchangeably tinged—
 “ that loving Thee with a Love most dis-
 “ interested and sincere; enamoured of
 “ thy Polity, and thy DIVINE ADMI-
 “ NISTRATION; welcoming every Event
 “ with Chearfulness and Magnanimity, as
 “ being *best* upon the Whole, because or-
 “ dained of Thee; proposing nothing of
 “ ourselves, but *with a Reserve* that Thou
 “ permittest; acquiescing in every Obstruc-
 “ tion, as ultimately referable to thy Provi-
 “ dence—in a word, that working this
 “ Conduct, by due exercise, into perfect
 “ *Habit*; we may never murmur, never
 “ repine; never miss what we would ob-
 “ tain, or fall into that which we would
 “ avoid;

“ avoid; but being happy with that tran-
“ scendent *Happiness*, of which no one
“ can deprive us; and blest with that Di-
“ vine *Liberty*, which no Tyrant can an-
“ noy; we may dare address Thee with
“ pious Confidence, as the *Philosophic Bard*
“ of old,

“ *Conduct me, Thou, of Beings Cause Divine,*
“ *Where-e’er I’m destin’d in thy great Design.*
“ *Active I follow on: for should my Will*
“ *Resist, I’m impious; but must follow still.”*

IN this manner did *Theophilus*, said he, pursue the Subject, to which I had led him. He adorned his Sentiments with Expressions even more splendid than I have now employed. The Speaker, the Speech, the happy Circumstances which concurred, the Night’s Beauty and Stillness, with the Romantic Scene where we were walking, all together gave the Whole such an Energy and Solemnity, as it is impossible you should feel from the Coldness of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for my

Part II. my own part, returned home sensibly touched, and retained the strongest Feelings of what I had heard, till the following Morning. Then the Business of the Day gently obliterated all, and left me by Night as little of a Philosopher, as I had ever been before.

§ 10. AND is it possible, said I, so soon to have forgotten, what seems so striking and sublime, as the Subject you have been now treating?

It is HABIT, replied he, is all in all.

It is *Practice and Exercise, which can only make us truly any thing.*

Is it not evidently so, in the most common vulgar Arts? Did mere *Theory* alone ever make the meanest Mechanic? And is the *Supreme Artist* of *Life and Manners* to be formed more easily, than such a one? Happy for us, could we prove it near so easy. But believe me, my Friend, good Things are not so cheap. *Nothing is to be had gratis*, much less that which is most valuable.

YET

YET however for our Comfort, we have this to encourage us, that, tho' the Difficulty of *acquiring* Habits be great and painful, yet nothing so easy, so pleasant, as their *Energies*, when once wrought by Exercise to a due Standard of Perfection. I know you have made some Progress in *Musick*. Mark well what you can do, as a Proficient this way—You can do that, which without Habit, as much exceeds the wisest Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to ascend a Cliff perpendicular. You can even do it with Facility; and (lest you should think I flatter) not you yourself alone, but a thousand others beside, whose low Rank and Genius no way raise them above the Multitude. If then you are so well assured of this Force of Habit in one Instance, judge not in other Instances by your own present Insufficiency. Be not shocked at the *apparent Greatness* of the *perfect Moral Character*, when you compare it to the *Weakness* and *Imperfection* of your own. On the contrary, when these

Part II.

dark,
/ Apply this to Christian Habits

B Part II. dark, these melancholy Thoughts assail you, immediately turn your Mind to the Consideration of *Habit*. Remember how *easy* its Energies to those, who *possess* it; and yet how *impracticable* to such, as *possess* it not.

IT must be owned, said I, that this is a Satisfaction, and may be some kind of Assistance in a melancholy Hour. And yet this very Doctrine naturally leads to another Objection.—Does not *the Difficulty of attaining Habit* too well support a certain Assertion, that, *defend Virtue as we will, it is but a Scheme of Self-denial?*

B BY *Self-denial*, said he, you mean, I suppose, something like what follows—*Appetite* bids me eat; *Reason* bids me forbear—If I obey Reason, I deny Appetite; and Appetite being a *Part of myself*, to deny it, is a *Self-denial*. What is true thus in *Luxury*, is true also in other Subjects; is evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of Resentment, or whatever else we pursue
by

by the Dictate of any Passion. You Part II.
appear, said I, to have stated the Objection justly.



To return then to our Instance, said he, of Luxury. *Appetite* bids me eat; *Reason* bids me forbear—If I *obey Reason*, I *deny Appetite*—and if I *obey Appetite*, do I not *deny Reason*? Can I *act either way, without rejecting one of them*? And is not *Reason a Part of myself*, as notoriously as *Appetite*?

OR to take another Example—I have a Deposite in my Hands. *Avarice* bids me retain—*Conscience* bids me restore. Is there not a *reciprocal Denial*, let me obey *which I will*? And is not *Conscience a Part of me*, as truly as *Avarice*?

POOR SELF indeed must be denied, take which Party we will. But why should *Virtue* be arraigned of thwarting it, more than *Vice* her contrary?—Make the most of the Argument, it can come but to this—

Part II. this—If *Self-denial* be an Objection to *Virtue*, so is it to *Vice*—If *Self-denial* be no Objection to *Vice*, no more can it be to *Virtue*. A wonderful and important Conclusion indeed !

HE continued by saying, that the *Soul of Man* appeared not as a *single Faculty*, but as *compounded of many*—that as these Faculties were not always in perfect Peace one with another, so there were few Actions which we could perform, where they would be *all* found to *concur*. What then are we to do? Suspend till they agree?—That were indeed impossible.—Nothing therefore can remain, but to weigh well their several Pretensions; to hear all, that each has to offer in its behalf; and finally to pursue the Dictates of the *Wiseſt* and the *Beſt*. This done, as for the *Self-denial*, which we force upon the reſt; with regard to our own *Character*, it is a Matter of Honour and Praise—with regard to the *Faculties denied*, it is a Matter of as ſmall Weight, as to condemn the Noiſe and Clamours of a
mad

mad and senseless Mob, in deference to the Part II. 
 sober Voice of the worthier, better Citizens. And what Man could be justified, 
 should he reject these, and prefer a Rabble?

§ 10. IN this place he paused again, and I took occasion to acknowledge, that my Objection appeared obviated. As the Day advanced apace, he advised that we might return home; and walking along leisurely, thus resumed to himself the Discourse.


I DARE say, continued he, you have seen many a wise Head shake, in pronouncing that sad Truth, *how we are governed all by INTEREST.*—And what do they think should govern us else? Our Loss, our Damage, our *Disinterest*?—Ridiculous indeed! We should be Ideots in such case, more than rational Animals. The only Question is, *where Interest truly lies?* For if this once be well adjusted, no Maxim can be more harmless. 

R

“ I

Part II.

“ I FIND myself existing upon a little
 “ Spot, surrounded every way by an im-
 “ mense unknown Expansion.—Where
 “ am I? What Sort of a Place do I
 “ inhabit? Is it exactly accommodated,
 “ in every Instance, to my Convenience?
 “ Is there no Excess of Cold, none of
 “ Heat, to offend me? Am I never an-
 “ noyed by Animals, either of my own
 “ kind, or a different? Is every thing
 “ subservient to me, as tho’ I had ordered
 “ all myself?—No—nothing like it—
 “ the farthest from it possible——The
 “ World appears not then originally made
 “ for the *private Convenience of me alone?*—
 “ It does not.—But is it not possible so to
 “ accommodate it, by my own particular
 “ Industry?——If to accommodate Man
 “ and Beast, Heaven and Earth; if this be
 “ beyond me, it is not possible——What
 “ Consequence then follows? Or can
 “ there be any other than this—*If I seek*
 “ *an Interest of my own, detached from that*
 “ of

" *of others; I seek an Interest which is chi-* Part II.
 " *merical, and can never have Existence?* 

" How then must I determine? Have
 " I no Interest at all?—If I have not, I
 " am a Fool for staying here. It is a
 " smoaky House, and the sooner out of
 " it, the better—But why no Interest?—
 " Can I be contented with none, but one
 " separate and detached?—Is a SOCIAL
 " INTEREST joined with others such an
 " Absurdity, as not to be admitted? The
 " Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herd-
 " ing Animals, are enough to convince
 " me, that the thing is, *somewhere at*
 " *least*, possible. How then am I assured,
 " that it is not equally true of *Man*?—
 " Admit it; and what follows?—If so,
 " then HONOUR and JUSTICE are my
 " INTEREST—then the WHOLE TRAIN
 " OF MORAL VIRTUES are my INTE-
 " REST; *without some Portion of which,*
 " *not even Thieves can maintain Society.*

R 2

" BUT

Part II.

" BUT farther still—I stop not here—
 " I pursue this *Social Interest*, as far as I
 " can trace my several *Relations*. I pass
 " from my own Stock, my own Neigh-
 " bourhood, my own Nation, to the *whole*
 " *Race of Mankind*, as dispersed through-
 " out the Earth.—Am I not *related to them*
 " *all*, by the mutual Aids of Commerce;
 " by the general Intercourse of Arts and
 " Letters; by that *common Nature*, of
 " which we all participate?—Again—
 " I must have Food and Cloathing.—
 " Without a proper genial Warmth,
 " I instantly perish.—Am I not rela-
 " ted, in this view, to the very *Earth*
 " itself? To the distant *Sun*, from
 " whose beams I derive Vigour? To that
 " stupendous *Course and Order of the infi-*
 " *nite Host of Heaven*, by which the Times
 " and Seasons ever uniformly pass on?—
 " Were this Order once confounded, I
 " could not probably survive a Moment;
 " *so absolutely do I depend on this common*
 " *general Welfare*.

" WHAT

“ WHAT then have I to do, but to Part II.
“ enlarge VIRTUE into PIETY? Not
“ only *Honour* and *Justice*, and what I
“ owe to MAN, is my *Interest*; but *Grati-*
“ *tude*, also *Acquiescence*, *Resignation*, *Ado-*
“ *ration*, and all I owe to this great *Polity*,
“ and its greater GOVERNOR, OUR COM-
“ MON PARENT.

“ BUT if all these MORAL and DI-
“ VINE HABITS be my INTEREST, I
“ need not surely seek for a better, I
“ have an Interest *compatible* with the
“ Spot on which I live—I have an In-
“ terest which may exist, without *altering*
“ the Plan of Providence; without *mend-*
“ *ing* or *marring* the general Order of
“ Events.—I can bear whatever happens
“ with manlike Magnanimity; can be
“ contented, and fully happy in the *Good*,
“ which I possess; and can pass thro’ this
“ turbid, this fickle, fleeting Period, with-
“ out Bewailings, or Envyings, or Mur-
“ murings, or Complaints.”

Part II.

AND thus my Friend, have you my Sentiments, as it were abridged; my Sentiments on that Subject, which engages every one of us. For who would be unhappy? Who would not, if he knew how, enjoy *one perpetual Felicity*? Who are there existing, who do not at every Instant, seek it? It is the Wish, the Employ, not of the Rational Man only, but of the Sot, the Glutton, the very lowest of our kind. For my own System, whether a just one, you may now examine, if you think proper. I can only say on its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, it is a grateful Error, which I cherish and am fond of. And yet if really such, I shall never deem it so sacred, as not willingly, upon Conviction, to resign it up to Truth.

LITTLE passed after this worth relating. We had not far to walk, and we fell into common Topics. Yet one Observation of his I must not omit. It was
 4 what

I admire your Candor

what follows.—When we are once, Part II.
said he, well *habituated* to this CHIEF,
this MORAL SCIENCE, then LOGIC
and PHYSICS become two profitable
Adjuncts: *Logic*, to secure to us the
Possession of our Opinions; that, if an
Adversary attack, we may not basely give
them up: *Physics*, to explain the Reason
and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that
we may know something of that Universe,
where our Dwelling has been appointed
us. But let me add a Saying (and may
its Remembrance never escape you) while
you find this great, this *Master-Science*
wanting, value *Logic* but as *Sophistry*, and
Physics but as *Raree-shew*; for both, assure
yourself, will be found nothing better.

IT was soon after this that our Walk
ended. With it ended a Conversation,
which had long engaged us; and which,
according to my Promise, I have here en-
deavoured to transcribe.

THE END.

Advertisement to the Reader,

THE Author has chosen to separate all Notes from his first and third Treatises, and thus subjoin them to the End, because those Treatises, being written in Dialogue, from their Nature and Genius admit not of Interruption. One of his Reasons for adding Notes was, to give Weight to his Assertions from the Authority of Antient Writers, But his chief and principal Reason was, to excite (if possible) the Curiosity of Readers, to examine with stricter Attention those valuable Remains of antient Literature. Should he obtain this End, he shall think his Labours (such as they are) abundantly rewarded.



THE HISTORY OF THE

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NOTES

ON

TREATISE the First;

CONCERNING

ART.

NOTE I. p. 6. ALL ART IS CAUSE.] *Artis maxime proprium, creare & gignere.* Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22. Ἐστὶ δὲ τέχνη πάντα περὶ γένεσιν. *All Art is employed in Production, that is, in making something to be.* Aristot. Ethic. Nicom. l. 6. c. 4.

THE *active efficient Causes* have been ranged and enumerated after different manners. In the same *Ethics*, they are enumerated thus—αἴτια γὰρ δοῦναι εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τύχη· ἔτι δὲ νῦς, καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. *The several Causes appear to be Nature, Necessity, and Chance; and besides these, Mind or Intellect, and whatever operates by or thro' Man.* l. 3. c. 3. The Paraphrast *Andronicus*, in explaining this last Passage, Πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, adds οἷον τέχνη, ἢ ἄλλη τις πράξις, *as for instance, Art, or any other human Action,*

ALEX-

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS speaks of efficient Causes as follows: Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ κυρίως αἰτια ποιοτικά, φύσις τε, καὶ τέχνη, καὶ προαίρεσις. *The Causes, which are strictly and properly efficient, are Nature, Art, and each Man's particular Choice of Action, περὶ Ψύχης. p. 160. B. Edit. Ald.*

IN what Manner ART is distinguished from the rest of these efficient Causes, the subsequent Notes will attempt to explain.

NOTE II. p. 6. OF THAT PAINTER FAMED IN STORY, &c.] See *Valer. Max.* 1. 8. c. 11. See also *Dion, Chrysostom, Orat.* 63. p. 590.

NOTE III. p. 12. ART IS MAN BECOMING A CAUSE, INTENTIONAL AND HABITUAL.] *Aristotle*, in his *Rhetoric*, thus accurately enumerates all the possible manners, either direct or indirect, in which Mankind may be said to *act* or *do* any thing. Πάντες δὴ πράττεισι πάντα, τὰ μὲν ἔτι δι' αἰτίας· τὰ δὲ, δι' αἰτίας· τῶν μὲν ἔν μὴ δι' αἰτίας, τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττεισι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ μὲν βία, τὰ δὲ φύσει· ὥστε πάντα, ὅσα μὴ δι' αἰτίας πράττεισι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης· τὰ δὲ φύσει· τὰ δὲ βία· Ὅσα δὲ δι' αἰτίας, καὶ ἂν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν δι' ἔθος, τὰ δὲ δι' ὀρεξίν· καὶ τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὀρεξίν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀλόγιστον· ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν βέλησις, μετὰ λόγον ὀρεξίς ἀγαθῶν — ἀλογοὶ δ' ὀρέξεις, ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία· ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττεισιν, ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι' αἰτίας ἐπὶ· διὰ τύχην, διὰ βίαν, διὰ φύσιν.

φύσιν, δι' ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμὸν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.

All Men do all Things, either of themselves, or not of themselves. The Things which they do not of themselves, they do either by Chance, or from Necessity; and the Things done from Necessity, they do either by Compulsion, which is External Necessity, or by Nature, which is Internal. So that all Things whatsoever, which Men do not of themselves, they do either by Chance, or from Compulsion, or by Nature.

Again, the Things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves properly the Causes, some they do thro' Custom and acquired Habit, others thro' original and natural Desire. Farther, the Things done thro' natural Desire they do, either thro' such Desire assisted by Reason, or thro' such Desire devoid of Reason. If it be assisted by Reason, then it assumes the Denomination of Will,—on the contrary, the irrational Desires are Anger and Appetite.

Hence it appears that all Things whatever, which Men do, they necessarily do thro' one of these seven Causes; either thro' Chance, Compulsion, Nature, Custom, Will, Anger, Appetite. Arist. Rhet. l. i. c. 10.

It remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to consider with which of these Causes we ought to arrange ART.

As to CHANCE, it may be observed in general of all Casual Events, that they always exclude Intention or Design: But Intention and Design, are from Art

Art inseparable. Thus is the Difference between *Art* and *Chance* manifest.

AS to EXTERNAL COMPULSION, we have it thus described—Βίαιον δὲ ἔστι ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐξωθεν. *That is, an Act of Compulsion, the efficient Principle of which is from without, independent of the Doer. Ethic. Nic. l. 3. c. 1.* Again, in the same Treatise, l. 6. c. 4. we are told of the Works of *Art*, that they are such, ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιῶνι, *the efficient Principle of which is in the Doer or Agent.* Thus therefore is *Art* distinguished from *Compulsion*.

THESE two Causes, *Chance* and *Compulsion*, are mentioned and considered in the Dialogue, Pages 6 and 7.

NATURE, or rather NATURAL NECESSITY, is that Cause, thro' which we breathe, perspire, digest, circulate our Blood, &c. *Will, Anger, and Appetite*, are (as already observed) but so many Species of NATURAL DESIRE, considered either as assisted by Reason, or else as devoid of it. Now tho' *Natural Desire* and *Natural Necessity* differ, because in the one we act spontaneously, in the other not spontaneously, yet both of them meet in the common Genus of *Natural Power*. Moreover this is true of all *Natural Power*, that the *Power* itself is prior to any *Energies* or *Acts* of that *Power*. 'Ου γὰρ ἐκ τῆ πολλάνης ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάνης αἰεῖσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, ἢ χρησάμενοι ἔχομεν. *For [to instance in the natural Powers of Sensation] it was not from often seeing, and often hearing, that we acquired*

acquired those Senses; but on the contrary, being first possessed of them, we then used them, not through any Use or Exercise did we come to possess them. *Arist. Ethic.* l. 2. c. 1.

Now the contrary to this is true in the case of any Powers or Faculties not natural, but acquired by Custom and Usage. For here there are many Energies and Acts, which must necessarily precede the Existence of such Power or Habit, it being evident (as is said in the same Chapter) that ἐν τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, from similar and homogeneous Energies it is that Habits are obtained. So again, in the same Place, ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθήσας ποιεῖν, τὰυτα ποιῶντες μακρύνομεν· οἷον οἰκοδομῶντες οἰκοδομοὶ γίνονται, καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. The Things which we are to do by having learnt, we learn by doing. Thus by building Men become Builders, and by practising Music they become Musicians.

THUS therefore is ART distinguished from ALL NATURAL POWER OF MAN, whether Natural Necessity, Will, Anger, or Appetite. But ART has been already distinguished from CHANCE and COMPULSION. So that being clearly not the same with six of those seven Causes, by which all Men do all Things, it must needs be referred to the seventh, that is, to CUSTOM or HABIT.

It must be observed, the natural Causes or Powers in Man, considered as distinct from Art, are treated in the Dialogue, Pages 8 and 9.

AND

AND now, as we have shewn *Art* to be a certain Cause working in *Man*, it remains to shew how it is distinguished from those other Causes beside *Man*, which we suppose to operate in the Universe. These are either such Causes as are below him, like the *Vegetative Power*, which operates in Vegetables, the *Sensitive* in Animals; or else such Causes as are above him, like *God*, and whatever is else of Intelligence more than human.

THE CAUSES BELOW us may be all included in the common Genus of *NATURE*; and of *Nature* we may say universally, as well of *Nature* without us as within us, that its several Operations, contrary to those of *Art*, are not in the least degree derived from Custom or Usage. Thus the Author above cited—
 'Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζειται· οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος, ἐκ ἂν ἐθισθεῖν ἄνω φέρεσθαι, ἔδ' ἂν μυρίακις αὐτὸν ἐθίξη τις ἄνω ρίπτων, ἔδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω. None of those Things, which are what they are by Nature, can be altered by being accustomed. Thus a Stone, which by Nature is carried downward, can never be accustomed to mount upwards, no, not tho' any one should ten thousand times attempt it, by throwing the Stone upward. The same may be said of accustoming Fire to move downward. *Ethic. Nicom.* l. 2. c. 1. Again, in the Works of Nature, such as Trees, Animals, and the like, the efficient Principle, is vitally united to the Subjects, wherein it operates.—ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν τὰ πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν. *Ethic. Nicom.* l. 6. c. 4. But in the Works of Art, such as Statues or Houses, the efficient Principle is disunited from the Subjects, and exists not in the Things done or made,

but in the *Doer or Artist*—ὡν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιῶντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ. *Ethic. Nic.* 1. 6. c. 4. It is indeed possible that, even in *Works of Art*, the *Subject and efficient Cause* may be united, as in the Case of a Physician becoming his own Patient, and curing himself. But then it must be remembered that this Union is κατὰ συμβεβηκός, merely *accidental*, and no way *essential* to the constituting of Art, considered as Art. By this therefore is ART clearly distinguished from NATURE, whose Definition informs us that it is—ἀρχὴ τίς καὶ ἄλλια τὴ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως, καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. *A certain Principle or Cause of moving and ceasing to move, in some Subject wherein such Principle exists immediately, essentially, and not by way of Accident.* Arist. Natur. Aufc. 1. 2: c. 1.

THE CAUSES, which are of Rank SUPERIOUR to Man, such as the DEITY, can have nothing to do with Art, because being (as is said in the Dialogue, p. 11.) perfect and complete, and knowing all from the Beginning, they can never admit of what is additional and secondary. Art therefore can only belong to Beings, like Men, who being imperfect, know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them by Helps secondary and subsequent. It was from a like Consideration that Pythagoras called himself a PHILOSOPHER, that is to say (according to his own Explication of the Name) a Lover and Seeker of what was wise and good, but not a Possessor, which he deemed a character above him. Consonant to this we read in *Plato's Banquet*, θεῶν ἰδού

NOTES on TREATISE the First.

ἔδει φιλοσοφεῖν, ἔδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ, &c. No GOD philosophizes, or desires to become wise, FOR HE IS SO ALREADY. Nor, if there be any other Being wise, doth he philosophize for the same Reason. On the other hand, neither do the Indocil philosophize; for this is the Misfortune of Indocility, without being virtuous, good or prudent, to appear to ones self sufficient in all these Respects. In general therefore, he who thinketh himself in no want, desireth not that, which he thinks himself not to need. Who then, said Socrates to Diotima, (the Speaker of this Narration) WHO ARE THOSE WHO PHILOSOPHIZE, if they are neither the Wise nor the Indocil? That (replied she) may be now conspicuous even to a Child. THEY ARE THOSE OF MIDDLE RANK, BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES. Plat. p. 203. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani.

HERE we see (agreeably to what is said in the Dialogue, pages 11. and 12.) that as to acquired or secondary Habits, some Beings are too excellent for them, and others too base; and that the DEITY above all is in the number of those transcendent, and is thus, as a Cause, distinguished from ART. Vid. Amm. περὶ Ἐρμην. p. 26. b. et omnino eis καλῶν. p. 127, 128.

THERE are, besides the Deity and Nature now spoken of, certain other external Causes, which are mentioned in the first Note as distinct from Art; namely Chance and Necessity. But of these hereafter, when we consider the Subject of Art.

NOTE

NOTE IV. p. 13. FACULTIES, POWERS, &c. ARE OBSCURE AND HIDDEN THINGS—ENER-

GIES AND OPERATIONS LIE OPEN TO THE SENSES.]

Εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν, οἷον τὸ νοητικόν, ἢ τί τὸ αἰσθητικόν, πρότερον ἐπισκεψέσθαι, τί τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ τί τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι· πρότεροι γὰρ καὶ σαφέ-
τεροι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τῶν δυνάμεων εἰσι αἱ ἐνέργειαι· προεν-
θυγχάνομεν γὰρ αἰσθεῖς, καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπινοοῦμεν. If we are to explain what each of these Things are, as for instance, what the intelligent Principle, what the sensitive, we must first inquire what it is to think, what to see, hear, and use the Senses. For with respect to us Men, the ENERGIES are PRIOR and MORE EVIDENT than the POWERS, because it is in the Energies we are first conversant, and comprehend the Powers from them. Themist. in lib. 2. de Animâ, p. 76. Edit. Ald. Fol. Aristot. de An. II. 4.

NOTE V. p. 15. ARE THERE NOT PRECEPTS, &c.] Vid. Plat in Min. tom. 2. p. 316, 17. Edit. Serran. et in Gorgia, tom. i. p. 465. A. ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην ἔκαλῶ, ὃ ἂν ἡ ἀλογον πρόγμα.

As to those low Habits here mentioned, from which we distinguish Art by the Number and Dignity of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Denomination of Μαλαιοτεχνία, of which Quintilian gives the following Account. Μαλαιοτεχνία quoque est quædam, id est, supervacua Artis Imitatio, quæ nihil sane nec boni nec mali habeat, sed vanum laborem: qualis illius fuit, qui grana ciceris, ex spatio distante missa, in acum continuo & sine frustratione inferebat; quem, cum spectasset Alexander, donasse dicitur ejusdem

NOTES on TREATISE the First.

leguminis modio. Quod quidem præmium fuit illo opere dignissimum. Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 20.

NOTE VI. p. 17. AN HABITUAL POWER IN MAN OF BECOMING THE CAUSE OF SOME EFFECT, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS—]

THE *Peripatetic* Definition of Art is Ἐξὶς μετὰ λόγῳ ἀληθῶς ποιητικὴ — an efficient Habit, joined with sound and true Reason. *Aristot. Ethic. Nic. l. 6. c. 4.*

THE *Stoic* Definition, as we find it in *Sext. Empir. adversus Logicos*, p. 392. is, Σύστημα ἐκ κατὰλήψεων ἐγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τὸ τέλος εὐχεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Thus translated by *Cicero* in *Diodes de Grammat. l. 2. Ars est Perceptionum exercitatarum collectio, ad unum exitum vitæ utilem pertinentium.* And again by *Quintilian*, *Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 18. Artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus & coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitæ.* The same Definition is also alluded to in the *Academics* of *Cicero*, *l. 2. c. 7.* where it is said—*Ars vero quæ potest esse, nisi quæ non ex una, aut duabus, sed ex multis animi perceptionibus constat?*

THERE is a third Definition of Art cited by *Quintilian* in the same place, and ascribed by him to *Cleanthes*—*Ars est potestas viâ (id est, ordine) efficiens.* The Greek, from which this Latin Definition is taken, is fuller and more philosophical. The Words are—Ἐξὶς ὁδῷ βαδίζουσα μετὰ φαντασίας—which may be rendered, an Habit, which proceeds in a Road or Method, having a Sense withal of what it is about. The last

last Character distinguishes Art from the natural Energies of all things *insensitive*, which, tho' they proceed *methodically*, yet want a *Sense* of what they are doing. Vid. Niceph. Blemmid. Epit. Logic. p. 20.

Now if we compare these Definitions with that in the Dialogue, we shall find them all to correspond. *The Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Cause of some Effect*, is the same as *Ἐξίς ποιητικῇ* in the *Peripatetic* Definition. According to a System of various and well-approved Precepts, is the same as *μετὰ λόγου ἀληθούς*. For sound and true Reason must needs be the Basis of all such Precepts.

AGAIN, as to the second Definition—The Words *Σύστημα κατανόησεων* [*a System of Comprehensions, or of certain and evident Truths*] correspond to the latter Part of the Definition in the Dialogue—According to a System of various and well-approved Precepts. The Word *ἐργετυμασμένων* [that is to say, *worked in by Habit and Exercise*] corresponds to the first Part, that Art is a Cause founded in Habit. And the rest [*πρὸς τὸ τέλος, &c.* that is to say, *a System which has respect to some useful and serviceable End or Purpose in Human Life*] shews the System here mentioned to regard *Practice* and *Action*, not *Theory* and *Speculation*. And thus does it correspond with the Definition of the Dialogue, where it is said that Art is an *Habitual Power* not of merely *contemplating* and *knowing*, but of *becoming the Cause of some Effect*. It is not indeed expressed in the Dialogue, that this Effect has respect to the *Utility of Human Life*, because this latter Circumstance is reserved to the Definition of the final Cause of Art, given page 29.

As to the third Definition of Art, *potestas viâ efficiens*, a Power of operating methodically, it may be observed, that by being called an operating Power, it is distinguished from Powers purely speculative: and as it is said to operate methodically, or in a Road and regular Process, it is distinguished from Chance as well as blind Necessity. And thus far it corresponds with what is offered in the Dialogue. But it does not appear from this Definition, whether the Power therein mentioned be Original and Natural, or Secondary and Habitual, because Powers of either sort may operate methodically. And perhaps Cleanthes intended not to distinguish so far, but took Art in that larger and more general Sense, adopted sometimes by the Stoics; as when they describe Nature herself to be a Πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῶ βα-
 δίζον πρὸς γένεσιν, an artificial Fire, proceeding methodically to Production or Creation. For it is not to be imagined, they intended by this to insinuate that Nature was a Fire, which had learnt by Habit so to operate. On the contrary, by artificial it is probable they intended no more than some active efficient Principle, working with Reason, Order, and Method; of which Principle they considered Fire to be the properest vehicle, as being of all Bodies the most subtle, and that into which the rest are all ultimately resolvable. Vide Diog. Laert. l. 7. Sect. 156. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 22.

NOTE VII. page 22. IT SHOULD SEEM THAT THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF ART WAS — ALL THOSE CONTINGENT NATURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN THE REACH OF HUMAN POWERS TO INFLUENCE.]

THE CAUSE here treated is the MATERIAL, the ὕλη, or ὑποκείμενον, or τὸ ἐξ ἧς γινέσθαι τι ἐνυπάρχει.

OF a *Contingent* we have the following Definition—Λέγω δ' ἐνδεχέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἢ μὴ ὄν ἀναγκαῖα, τεθέντι δ' ὑπάρχειν, ἔδεν εἶναι διὰ τούτων ἀδύνατον. I call that a CONTINGENT, which not being necessary, but being supposed to be, there will follow nothing impossible from such supposition. Arist. Anal. prior. l. i. c. 13. Diog. Laert. l. 3. § 10.

THAT this is true in Works of *Art*, is evident. It is not necessary, that a given Fragment of such a Rock should assume the Figure of *Hercules*: but there follows nothing impossible, if we suppose it so figured. It is for this reason, that the *Subject of Art* is in the Dialogue called a *Contingent*,

BUT however, to explain the whole of what is said in this Place, it is necessary to go backward, and deduce what we would say from some remoter Considerations.

THE *Peripatetics* held the *End* or Aim of their Philosophy to be the discovering and knowing the ἀρχή, the primary and creative Principle of all Things. They pursued this Inquiry, when they reasoned analytically, that is to say, upwards, by beginning their Contemplation from those things, which are to us first in the Order of our Comprehension, and so ascending gradually to that which is truly first in the real Order of Beings. Ammon. εις E. φων. p. 36.

THE first and original Objects of our Comprehension are those nearer and more immediate, viz. the Objects of Sense, with which we are surrounded on every Side. These Objects we perceive to be all in motion; and the Motions are multiform, various, and often opposite to each other. The Consequences of this we perpetually behold. By such Motions we see that not only the mere local Site of these Beings is changed, but their very Bulk, and Figure, and Qualities; nay more than this, even the Beings themselves are made to separate and perish, while new Beings arise from the Re-assembly of the scattered Parts, which Parts different Motions can as well bring together, as disunite. The Beings or Objects of the Character here described, the Peripatetics denoted under the common Appellation of the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ φθαρτά, the Beings moving and corruptible.

FROM these moving and perishable Objects, they passed to those sublimer and more transcendent Objects of Sense, which they saw adorn the Heavens. Here likewise they discovered Motion; but then this Motion was uniform and constant; affecting not the Beings moved, save in the relation of local Site. As therefore they beheld no Change in the Form and Essence of these Beings, they deemed them (upon their Hypothesis) incorruptible, and out of them established another Class of Beings, that is to say, the τὰ κινούμενα καὶ ἀφθάρτα, the Beings moving and incorruptible,

FROM these sublimer Objects of Sense, they passed to Objects of pure Intellect; to Bodies devoid of all Motion, and of all Quality, save that inseparable one
of

of *Figure*; such Bodies for instance as the Cube, the Sphere, and the rest of Bodies *mathematical*. From *mathematical* Bodies, and the *Truths* resulting from them, they passed to the Contemplation of *Truth* in general; to the *Soul*, and its Powers both of *Intuition* and *Syllogization*; to *Being universal*, and above both *Time* and *Place*; and thus at last to that *supreme Cause*, the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the same *immutable* and *eternal*. The several *Objects* of this *intellectual Comprehension* they stiled not merely ἀφθάρτα, but ἀφθάρτα καὶ ἀνίμνα, *Beings incorruptible and immoveable*. V. inf. Note xvii.

IN this manner did the *Peripatetics* speculate. And hence was it they established to themselves *three Species* of Philosophical Employment—one about Beings *motionless* and *eternal*; another, about Beings *moveable* and *eternal*; and a third, about Beings *moveable* and *perishable*. The first they held the proper Employment of the *Metaphysician*; the two last of the *Astronomer* and the *Naturalist*.

Διὸ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματεῖαι· ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀνίμνων· ἡ δὲ, περὶ κινέμενων μὲν, ἀφθάρτων δὲ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ τὰ φθάρτα. Idcirco tres sunt tractationes; una, de immobili: altera de eo, quod movetur quidem, sed est interitus expers; tertia de rebus, interitui obnoxiiis. Aristot. Natural. Ausc. l. 2. c. 7. Διὸ καὶ τρεῖς αἱ πραγματεῖαι· ἡ μὲν, περὶ κινέμενα καὶ φθάρτα· ἡ δὲ περὶ κινέμενα, ἀφθάρτα δὲ· ἡ δὲ, περὶ ἀνίμνα καὶ ἀφθάρτα. Themistii Paraphrasis in loc.

THIS *threefold Subject* of Philosophic Inquiry is elegantly explained in the following Passage. Τί δὲ

τὸ

τὸ τέλ^θ ἐστὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς φιλοσοφίας; φαμέν ὅτι γινῶναι τὴν πάντων ἀρχὴν, τὴν τῶν πάντων δημιουργὸν αἰλίαν, τὴν αἰεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν· ἀποδείκνυσσι γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴν, καὶ ἀσώματον· ἐξ ἐκείνης δὲ τὰ πάντα παράγεσθαι. Τίνα δὲ τὰ ἄγونيا ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸτο τὸ τέλ^θ; φαμέν ὅτι ἡ διδασκαλία τῶν ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ μετεωρῶν ὑπαρχόντων· τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν, διὰ μεσῶν μαθηματικῶν, ἀνάλλομεν εὐαίως ἐπὶ τὰ αἰεὶ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐράνια· καὶ ἔτω, μετὰ τὰς ἀσωμάτους ἑσίας, ἐπὶ τὴν πρῶτην πάντων ἀρχὴν. Πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως ἢ κατ' ἑσίαν ἔσης, ἢ κατὰ ποῖον, ἢ κατὰ τόπον, τὰ μὲν ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ κατὰ πάσαν κίνησιν κινῆναι· τα δὲ ἐράνια κατὰ μόνην τὴν κατὰ τόπον. Διὸ χρὴ εὐλαίως ὀδεύειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολυτρόπως κινουμένων ἐπὶ τὰ κατὰ μίαν, καὶ μόνην κίνησιν κινούμενα, καὶ ἔτως ἐπὶ ΤΗΝ ΑΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΕΙ ΩΣΑΥΤΩΣ ΕΧΟΤΕΣΑΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ. Αμμονίς εἰς τὰς καθήγορίας, p. 12. Edit. Venit. 8vo. 1545.

THE Author of the Dialogue has had Reference to this *threefold Division of Subjects*, as may be seen in that Part of his Dialogue, which gives occasion to the present Comment. He has chosen however to stile the τὰ Ὀυράνια, or *Heavenly Bodies*, rather *Contingents of higher Order*, than *Beings necessary*, as imagining the former to be their truer Character.

IT may be here added, that the *Peripatetics* confined Φύσις, or *Nature*, for the most part, to this Earth of our's, where they considered her as the *active Principle of Life* in *Plants* and *Animals*. Hence therefore they distinguished not her *Effects* from those of *Art*, by their *Necessity* (for the *Effects* of both they treated as *contingent*) but from the Cause in *Natural Subjects*

Subjects operating *within*, in *Artificial without*, as has been already observed, p. 256, 257. See *Diog. Laert.* p. 459.

It may be farther added, that they placed these *Effects* of *Art* and *Nature*, and indeed all other *Contingents* whatever, in a *middle Rank* between Things *Necessary*, and Things *Impossible*. The Reason was evident. Things *Necessary* could not *but* be; Things *Impossible* could *not* be; but *Contingents* were τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, that is, *were equally susceptible both of Being and Non-being*.

BUT still tho' all *Contingents* admitted on their Hypothesis both of *Being* and *Non-being*, yet they supposed some to have a greater Tendency to *Existence*, and others to have a less. The first Species of these they stiled τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεον, the *Things which happen for the most part*; the last, τὰ ἐπ' ἑλαττον, the *Things which happen less frequently*.

Now as it is evident that both *Nature* and *Art* oftener obtain their *End*, than miss it (for complete Animals are more frequently born than Monsters, and the Musician, if an Artist, strikes oftener the right String than the wrong) hence it was, that they ranged the *Effects* of *Nature* and *Art* among those *Contingents* which were τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεον, *Contingents of greater Frequency*. But yet as these *Effects* were not from the Hypothesis *necessary*, and *contrary* to these upon occasion happened, hence it was, that whenever either *Nature* or *Art* became *Causes* of the τὰ ἐπ' ἑλαττον, *those rarer Events*,

Events, in such case they (Nature and Art) were considered by these Philosophers as ἀντίαι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, *Causes by way of Accident*, and not according to their own *Essence* and distinguishing *Character*. In such Instances it was, that they assumed the Names of Τύχη and Ἀυτομάλον, FORTUNE and CHANCE, Τύχη having mostly Reference to Works of Men, Ἀυτομάλον to Works of Nature. The Instances given by *Themistius*, in cases of *Chance* and *Fortune*, are as follow. A Tile falls from a House. The *End* of its falling is to arrive at that lower Place, whither *Nature* would carry it by the common Law of *Gravity*. In falling it strikes and wounds a Passenger. This *last* Event is from *Chance*. Again, a Man digs in his Garden, to plant. In digging, he discovers a hidden Treasure. This *last* Event is from *Fortune*. And thus, adds *Themistius*, ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία, ἀλλὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὴν αἰτία, ἀλλὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The same individual *Action* is the Cause of one Thing from its own peculiar *Character*, and of another Thing, by way of *Accident*. And again, ἔστι μὲν ἓν καὶ τῶν ἕτως συμβαινόντων ἢ τὴν φύσιν ἢ τὴν προαίρεσιν αἰτίαν πῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔκαστ' αὐτὴν ἔκαστ' ἕνεκα τῶν χάριν ἕτερον προήλθεν ὁ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἕτερον ἢ κέραμιν κατηνέχθαι, ἀλλ' εἰ ἅρα, κατὰ συμβεβηκός. — Of these Events we may call *Nature* or *Human Will* in a manner the Cause, but yet not so from themselves, and according to their own peculiar *Essence*; for it was not for the sake of what happened that either the Passenger WENT FORTH, or the Tile FELL DOWNWARD, but if any Thing it was by *Accident*. *Themist.* in lib. 2. *Natur. Aufcult.* p. 26. *Edit. Ald.* See also *Aristot. Natur. Aufcult.* l. 2. c. 4, 5, 6. *Ammon in Prædicam.* p. 113. b. This Doctrine came originally

originally from *Plato*, whose *Definition* of *Fortune* was, Συμπτῶμα φύσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως, a *Symptom*, or thing co-incident either with *Nature* or *Human Will*. Vid. *Suidam in Voc. Ἐμαρμέν.*

It must be here observed, that κατὰ συμβεβηκός [by accident] means in no Part of these Quotations *accidental*, as standing for *casual*; for this would be mere Tautology, as to what is here said concerning *Chance*. It means rather something by way of *Appendage*; something *Adventitious*; in other Words, it means *Accident*, as adhering to *Substance*, without which it can have no Being, tho' suppose it absent or taken away, the *Nature of Substance* is no way affected. It was in this Sense the *Peripatetics* supposed *Chance* and *Fortune* to be *Accidents* or *Appendages* to *Nature*, and *Mind*. According therefore to them, the Supposition of *Chance* and *Fortune* was so far from excluding *Nature* and *Mind* from the Universe, that they demonstrably proved their Existence in it. For admitting their Account of *Chance* and *Fortune* to be just; if we grant the *Accidents* to exist, much more must we grant the *Subjects*, and this too with that *superior Dignity* and *Priority of Existence*, which is evidently due to all *Subjects* above their *Accidents*. Well therefore did the Philosopher conclude ὕστερον ἄρα τὸ Ἀυτόματον, καὶ ἡ Τύχη τῇ Νῦ, καὶ τῇς Φύσεως. *Subsequent in Existence, are CHANCE and FORTUNE to MIND and NATURE.* *Aristot. Natur. Aufc.* l. 2. c. 6.

FROM what has been said, we see the Reason of that Enumeration of Causes mentioned in the Beginning of the first Note, where they are described to be *NECESSITY, NATURE, MAN, and FORTUNE.*

To

TO NECESSITY they referred all those Things and Events, which they *supposed of necessary Existence*; such as the Universe, the Heavenly Bodies, together with their *uniformly regular Motions*.

TO NATURE, MAN, and CHANCE, they referred all *Contingents*; to *Nature*, and *Man*, obtaining *their End*, all *Contingents of greater Frequency*; to the same Causes, either *falling short of their End*, or *going beyond it*, and thus becoming *Chance* or *Fortune*, those *opposite Contingents of Existence less usual*.

AND hence, as *Art* and *Fortune* were both conversant about the *same Subjects* (*viz.* such *Contingents* as respected *Human Life*) we find the Meaning of that Verse of *Agatho's* cited by *Aristotle*, in his *Ethics*, l. 6. c. 5.

Τέχνη τύχην ἐρεσκε, καὶ τύχην τέχνην,

Art loveth Fortune; Fortune loveth Art.

THE whole Chapter indeed is well worth perusal. But we shall not venture to lengthen this Note, which may be probably deemed too long already, and which can be only excused, as giving some Sample of a Philosophy, which, from its Rarity perhaps, may possibly furnish some Amusement.

NOTE

NOTE VIII. p. 23. I MEAN, SAID HE, BY BEGINNING, THAT CAUSE FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH, &c.

As the CAUSE here spoken of, is that *Cause* usually called FINAL, it may be asked, how it comes in this Place to be considered as a *Beginning*. The Answer is, that what comes *last* in *Practice*, stands in *Theory* *first*; or in other Words, the Order of *Ideas* in the *Intellect* of the Artist is exactly *inverted*, with respect to the Order of his *Energies*.

THUS Ammonius — Καθόλου γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλϑ γίνεται ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως· ἐμπαιὼν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλϑ, ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας. οἷον ὁ Ὀικοδόμϑ, ἐπιλαγείσ οἶκον, λέγει καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ἐπετάγην οἶκον ποιῆσαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶ σκέπασμα, καλυπτικὸν ὀμβρῶν καὶ καυμάτων. τῆτο δὲ ἐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένης ὀροφῆς. Ἐντεῦθεν ἂν ἀρχεῖται τῆς θεωρίας, προβαίνων δὲ φησὶν· Ἄλλα τῆτο ἐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ γινομένων τοίχων· ἔτοι δὲ ἐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μὴ ὑποβληθέντων δεμελίων· οἱ δὲ δεμελῖοι ἐκ ἂν βληθεῖεν, μὴ ὀρυχθείσης τῆς γῆς. ἐνταῦθα κατέληξεν ἡ θεωρία. Ἐντεῦθεν ἂν ἀρχεται ἡ πράξις. πρότερον γὰρ ὀρύττει τὴν γῆν. εἰθ' ἔτω βάλλει τὸν δεμέλιον. ἔτα ἐγείρει τοίχους· καὶ ὕτερον ἐπιτίθησι τὴν ὀροφήν, ἥτις ἐστὶ τέλϑ τῆς πράξεως. ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, τέλϑ τῆς θεωρίας. Αμμ. εἰς κατηγ. p. 15. Edit. Venet. 8vo.

FOR in general the End of Theory is the Beginning of Practice; and so reciprocally, the End of Practice, the Beginning of Theory. Thus for instance: An Architect, being ordered to build a House, says to himself, I am ordered to build a House; that is to say, a certain Defence,

Defence, to protect against the Rains and the Heats. But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From this Point therefore he begins his Theory. He proceeds and says—But there can be no Roof, if there be no Walls; and there can be no Walls, without some Foundations; nor can there be laid Foundations, without opening the Earth. At this Point, the Theory is at an End. Hence therefore commences the Practice or Action. For first he opens the Earth; then lays the Foundation; then raises the Walls; and lastly puts on the Roof, which is the End of the Action or Practice, [but Beginning of the Theory] as the Beginning of the Practice was the End of the Theory. See also *Arist. Ethic. Nicom.* l. 3. c. 3. et de *Animá*, l. 3. 3.

NOTE IX. p. 24. Was it not the Absence of Health, &c.] *Vide Platon. de Rep.* l. i. tom. 2. p. 341. Edit. Serrani. "Ὡς περ (ἔφην ἐγὼ) εἰ με ἔροιο εἰ ἐξαρκεῖ σώματι, εἶναι σώματι, ἢ προσδεῖται τίνος· εἶπομι δὲ, ὅτι παντάπασιν μὲν ἔν προσδεῖται. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ τέχνη ἐστὶν ἰατρικὴ νῦν εὐρεμένη, ὅτι σῶμα ἐστὶ πονηρὸν, καὶ ἐκ ἐξαρκεῖ αὐτῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι. *Quemadmodum, inquam, si a me quæreres, an satis sit Corpori, ut sit Corpus, an aliâ quâpiam re indigeat: responderem, omninò indigere. Atque hâc quidem de Causâ medicinæ ars nunc est inventa, quoniam Corpus per se profligatum est, neque ipsi satis est, ut sit hujusmodi.* So likewise the acute Scalliger—*Motionis enim Appetentia Causa est; Appetentia, Privatio. De Caus. L. Lat. l. 15. c. 114. p. 235.*

NOTE X. p. 26. OR IS IT NOT ABSURD TO SUPPOSE THERE SHOULD BE AN ART OF IMPOS-

IMPOSSIBILITIES?] What is here said concerning the Difference between those Things for which we may possibly wish, and those which we actually pursue, is expressed in the *Ethics* of *Aristotle*, l. 3. c. 2. Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἑστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων. καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκίμῃ ἂν ἡλίδι εἶναι. βέβαιος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. *There is indeed no determined Choice of Action with respect to Things impossible; and if any one should say he had so determined, he would appear to be a Fool. But there may be a Willing or Longing after Things impossible; as for instance, never to die.*

NOTE XI. p. 27. THE SUGGESTIONS OF WILL, AND UNINSTRUCTED INSTINCT.] *Will*, βέβαιος, or Ὀρεξις λογικὴ; *uninstructed Instinct*, Ὀρεξις ἀλόγιστος. See before, *Note III.*

NOTE XII. p. 29. THE WANT OR ABSENCE OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD; RELATIVE TO HUMAN LIFE, AND ATTAINABLE BY MAN, BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES.]

THE CAUSE here described is the τὸ ἕνεκα, or FINAL.—*Aristotle* in his *Physics*, l. 2. c. 3. in enumerating the various Sorts of Causes, reckons among the rest—τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ τέλος, καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων. τὸ γὰρ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον, καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι. *To these may be added that Cause, which is considered as the End, and Good of all the rest. For that, for whose Sake all the others are*

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NOTES on TREATISE the First.

deemed necessary, has just pretensions to be best, and to be the End of them all. To this he subjoins, consonant to what is said in the Dialogue — διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν — Let it make no Difference whether we call this End, real Good, or only apparent Good. So in the Beginning of his *Ethics* — Πᾶσα τέχνη, καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθὸν τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ. Διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφώνησαν τ' ἀγαθὸν, ἃ πάντα ἐφίεται. Every Art, and every orderly Speculation, so likewise every Action, and determined Choice of Pursuit, appear all of them to tend toward some Good. Well therefore have they pronounced GOOD to be that, toward which all things tend. See also Plat. in Gorg. p. 499. E. tom. 1. Edit. Serrani.

IN the Definition here treated, the Words [*relative to Human Life*] express that Part of the Stoic Definition of Art [πρὸς τὸ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.] They were omitted in the Definition p. 17. as more properly belonging to the present Definition, which respects Art in its final Cause. See page 261.

THAT what is perfect and self-sufficient is above the secondary Helps of ART; that our own Weakness and Insufficiency, and the Prospect of procuring that absent Good, by which we all hope to supply ourselves, where deficient; that this is the Source not only of all Arts, but (joined to social Affection) is the Origin and Cement of HUMAN SOCIETY; see (besides the Place here treated) pages 11, 12; and of the third Treatise, p. 147 to p. 157.

Thus

Thus the Poet in *Stobæus*, p. 515.

Χρειώ πάντ' ἐδίδαξε· τί δ' ἔχειώ κεν ἀνεύροι;

Need all Things taught: What cannot need invent?

AGREEABLY also to this, *Virgil*, in his first *Georgic*, having told us of the various Changes to the worse, which happened in the *natural* World immediately subsequent to the *Golden Age*, goes on to enumerate the several *Inventions* of Men, which were the *natural Result of this their newly indigent State*. He at last sums up the whole by saying —

Tum variæ venere artes: labor omnia vicit.

Improbis, & duris urgens in rebus EGESTAS.

WHERE (according to the Doctrine in the Dialogue) WANT is made the *Beginning* or *Origin* of ARTS. The Poet even refers this *Dispensation*, this Introduction of *Indigence*, *Care*, and *Solicitude*, to the immediate Will of PROVIDENCE, acting for the Good of Mankind; lest Plenty should lull them into slothful *Lethargy*, so as to forget their *noblest* and *most active Faculties*.

— *Pater ipse colendi*

Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem

Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda,

Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno.

NOTE XIII. p. 32. CO-EXISTENT, REPLIED HE, AS IN A STATUE, &c. SUCCESSIVE, AS IN

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A TUNE or DANCE, &c.] This Division of Beings or Productions we find mentioned by *Aristotle* in his *Physics*, (l. 3. c. 8.) where explaining his Doctrine concerning *Infinite*, he says—ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πολλάκις τὸ εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν, τῷ αἰεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γίνεσθαι ἔτω καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. In as much as BEING is manifold, such as is the Being of a Day or public Festival, (which exist by continually becoming something farther) such also is the Being and Nature of Infinite. The same Sentiment soon after is more fully explained and opened. Ὡστε τὸ ἄπειρον ἔδει λαμβάνειν, ὡς τόδε τί, οἷον ἀνθρώπον, ἢ οἰκίαν· ἀλλ' ὡς ἡμέρα λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἀγὼν οἷς τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ὡς ἐστὶα τις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ. We are not to conceive of Infinite, as of a positive particular Substance, like a Man or a House; but rather as we pronounce Existence of a Day or public Festival, which have their Essence, not as sensible, individual Substances, but by a continued Procedure of Being and ceasing to be. Vid. Scalig. de Caus. Ling. Lat. 3. C. 72. p. 124. Aristot. Categ. Cap. 6. Ammon. Com. ει; Καλ. p. 82. b. Scal. Poetic. L. 3. C. 1. p. 82.

NOTE XIV. p. 32. WHAT IS HUMAN LIFE, BUT A COMPOUND OF PARTS THUS FLEETING, &c.] It is not inelegantly said in the *Ethics* so often referred to—Ἡ δὲ ζωὴ ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τέτοις ἐνεργεῖ αἰ καὶ μάλα ἀγαπᾷ· οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς, τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθής, τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρηματικά· ἔτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. LIFE is a certain ENERGY, and each Man energizes about those Subjects,

Subjects, and with those Faculties, for which he hath the greatest Affection; the Musician, with his Hearing, about Sounds harmonious; the Studios, with his Intellect, about Matters of Speculation; and in like manner each Man else of the various sorts beside. Ethic. Nicom. l. 10. c. 4.

NOTE XV. p. 34. EVERY ART WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR ENERGY.] The CAUSE here treated is the FORMAL, called by various Names; the εἶδος, the λόγος, the τί ἐστίν, the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι Vid. Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. L. v. c. 113. p. 232. Imperfectum autem Græci, &c.

IN the Beginning of the above cited *Ethics*, after the Author has told us that every *Art*, and Human *Action* tend to some *Good* or *End*, he adds Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τέλων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνεργεῖαι· τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτάς, ἔργα τινά.—But there appears a Difference in Ends: For some are ENERGIES; some, over and above these Energies, are certain WORKS. In *Quintilian's Institutes* the same Distinction, with respect to the End of Arts, is mentioned, l. 2. c. 18. Vid. Plat. in Dio. Laert. L. 3. C. 84. p. 216. C. 100. p. 225.

BUT here perhaps it may be asked, if all *Arts* are ended and accomplished in some *Energy* or *Work*, and this *Energy* or *Work* be almost universally that *absent Good*, toward which they all tend, and for the sake of which they are all exerted? (for a *Dance*, which is an *Energy*, and a *House*, which is a *Work*, are certain *absent Goods* or *Pleasures*, for the sake of which

certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it may be asked, whence then the Difference between the *Formal Cause* and the *Final*; the *Final*, as in *Note XII.* it has been already treated?

THE Answer to this is, that they *concur* and are the *same*. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ὅ ἐνεκα, ἓν ἐστὶ, *The FORMAL Cause and the FINAL are ONE.* *Arist.* *Nat. Aufc.* 1, 2. c. 7. If they *differ*, it is (as *Joannes Grammaticus* observes in commenting on this Place) a *Difference* rather in the *Time* and *Manner* of our viewing them, than in their own *Essence* and *Nature*. It may not perhaps be improper to transcribe his own Words. Ταῦτον τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸ τέλει καὶ τὸ εἶδος, τῇ σχέσει μόνῃ διαφέρον, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ὡς γινόμενον, καὶ μήπω ὄν θεωρῆται, τέλει ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ ὡς ἤδη γεγόμενον, εἶδος. *The END and the FORM are numerically the same, differing (as has been said) in the RELATION only, and TIME. For thus the same Thing, while considered as in its Progress to Completion, but as not yet complete, is so long an END; when considered as actually complete, is no longer an End, but a FORM.* And thus is this Question one way answered, by acknowledging that these two Causes *co-incide*, and differ not in their *Essence* or real Character, but rather in the *Time* and *Manner* of our contemplating them.

BUT there is another Answer, and that is derived from the *twofold* Nature of *final* Causes. According to this Doctrine, *Arts* have not only a *nearer* and *more immediate End*, (as a Ship is the End of Ship-building, or Navigation the End of Pilotry) but they have a still *remoter* and *higher End*, a τέλει τε-
λκώτατον,

ἀνώτατον, that is to say, MAN, *Human-kind*, or (in other Words) the *Utility* or *Elegance of Human Life*. Thus the *Stagirite*. Ἔσμεν γὰρ πῶς καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλει διχῶς γὰρ τὸ ἔ' ἐνεναι. For WE OURSELVES also are in some sort AN END; for the final Cause is twofold. Natur. Auscult. l. 2. c. 2. If therefore we have respect to this ULTIMATE END, these two Causes will be found to differ, and be really distinct from each other.

AND thus it is that in some respects they agree, and in others they differ, according to the above Distinctions established by this Philosophy.

NOTE XVI. p. 38. O ART! THOU DISTINGUISHING ATTRIBUTE, &c.] This alludes to a capital Distinction of ART, taken from a View of her different Ends. ART may in some respects be said to FINISH NATURE, in others TO IMITATE HER. She finishes her, where Nature, having given the Powers, is of herself unable to give them Perfection. It is thus the *Gymnastic Arts*, Dancing, Riding, &c. finish the *Corporeal Powers*; while the sublimer Arts, Logic, Rhetoric, Moral Virtue, &c. finish the *Mental*. Where she does not finish Nature, she imitates her, as in Sculpture, Painting, Dramatic Poetry, &c.

ARISTOTLE expresses the above sentiment, as follows. Ὅπως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ, ἂν ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατῇ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. *Physic. L. 2. C. 8.*

NOTE XVII. p. 44. THE EFFICIENT, THE MATERIAL, THE FINAL, AND THE FORMAL.] That is to say, τὸ κινῆσαν, ἢ Ἔλκ, τὸ ἔ' ἐνεκα, τὸ Εἶδος.

THUS Seneca, in his 65th Epistle. *Causam Aristoteles putat tribus modis dici. Prima, inquit, causa est ipsa Materia, sine qua nihil potest effici. Secunda, Opifex. Tertia, Forma quæ unicuique operi imponitur, tanquam statuae; nam hanc Aristoteles Idos (εἶδος) vocat. Quarta quoque, inquit, his accedit, Propositum totius operis.*

QUID sit hoc, aperiā. Æs prima statuae causa est: nunquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id, ex quo ea funderetur, ducereturve. Secunda causa, Artifex est: non potuisset enim æs illud in habitum statuae figurari, nisi accessissent peritæ manus. Tertia causa est Forma: neque enim statua ista Doryphoros aut Diadumenos vocaretur, nisi hæc illi esset impressa facies. Quarta causa est, faciendi Propositum: nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset. Quid est Propositum? Quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit. Vel pecunia est hoc, si venditurus fabricavit; vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen; vel religio, si donum templo paravit. Ergo hæc Causa est, propter quam fit. An non putas inter causas facti operis numerandum, quo remoto factum non esset.—

ARISTOTLE'S own Words are as follow. Ἐνα μὲν ἐν τρόπῳ αἰτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ ἧς γίνεται τι ἐνυπάρχοντι· οἷον, ὁ χαλκὸς τῇ ἀνδριάντι, καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιλῆς, καὶ τὰ τέτων γένη. Ἄλλον δὲ, τὸ

τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τῆτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος·
ὃ τῆ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ τὰ τέττε γένη· οἷον τῆ διὰ πασῶν
τὰ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς, καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν
τῷ λόγῳ. Ἔτι, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ πρώτη,
ἢ ἡ τῆς ἡρεμήσεως· οἷον ὁ βελεύσας, αἰτιον· καὶ ὁ
πατήρ, τῆ τέκνη· καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιῶν τῆ ποιούμενον, καὶ τὸ
μεταβάλλον τῆ μεταβαλλομένον. Ἔτι, ὡς τὸ τέλος·
τῆτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἔνεκα· οἷον τῆ περιπατεῖν ἢ ὑγίεια·
διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φάμεν ἵνα ὑγιαίνη, καὶ εἰπόντες
ἔτι, οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἰτιον.

IN one manner that may be called a Cause, out of which, existing as a Part of it, any thing is made or compounded. Thus is Brass the Cause of a Statue, Silver of a Cup, and so also the higher Genera, in which these are included [as Metal, the Genus including Brass and Silver; Body, the Genus including Metal, &c. &c.] In another way, the Form and Exemplar of any Thing is its Cause; that is to say, in other Words, the Definition, the Detail or Narrative of its Essence [that which, characterizing it to be such a particular thing, distinguishes it from all things else] and of this Definition the several higher Genera. Thus the Cause of the Diapason or Octave is the Proportion of two to one; and more generally than that, is Number; and is moreover the several Parts, out of which this Definition is formed. Add to this Cause, that other, from whence the original Principle of Change, or of ceasing to change; as for Instance, the Person who deliberates is the Cause of that which results from such Deliberation; the Father is the Cause of the Son; and in general, the Efficient, of the Thing effected; the Power changing, of the Thing changed. Besides these Causes,
there

there is that also, which is considered as the End; that is to say, the Cause, for the sake of which the thing is done. Thus the Cause of Exercising is Health. For if it be asked, *Why does he use Exercise?* We say, To preserve his Health; and having said thus much, we think we have given the proper Cause. Aristot. Natur. Auscult. l. 2. c. 3.

ADDITION to NOTE III.

THE *Peripatetic* Definition of Nature, given p. 257, tho' in some degree illustrated p. 266, yet being still from its Brevity perhaps obscure, the following Explication of it is subjoined.

IN the first place, by NATURE the *Peripatetics* meant that *Vital Principle* in Plants, Brutes, and Men, by which they are said to live, and to be distinguished from Things *inanimate*. Nature therefore being another Name for Life or a *vital Principle*, the first Act of this Principle, throughout all Subjects, is universally found to be of the following kind; namely, to advance the Subject, which it enlivens, from a Seed or Embryo to something better and more perfect. This Progression, as well in Plants as in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that NATURE is a Principle of Motion.—But then this Progression or Growth is not infinite. When the Subject is mature, that is, hath obtained its Completion and perfect Form, then the Progression ceases. Here therefore the Business of the *vital Principle* becomes different. It is from henceforward no longer employed to acquire a Form, but to preserve to its Subject a Form already acquired. And thus is it

it that NATURE is a *Principle of Rest, Stability, or Ceasing to move.* And such indeed she continues to be, maintaining, *as long as possible,* the *Form* committed to her Care, till *Time* and *external Causes* in the first Place impair it, and induce at length its *Dissolution*, which is *Death.*

AND thus it has been shewn how NATURE may be called A PRINCIPLE BOTH OF MOTION AND CEASING TO MOVE.

As to the rest of the Definition, namely, that NATURE is a *Principle*, which inheres in its Subject *immediately, essentially,* and *not by way of Accident*; no more is meant by this, than that the NATURE or *Life* in every Being, which hath such Principle, is *really* and *truly* A PART OF THAT BEING, and not *detached* and *separate* from it, like the Pilot from the Ship, the Musician from the Instrument. For to these *Subjects* tho' those *Artists* are *Principles of Motion and Rest*, yet do they in no sense participate with them in *vital Sympathy* and *Union.*

END of the NOTES on TREATISE *the First.*

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NOTES

ON

TREATISE the Third;

CONCERNING

HAPPINESS.

NOTE I. p. 107. NATURE SEEMS TO
TREAT MAN, &c.] *Ut Phidias potest a
primo instituere signum, idque perficere; po-
test ab alio inchoatum accipere & absolvere: huic est
sapientia similis. Non enim ipsa genuit hominem, sed
accepit a natura inchoatum: hanc ergo intuens, debet
institutum illud, quasi signum absolvere. Cic. de Fin.
IV. 13. p. 334. Edit. Davif.*

NOTE II. p. 113. PRACTICE TOO OFTEN
CREEPS, &c.] See p. 136. and Note X.

NOTE III. p. 114. THE SOVEREIGN GOOD
IS THAT, THE POSSESSION OF WHICH RENDERS
US HAPPY.] *Κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες,
εὐδαίμονες. By the Possession of Things GOOD, are
the*

NOTES on TREATISE *the Third.*

the Happy made HAPPY. Platon. Conviv. p. 204. tom. 2. Edit. Serrani. *Phileb. Plat.* p. 60. B. See *Arrian Epict.* l. 3. c. 22. p. 453.

THE Reader will be pleased to observe, that, in all Quotations from the Dissertations of *Epicletus* collected by *Arrian*, the Author refers to the late Edition in two Volumes *Quarto*, published by his learned and ingenious friend, Mr. UPTON.

NOTE IV. p. 115. CERTAIN ORIGINAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PRE-CONCEPTIONS, &c.] The *Pre-conceptions* here spoken of, are called by the *Latins* *Prænotiones*, or *Anticipations*; by the *Greeks*, προλήψεις, or ἔννοιαι, with the occasional Epithets of either νομαί, ἐμφυτοί, or φυσικαί.

It is evident that all Men, without the least Help of Art, exert a kind of *Natural Logic*; can in some degree *refute*, and *prove*, and *render a Reason*.

Now this cannot be (as the meanest Proficient in Logic well knows) without *general Ideas*, and *general Propositions*, because a Syllogism of *Particulars* is an Impossibility. There must be therefore some *natural Faculty* to provide us these *Generals*. This Faculty cannot be any of the *Senses*, for they all respect *Particulars* only. Nor can it be the *reasoning* or *syllogizing Faculty*, for this does not *form* such *Generals*, but *use* them when formed. There only therefore remains the *Faculty* called Νῆς, that is to say, the *Inductive Faculty*; the *Faculty*, which, by *Induction of similar Individuals*, forms out of the particular

particular and the many what is general and one. This Species of *Apprehension* is evidently our *first* and *earliest* Knowledge, because all Knowledge by *Reasoning* dates its Origin from it, and because, except *these two*, no other knowledge is possible.

As therefore *every* Ear, not absolutely depraved, is able to make some *general Distinctions* of *Sound*; and in like manner *every* Eye, with respect to Objects of *Vision*; and as this general Use of these Faculties, by being diffused through all Individuals, may be called *common* Hearing, and *common* Vision, as opposed to those *more accurate* *Energies*, peculiar only to *Artists*: So fares it with respect to the *Intellect*. There are Truths, or Universals of so *obvious* a kind, that *every* *Mind*, or *Intellect*, not absolutely depraved, without the least Help of Art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The *Recognition* of these, or at least the *Ability* to recognize them, is called Κοινὸς Νῆς, COMMON SENSE, as being *a Sense common to all*, except Lunatics and Ideots.

FARTHER, as this Power is called Κοινὸς Νῆς, so the several *Propositions*, which are its proper Objects, are called προλήψεις, or *Preconceptions*, as being *previous* to all other Conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said, that these προλήψεις, must be *general*, as being formed by *Induction*; as also *natural*, by being *common to all Men*, and *previous* to all Instruction. Hence therefore their Definition. "Ἐστὶ δ' ἡ πρόληψις, ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου." "A PRE-CONCEPTION is the natural *Apprehension* of what is general, or universal." Diog. Laert.

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Laert. l. 7. f. 54. See also *Arrian. Epiēt.* l. 1. c. 22. l. 3. c. 6. *Cic. de Naturâ Deor.* l. 1. c. 16, 17. *Plut. de Placit. Philosoph.* 910. c. *Aristot. de Anim.* III. 11.

NOTE V. p. 115 — AND THAT THE DIFFERENCE LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS.] This was called Ἐφαρμογὴ τῶν προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέγας ἐσiais — τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέγας ἐσiais. *Arr. Epiēt.* l. 1. c. 22. p. 114, 116. *Edit. Upt.* See an eminent Instance, illustrating the Truth of this Reasoning, in the same Author, l. 4. c. 1. p. 545. Ἐνωόμεν γὰρ, ὅτι, &c. *Boet. de Conf. L.* 3. *Prosa.* 2. p. 106.

NOTE VI. p. 120. WHY ARE THERE, WHO SEEK RECESSES, &c.] *Multi autem & sunt, & fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se removerint, ad otiumque perfugerint.* — *His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus; ut ne quâ re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur: cujus proprium est sic vivere, ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune sit potentiæ cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis: alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant; alteri si contenti sint & suo, & parvo.* *Cic. de OFFIC.* l. 1. c. 20, 21.

NOTE VII. p. 121. — THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, THEY HAVE TAUGHT US, OUGHT TO BE, &c.] The ORIGINAL PRE-CONCEPTIONS of the SOVEREIGN GOOD here recited, may be justified by the following Authorities, from among many which are omitted.

AGREE-

AGREEABLE TO NATURE, — *Neque ulla alia in re, nisi in NATURA, quærendum esse illud SUMMUM BONUM, quo omnia referrentur.* Cic. Acad. l. i. c. 5. p. 27. Edit. Davif.

CONDUCTIVE TO WELL-BEING. — *Epicletus* calls that *Truth or Knowledge, which respects our real Happiness* [τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας] the *Truth or Knowledge, which regards not mere Living, but which conduces to LIVING WELL* [ἡ τὴν περὶ τῆς ΖΗΝ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ ΕΤ ΖΗΝ.] *Arrian.* *Epiet.* l. i. c. 4. p. 28. Edit. Upt. Ἀι νομοὶ περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ἔννοιαι — TO ΖΗΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΝ, καὶ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ λέγουσι πρὸς δὲ τέτοις, TO ΕΤ ΖΗΝ, καὶ τὸ εὖ βίειν, καὶ τὴν εὐζωΐαν, ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ φασὶν εἶναι. *Our common Pre-conceptions concerning HAPPINESS call it the LIVING ACCORDING TO NATURE; farther than this, they say it is Living or Existing well; THE LIFE OF WELL-BEING.* *Alex. Aphrod.* περὶ ψυχ. p. 157. Edit. Ald.

ACCOMMODATE TO ALL PLACES and TIMES — *Antoninus*, speaking of that *Happiness*, which he deemed our *Sovereign Good*, calls it something which was in our Power ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ καὶ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΩΣ, EVERY WHERE and PERPETUALLY. l. 7. f. 54.

DURABLE — and INDEPRIVABLE — *Nisi STABILI & FIXO & PERMANENTE BONO, BEATUS esse nemo potest.* *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 14. p. 372. Edit. U Davif.

Davis. So immediately after, in the same page—*An dubium est, quin nihil sit habendum in eo genere quo vita beata completur, si id possit amitti; nihil enim interarescere, nihil exstingui, &c.* Καὶ τίς αὐτῇ ἡ εὐροια, ἣν ὁ τυχὼν ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, ἔ λέγω Καίσαρ ἢ Καίσαρος φίλος, ἀλλὰ κόραξ, ἀυλητής, πυρετός, ἀλλὰ τρισμύρια; ἡ δ' ΕΥΡΟΙΑ ἔδεν ἔτως ἔχει ὡς ΤΟ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΕΣ καὶ ΑΝΕΜΠΟΔΙΣΤΟΝ. *And what sort of Happiness is this, which any thing intervening may embarrass; I say not Cæsar, or Cæsar's Friend, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, a thousand things beside? HAPPINESS surely implies nothing so much, as PERPETUITY and BEING SUPERIOR TO HINDRANCE OR IMPEDIMENT. Arrian. Epiēt. l. 4. c. 4. p. 585. Edit. Upt. See also l. 2. c. 11. p. 227.*

SELF-DERIVED.—*Atque hoc dabitur, ut opinor si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere TOTUM PONI IN POTESTATE SAPIENTIS: nam si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 27. p. 163.*—καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπίπῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐπ' αὐτῷ [οἱ θεοὶ] τὸ πᾶν εἶεν. *That Man might not fall into real Evils, the Gods have put the whole IN HIS OWN POWER. M. Ant. l. 2. f. 11. Τί γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ ζητεῖ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος; Εὐσταθῆναι, εὐδαιμονῆσαι, ΠΑΝΤΑ ΩΣ ΘΕΛΕΙ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, μὴ κωλύεσθαι, μηδ' ἀναγκάζεσθαι. For what is it, that every Man seeks? To be securely fixed, to be happy, TO DO ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO HIS OWN WILL, not to be hindered, not to be compelled. Arr. Epiēt. l. 4. c. 1. p. 539, 540. Aristotle joins self-derived and indeprivable in his idea*
of

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of Good. Τάγαθὸν δὲ οἰεῖσθαι τι καὶ δυσαπαίρετον εἶναι
μαρτυρούμεθα. *Eth. Nic.* l. i. c. 5.

NOTE VIII. p. 125. THE POLITICAL AND LUCRATIVE, THE CONTEMPLATIVE AND PLEASURABLE.] This *fourfold* Distinction of *Lives* is mentioned in *Aristotle's Ethics*, l. i. c. 5.

NOTE IX. p. 131.—PLEASURE
WHOM LOVE ATTENDS, &c.
alluding to *Homer, Iliad* E. V. 214.

NOTE X. p. 136. SUPPOSE AN EVENT WERE TO HAPPEN—NOT AN INUNDATION, &c.] See *Arrian. Epict.* l. 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly addressed to the Seekers of *Leisure Retirement*, and *Study*. Part of it has been already quoted, p. 290. καὶ τίς αὐτῇ ἢ εὐποία, &c. See also the same Author, l. 4. c. 1. p. 567. Πῶς ἀνέσεις, &c. and of the Dialogue here commented, p. 113.

NOTE XI. p. 137.—IS ACTING A CIRCUMSTANCE, &c.] *Etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturæ manca quodammodo atque inchoata sit, si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Cic. de Offic.* l. i. c. 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the Subsequent, is well worthy of Perusal.

NOTE XII. p. 140.—IF A PIECE OF METAL BE TENDERED US, &c.] See *Arr. Epict.* l. i. c. 10. p. 110. Ὅρᾶτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ νομισμᾷ, &c.

NOTE XIII. p. 144.—ARE ALIENATED FROM IT, OR ARE INDIFFERENT TO IT?] *Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit*

animal (*hinc enim est ordiendum*) ipsum sibi conciliari, & commendari ad se conservandum, & suum statum, & ad ea quæ conservantia sunt ejus statûs, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, quæ interitum videantur afferre. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit. Dav. See also l. 5. c. 9. De Offic. l. 1. c. 4. 'Οικειώμεθα πρὸς αὐτὰς ἐνθὺς γενόμενοι. Plut. Mor. p. 1038. b.

NOTE XIV. p. 155. LET IT NOT BE FORGOT THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY, &c.] The whole *Argument* to prove *Society natural to Man*, from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken from the second Book of *Plato's Republic*. See *Plat.* tom. 2. p. 369, &c. Edit. Serrani. See also the same Argument hinted at in the *Protagoras* of *Plato*, p. 322. C. Edit. Serr. Tom. 1.

NOTE XV. p. 156.—ARE NOT THE POWERS AND CAPACITIES OF SPEECH, &c.] The Argument in favour of *Society*, from our being possessed of λόγος, or the *speaking Faculty*, seems to have been much insisted on by the best Authors of Antiquity.

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, πάσης μελίττης καὶ πάντῃ ἀγελαίᾳ ζωῇ μᾶλλον, δῆλον. Οὐθὲν γὰρ, ὡς φάμεν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων. Ἡ μὲν ἔν φωνῇ τῇ ἡδέῃ καὶ λυπηρῇ ἐστὶ σημεῖον· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζωῇ· μέχρι γὰρ τῆς ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθεν, ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῇ λυπηρῇ καὶ ἡδέῃ, καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἄλληλοις. Ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τὸ δηλῆν ἐστὶ τὸ σύμμερον, καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν· ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον. Τέτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ

τὸ μόνον ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν, καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον αἰσθῆσιν ἔχειν· ἢ δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. *The Reason why MAN is a SOCIAL ANIMAL, more than any Bee, or any herding Species whatever, is evident from hence. Nature, we say, makes nothing in vain; and Man, of all Animals, is only possessed of SPEECH. Bare Sound indeed may be the Sign of what is pleasurable or painful; and for that reason is it common even to other Animals also. For so far we perceive even their Nature can go, that they have a Sense of those Feelings, and signify them to each other. But Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful, and in consequence of this, what is just and unjust. It is therefore given to Men, because this, with respect to other Animals, is to Men alone peculiar, that of Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, they only possess a Sense or Feeling. Now it is the Participation or Community of these, which makes and constitutes both a FAMILY, and a POLITY. Aristot. Polit. l. I. c. 2.*

Εἰκόνες γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν πραγμάτων [τὰ νοήματα]. αἱ δὲ φωναὶ τῶν νοημάτων εἰσιν ἐξαγγελτικά· καὶ διὰ τῆτο δίδονται ἡμῖν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, πρὸς τὸ δι' αὐτῶν σημαίνειν ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ νοήματα — ἵνα καὶ δυνάμεθα κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμπολιτεύεσθαι· κοινωνικὸν γὰρ ζῶον ὁ Ἄνθρωπος. *Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul; and Sounds are declarative of these Ideas. And for this reason were these SOUNDS imparted to us by Nature, not only that we might indicate to each other these Ideas, but that we might be enabled to COMMUNICATE and LIVE IN ASSOCIATIONS. For MAN is by Nature a SOCIAL ANIMAL. Ammon. in l. de Interpr. p. 16. b,*

NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

THUS Cicero, speaking of Human Nature—*Omitto opportunitates habilitatesque reliqui corporis, moderationem vocis, ORATIONIS vim, quæ conciliatrix est humanæ maxime societatis. De Legg. l. i. c. 9. p. 35. Edit Davis.*

AGAIN in his Offices—*Sed quæ natura principia sint communitatis & societatis humanæ, repetendum alius videtur. Est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Ejus enim vinculum est Ratio, & ORATIO; quæ docendo, discendo, communicando, disceptando, dijudicando, conciliat inter se homines, conjungitque naturali quadam societate. De Offic. l. i. c. 16.*

THUS too in his Treatise *De Nat. Deor.*—*Jam vero domina rerum (ut vos soletis dicere) ELOQUENDI vis quam est præclara, quamque divina? Quæ primum efficit ut ea, quæ ignoramus, discere, & ea, quæ scimus, alios docere possimus. Deinde hac cohortamur, hac persuademus, hac consolamur afflictos, hac deducimus perterritos a timore, hac gestientes comprimimus, hac cupiditates iracundiasque restringimus: hæc nos juris, legum, urbium societate devinxit: hæc a vitâ immani & ferâ segregavit. De Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 59. p. 243. Edit. Davis.—See also Quint. Inst. l. 2. c. 16. and Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψυχ. p. 155. b. Edit. Ald. Sanctii Min. l. i. c. 2. p. 15. Plat. in Sophistâ, p. 260. A. Edit. Serr.*

NOTE XVI. p. 166.—IT IS FROM AMONG THE FEW, &c.] *In omni enim arte, vel studio, vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, optimum quodque rarissi-*

mum est. Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 25. p. 158. *Edit. Dav.*
Thus too *Aristotle* joins the rare and the excellent.—
τὸ εὖ, καὶ σπάνιον, καὶ ἐπαίνεται, καὶ καλόν. *Eth. Nic.*
l. 2. c. 9. τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὃ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον. *Plat. in*
Euthyd. p. 304. b. *Edit. Serr.*

NOTE XVII. p. 167.—WORKING EVER UNIFORMLY ACCORDING TO THIS IDEA OF PERFECTION, &c.

Thus, *Boethius*, addressing the Deity,

*O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,
Terrarum cœlique Sator, qui tempus ab ævo
Ire jubes, stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri;
Quem non externæ pepulerunt fingere causæ
Materiæ fluitantis opus; verum INSITA SUMMI
FORMA BONI, livore carens: Tu cuncta SUPERNO
Ducis ab EXEMPLO, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans.*
Consol. Philos. l. 3. *Met.* 9.

NOTE XVIII. p. 167.—FROM SOME HIDDEN
HIGHER MOTIVE, &c.] Μήποτε δὲ μήδε ταῦτα
[sc. τὰ τέρατα] παρὰ φύσιν εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν με-
ρικῇ φύσει ἢ φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν· τῇ δὲ καθόλου,
καὶ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν· Ἡ μὲν γὰρ μερικὴ φύσις
ἐνὸς εἶδους σοχάζεται, καὶ μίαν τέρῃσιν φεύγει· Διὰ
τὸτο τῇ μὲν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φύσει τὸ τέρας ἔτε φύσει
εἶναι ἔτε κατὰ φύσιν· τῇ δ' ὅλη φύσει ἐπεὶ μηδὲν τῷ
παντὶ παρὰ φύσιν (εἰδὲν γὰρ κανὼν ἐν τῷ παντὶ) οὐκ
ἔστι παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. *Joan-*
nes Gram. in Aristot. lib. 2. Natural. Auscult.
Nihil enim fieri sine causâ potest: nec quicquam fit,

quod fieri non potest: nec, si id factum est quod potuit fieri, portentum debet videri. Cic. de Divin. l. 2. c. 28. p. 189. Edit. Davis.

NOTE XIX. p. 169.—MAN IS A SOCIAL RATIONAL ANIMAL.] Ζῶον λογικόν, καὶ πολιτικόν, λογικὸν καὶ κοινωνικόν, λογικὸν καὶ ἡμέρον, these are Descriptions of *Humanity*, which we meet in every Page of *Epicetetus* and *Antoninus*.

It seems indeed to have been a received Opinion of old, that so intimate was the *Relation* between these two *Attributes*, that wherever there was *Rationality*, *Sociality* followed of course. Thus *Antoninus*—ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ λογικόν, εὐθὺς καὶ πολιτικόν. l. 10. s. 2. And again, more fully—καὶ τοίνυν πᾶν τὸ τῆς νοεῖας φύσεως μέτοχον, πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ὁμοίως σπένδει, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον· ὅσω γάρ ἐστι κρείττον παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, τοσάτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγκρινᾶσθαι τῷ οἰκίῳ καὶ συγκρίσθαι ἐτοιμότερον. l. 9. s. 9.

It is not perhaps foreign to the present Subject to observe, that were the *Eyes* of any two Men whatever to view the *same Object*, they would each, from their *different Place*, and their *different Organization*, behold it *differently*, and have a *different Image*. But were all the *Minds* in the Universe to recognize the *same Truth*, they would all recognize it as *one*, their *Recognition* would be *uniform*, and themselves in a *manner* would be *one* also. The Reason is, *Perception by the Senses* admits of *more* and *less*, better and worse; but *Perception by the Intellect*, like *Truth*, its *Object*, admits of *no degrees*, and is either nothing at all, or else *total, uniform, complete*, and *ONE*.

Hence

Hence therefore one Source of the *Society*, and as it were *Communion of all Minds*, considered as Minds, namely, the Unity of *Truth*, their common Object.

AGAIN, every just and perfect *Society* stands on the Basis of certain *Laws*. But LAW is nothing more, than *right and perfect REASON*, seen in *bidding and forbidding*, according to the Nature and Essence of those Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore this UNIVERSE be *one WHOLE*, or general Society, there must be some COMMON, GENERAL LAW for its *Conduct and Welfare*; and this Law must, of consequence, be some *right and perfect REASON*, which passes thro' all things, and extends to every Part. Well therefore might *Antoninus* say in the Beginning of this *Note*, that every thing *rational*, was of course *social*, since REASON and LAW appear to be the same, and Law to be the Support and Basis of all SOCIETY. Thus too *Cicero*—*sequitur, ut eadem sit in his [sc. Diis] quæ humano generi RATIO; eadem VERITAS utrobique sit; eademque LEX, quæ est recti præceptio, pravique depulsio.* De Nat. Deor. l. 2. c. 31. p. 180. See also the same Author, *De Legg.* l. 1. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. Edit. Davis. *De Fin.* l. 2. c. 14. p. 123. See also *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. §. 88. *M. Anton.* l. 5. c. 16. l. 6. c. 23. *Arist. Polit.* as quoted in *Note XV.*

NOTE XX. p. 169. NOTHING CAN BE PURSUABLE, which is DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY.] *Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliaret, aut violaret alterum, disrumpi necesse est eam, quæ maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis Societatem.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 5.

NOTE

NOTE XXI. p. 173.—FOR CONTRARIES ARE EVER RECOGNIZED THROUGH THE SAME HABIT, &c.] Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι. *There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same Science, with respect to things contrary.* Arist. de Anim. l. 3. c. 3. This by Themistius, in his Paraphrase, is thus illustrated. Τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ μία ἄγνοια· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ὠφέλιμον γινώσκων, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὅτι βλαβερὸν συνεπίσται· καὶ ὁ περὶ θάτερον ἐξαπατῶμενθ', ἐξαπαλᾶται καὶ περὶ θάτερον. *Of Things contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For thus he, who knows Good to be something beneficial, knows Evil at the same time to be something pernicious; and he, who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other.* See the Io of Plato, p. 531. T. I. Edit. Serr.

NOTE XXII. p. 174.—THOSE FOUR GRAND VIRTUES, &c.] Stobæus having told us, that of the Virtues some were primary, some subordinate, adds —πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν, περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιοσύνην, περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις. *The primary Virtues are four; PRUDENCE, TEMPERANCE, FORTITUDE, and JUSTICE: Prudence is employed in moral Offices; Temperance, in Mens natural Appetites and Pursuits; Fortitude, in Endurings; and Justice, in Distributions.* Ecl. Ethic. p. 167.

THAT

THAT the Life according to VIRTUE, was deemed the Life according to NATURE, appears from what is said by the same Author, in the Page following—

Πασῶν δὲ τῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι, τὸ ἀπολαύσας τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν διὰ τῶν ἰδίων παρέχεσθαι τυχεράνους τὸν ἄνθρωπον. *The End of all these Virtues is, to live agreeably to Nature; and each of them, by those Means, which are peculiar to itself, is found to put a Man in possession of this End.*

So likewise Cicero—*Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, cum virtute congruere semper. De Offic. l. 3. c. 3.*

NOTE XXIII. p. 174. THAT LIFE, WHERE THE VALUE OF ALL THINGS IS JUSTLY MEASURED, &c.] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203, 204.

NOTE XXIV. p. 175.—THAT, WHICH BEING DONE, ADMITS OF A RATIONAL JUSTIFICATION.] In the Original it is —ὁ πραχθέν εὐλογον ἴσχει ἀπολογισμὸν. *Diag. Laert. l. 7. f. 107. ὅπῃ πραχθέν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογίαν. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. l. 7.* Thus rendered by Cicero—*Officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. De Offic. l. 1. c. 3.* The Reason of its Greek Name, καθήκον is given by Simplicius. Καθήκοντά ἐστι τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ τὰ ἥκοντα καὶ ἐπιτελούντα—*Moral Offices are those things which are done agreeably*

agreeably to what is fitting, and expedient. Simplic. in Ench. c. 37.

NOTE XXV. p. 176.—AND WHEN OUR SEVERAL ENERGIES, EXERTED ACCORDING TO THE VIRTUES ABOVE, HAVE PUT US IN POSSESSION OF, &c.] This was the *Idea* of HAPPINESS, adopted by the old Academy, or Platonics, *Secundum naturam vivere, sic affectum, ut optimè affici possit, ad naturamque accommodatissimè.* Cic. de Fin. l. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics, who were originally of the same School, held the same. *Ἐὶ δ' ἔτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν—τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην—ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.* If this be admitted, it follows that HUMAN GOOD or HAPPINESS is, the energizing of the Soul according to the best and most consummate Virtue, in a perfect and complete Life. Ethic. Nic. l. 1. c. 7. A perfect and complete Life, they explained to be such a Life as was no way deficient either as to its Duration, its bodily Health, and its being attended with a proper Competence of external Goods, and Prosperity. By the best and most consummate Virtue, they not only meant that Virtue, which was in its kind most perfect, but which was the Virtue also of that Part, which is in each of us most excellent. For there are Virtues of the Body, such as Strength and Agility; and there are Virtues of the Senses, such as accurate Seeing, accurate Tasting; and the same of every Faculty, from the lowest to that which is supreme.

THE sovereign Good or Happiness here spoken of, is again repeated, in other Words, p. 179. where it is

is called, the ATTAINING the primary and just Requisites of our Nature, by a Conduct suitable to Virtue and moral Office.

THE PRIMARY AND JUST REQUISITES here mentioned, are all Things requisite to the Use and Enjoyment of our PRIMARY and NATURAL PERFECTIONS. These *Primary* and *Natural Perfections* mean the NATURAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS of both our MIND and BODY. They were called by the *Latins*, *Prima Naturæ*, *Prima secundum Naturam*; by the *Greeks*, τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ πρῶτα τῆς φύσεως. In them were included Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfect Sensations, Memory, Docility, Invention, &c. See *Stob. Ecl. Eth.* p. 163. *Cic. de Fin.* l. 5. c. 7. p. 364. *A. Gell.* l. 12. c. 5.

A like Sentiment of Happiness, to this here spoken of, is that mentioned by *Cicero*—*Virtute adhibitâ frui PRIMIS a naturâ datis.* *De Fin.* l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. It is there called the Opinion of the old *Academics*, and *Peripatetics*. It is again repeated by the same Author. *Honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas PRIMAS homini natura conciliet.* *Acad.* l. 2. c. 42. p. 240.

It is to be observed that *Cicero*, speaking of this Hypothesis, says that it proposed an Idea of Happiness, which was not properly in our own Power. *Hoc non est positum in nostrâ actione: completur enim & ex eo genere vitæ, quod virtute finitur, & ex iis rebus quæ secundum naturam sunt, neque sunt in nostra potestate.* *De Fin.* l. 4. c. 6. p. 287.

HENCE

HENCE therefore the DEFICIENCY of *this Doctrine*. However justifiable, however laudable its *End*, it could not insure a *due Success to its Endeavours*. And hence too the Force of what is objected to it in the *Dialogue*, from *p. 177*, to the End of the first Part.

NOTE XXVI. *p. 185.*—TO PLACE THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IN RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT, &c.] As the *Conduct* here mentioned implies a Conduct under the Direction of a befitting *Rule* or *Law*, and that, as opposed to *wrong Conduct*, which has either no rule at all, or at least one erroneous; it may not be an improper Place to enquire, what was the ancient Opinion concerning LAW UNIVERSAL, that *great and general Law*, which stood opposed to the *municipal Laws* of particular Cities and Communities.

EST quidem vera LEX, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat—nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia post-hac; sed & omnes gentes, & omni tempore una lex, & sempiterna, & immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, & imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, disceptator, lator. Cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit. *Fragm. Cic. de Rep. l. 3.*

LEX est ratio summa, insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. What follows is worth remarking. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata & confecta, lex est. Cic. de Legg. l. 1. c. 6. p. 22.

AGAIN. LEX vera——ratio est recta summi Jovis. To which he subjoins, as above, Ergo ut illa divina mens summa lex est; ita cum in homine est, perfecta est in mente sapientis. De Legg. l. 2. c. 4, 5. p. 88.

IT is in this Sense the *Apostle* tells us of the *Gentiles*, or *Mankind in general*, that they shew the *Work of the Law written in their Hearts*, their *Conscience* also bearing witness, and their *Thoughts* the mean while accusing, or else excusing one another. Rom. i. 11.

As *Cicero*, in his *Book of Laws* above cited, follows the *Stoic Discipline*, so is it agreeable to their Reasoning, that he makes the *original natural LAW*, of which we here treat, to be the *SOVEREIGN REASON OF THE DEITY himself*. Thus *Chrysippus*——*Idem* [scil. *Chrysippus*] legis perpetuæ & æternæ vim, quæ quasi dux vitæ & magistra officiorum sit, Jovem dicit esse. Nat. Deor. l. 1. c. 15. p. 41.

So by the same Philosophers in *Laertius*, we are ordered to live according to Nature, ἔδεν ἐνεργείας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν ἔωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὧν τῷ Διὶ καθηγεμόνι τὰ τῶν τῶν ὄντων (for ὄλων) διοικήσεως ὄντι, doing nothing, forbidden by the UNIVERSAL LAW, that

that is to say, by that right Reason, which passeth thro' all Things, and which is the SAME with JOVE himself, the Governor and Conductor of this universal Administration. Laert. l. 7. f. 88. Edit. Aldobrand.

AGREEABLY to this Reasoning, *Plutarch* corrects those, who made Δίκη, a Goddess, and the Assessor of Jove; for, says he, ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ἔχει μὲν τὴν Δίκην πάρεδρον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς Δίκη καὶ Θέμις ἐστὶ, καὶ νόμων ὁ πρεσβύτατος καὶ τελειότατος, Jove has not Δίκη or RIGHT for his Assessor, but is himself RIGHT, and JUSTICE, and of all LAWS the most ANTIENT and PERFECT. *Moral.* p. 781. B.

THUS *Antoninus* — — τέλος δὲ λογικῶν ζώων, τὸ ἐπεσθαι τῷ τῆς πόλεως καὶ πολιτείας τῆς πρεσβυτάτης λόγῳ καὶ θεσμῷ. The End of Rational Animals is to follow the REASON and SACRED LAW of that City, and most ancient Polity, [in which all rational Beings are included] l. 2. f. 16.

THE most simple Account of this Law, which the *Stoics* gave, seems to be that recorded by *Stobæus*; according to which they called it λόγον, ὀρθὸν ὄντα, προσακλικὸν μὲν τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ τῶν ἐπισητέων, RIGHT REASON, ordaining what is to be done, and forbidding what is not to be done. *Ecl. Ethic.* 178. See also the Notes of *Turnebus* and *Davis* upon *Cic. de Legg.* l. 1. c. 6.

HAVING premised thus much concerning Law universal, it remains to say something of that RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT, which is in this Part of the Dialogue

Dialogue proposed as our *Happiness*. RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT is intended to express the Term *Καλόθωσις* which *Cicero* translates *recta Effectio*. *Καλόθωσις* he translates *Rectum Factum*. See *De Fin.* l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a *Καλόθωσις*, was *Νόμος πρὸς αἴμα*, a Thing commanded by Law; to which was opposed *ἀμαρτία*, a Sin or Offence, which was defined *Νόμος ἀπαγορεύμα*, a Thing forbidden by Law. *Plut. Mor.* 1037. C. What Law is here meant, which thus commands or forbids, has been shewn above.

HENCE therefore may be seen the Reason, why we have said thus much on the Nature and Idea of Law universal; so intimate being the Union between *this* and *right Conduct*, that we find *the latter* is nothing more than a perfect Obedience to the former.

HENCE too we see the Reason, why in one view it was deemed HAPPINESS, to be void of Error or Offence, *ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι*, as we find it in *Arrian. Epiēt.* l. 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable was the necessary Result of Rectitude of Conduct, or rather in a manner the same thing with it.

I cannot conclude this Note, without remarking on an elegant Allusion of *Antoninus* to the primary Signification of the Word *Καλόθωσις*, that is to say, *κατὰ ὁρὸς*, right onwards, straight and directly forwards. Speaking of the Reasoning Faculty, how, without looking farther, it rests contented in its own Energies, he adds——*Καθὸ καλόθωσις αὐ τοιαύταις πράξεσι ὀνομάζονται, τὴν ὁρθότητα τῆς ὁδοῦ σημαίνειν.*

——For which Reason Actions of this sort
X are

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are called RECTITUDES, as denoting the *Directness* of their *Progression* RIGHT ONWARDS. l. 5. f. 14. So again in the same Sense, εὐθεΐαν περιάινειν, to keep on, the straight Road. l. 5. f. 3. l. 10. f. 11.

ONE would imagine that our Countryman *Milton*, had this Reasoning in view, when in his 19th Sonnet, speaking of his own Blindness, he says with a becoming Magnanimity,

——— Yet I argue not
Against Heav'n's Hand or Will; nor bate one jot
Of Heart or Hope; but still bear up, and steer
RIGHT ONWARDS.———

The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perusal, being both sublime and simple.

NOTE XXVII. p. 185.—THE MERE DOING WHATEVER IS CORRESPONDENT TO SUCH AN END, EVEN THO' WE NEVER ATTAIN IT——] Thus *Epicletus* in *Arrian*, speaking of Address to Men in Power, and admitting such Address, when justified by certain Motives, adds, that such Address ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. Upon this an Objector demands of him, πῶς ἐν τύχῃ, ἔδεομαι; But how then am I to obtain that, which I want?——The Philosopher answers, Ἐγὼ δὲ σοι λέγω, ὅτι ὡς ΤΕΤΕΟΜΕΝΟΣ ἀπέρχῃ. ἔχῃ δὲ μόνον, ἵνα πράξῃς τὸ σαυτῷ πρέπον; Did I ever say to thee, that thou shouldst go and address, as tho' thou wert to SUCCEED; and not rather with this only view, that thou mightest DO THAT, WHICH IS BECOMING THY CHARACTER?——And soon after, when

when an Objection is urged from Appearance, and the Opinion of Mankind, he answers,—ἐκ οἷσθ' ὅτι ἀνὴρ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἔδεν ποιεῖ τὴν δόξαν ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὴν ΠΕΠΡΑΧΘΑΙ ΚΑΛΩΣ; Knowest thou not, that a fair and good Man does nothing for the sake of Appearance, but for the sake only of having DONE WELL AND FAIRLY? *Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 24. p. 497, 498. This Doctrine indeed seems to have been the Basis of the Stoic Morals; the Principle, which included, according to these Philosophers, as well Honour and Honesty, as Good and Happiness. Thus Cicero—*Facere omnia, ut adipiscamur quæ secundum naturam sint*, etsi ea non adsequamur, id esse & honestum, & solum per se expetendum & summum bonum Stoici dicunt. *De Fin.* l. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this is consonant that Sentiment of theirs in *Plutarch*—Τὴν μὲν φύσιν αὐτὴν ἀδιάφορον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ὁμολογεῖν, ἀγαθόν—And again—τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν, τέλει εἶναι—τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀδιάφορα εἶναι. *Plut. Mor.* 1060. D. E. See below, Note XXX. Socrates was of the same Opinion, as appears from all parts of the Platonic and Xenophontean Dialogues. Take one Example out of many.—τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὔτε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἂν ἂν πράττοι· τὸν δὲ εὖ πράττοντα, μακάριον τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. *Gorg. Plat.* p. 507. Edit. Serr.

NOTE XXVIII. p. 185.—WHAT IF WE MAKE OUR NATURAL STATE THE STANDARD ONLY TO DETERMINE OUR CONDUCT, &c.] It is in this sense we find it elegantly said in *Plutarch* by the last mentioned Philosophers—τοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν—that our NATURAL STATE and what is consonant to it, are the ELEMENTS

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of Happiness,—and just before, the same natural State is called τὴ καθήκοντι ἀρχὴ, καὶ ὕλη τῆς ἀρετῆς, the SOURCE of Moral Office; and the SUBJECT MATTER of Virtue. Plut. Mor. 1069. E. F. *Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constitui necesse esse initium, quod sapientia, cum quid agere incipiat, sequatur; idque initium esse naturæ accommodatum: nam aliter appetitio, &c.* Cic. Acad. 1. 2. c. 8. p. 85, 86. *Initia proponi necesse esse apta & accommodata naturæ quorum ex selectione Virtus possit existere.* De Fin. 1. 4. c. 17. p. 316. *Cum vero illa, quæ officia esse dixi, proficiantur ab initiis naturæ; ea ad hæc referri necesse est: ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ; nec tamen ut hoc sit BONORUM ULTIMUM—*De Fin. 1. 3. c. 6. p. 217.

NOTE XXIX. p. 185.—WE SHOULD NOT WANT A GOOD TO CORRESPOND, &c.] *Plutarch* quotes the following Sentiment of *Chrysippus*, who patronized this Idea of Good—Τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, ὃν αὐτὸς εἰσάγει καὶ δοκιμάζει, συμφωνότατον εἶναι φησι τῷ βίῳ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἀπλεσθαι προλήψεων. Plut. Mor. 1041. E.

NOTE XXX. p. 187.—YET WE LOOK NOT FOR HIS REPUTATION, &c.] What *Quintilian* says of *Rhetoric*, may with great propriety be transferred to *Morality*. *Noster orator, Arsque a nobis finita, non sunt posita in EVENTU. Tendit quidem ad victoriam, qui dicit; sed, cum bene dixit, etiamsi non vincat, id quod arte continetur, effecit. Nam & gubernator vult salvâ nave in portum pervenire: si tamen tempestate fuerit abreptus, non ideo minus erit gubernator, dicetque notum illud; dum clavum rectum teneam. Et medicus sanitatem ægri petit: si tamen*
aut

aut valetudinis vi, aut intemperantiâ ægri, alioue quo casu summa non contingit; dum ipse omnia secundum rationem fecerit, medicinæ fine non excidit. Ita oratori bene dixisse, finis est. Nam est ars ea—in ACTU posita, non in EVENTU. Inst. Orat. l. 2. c. 17.

NOTE XXXI. p. 187.—HE FOR A SUBJECT HAS THE WHOLE OF HUMAN LIFE, &c.] Ὀυσία τῆ ἀγαθῆς, προαίρεσις ποιά· τῆ κακῆς προαίρεσις ποιά. Τί ἐν τὰ ἐκτός; Ὑλαὶ τῇ προαίρεσει, περὶ ἧς ἀναστροφόμεν τεύξεσθαι τῆ ἰδίᾳ ἀγαθῆς ἢ κακῆς. *The Essence of GOOD, is a peculiar Direction of Mind; and the Essence of EVIL, is a peculiar Direction also. What then are EXTERNALS? They serve as SUBJECTS to the Mind's Direction, from conversing with which it obtains its proper Good or Evil. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 29. Again—*Ἄν ὕλαι, ἀδιάφοροι· ἢ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν ἐν ἀδιάρθρω. *The SUBJECTS are indifferent, but not so the USE of them. Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 5.*

Thus HORACE:

*Non possidentem multa vocaveris
Recte beatum; rectius occupat
Nomen beati, qui Deorum
Muneribus SAPIENTER UTI,
Duramque callet pauperiem pati,
Pejusque leto flagitium timet:
Non ille, &c.*

Od. l. iv. 9.

EVEN the Comic Poet seems not to have been unacquainted with this Doctrine:

Ch. Quid nárrat? Cl. Quid ille? míserum se esse.

Ch. Míserum? quem minus crédere est?

Quid rélliqui est, quin hábeat quæ quidem in hómine dicuntúr bona?

Paréntis, patriam incólumen, amicos, génus, cognatos, dívitias:

Atque hæc perinde súnť ut illius ánimus, qui ea pód-
fidet:

Qui UTI scit, ei BONA; illi, qui non útitur recté,
mala.

Heauton. Act I. S. 2. V. 18,

Vid. Platon. in Euthydemo, p. 281. Edit Serr. ἐν νε-
φελείῳ δ', ἐφ' ᾧ Κλεινία, μινδυνέει.

NOTE XXXII. p. 189.—THE END IN OTHER
ARTS IS EVER DISTANT, &c.] Sed in cæteris
artibus cum dicitur Artificiosè, posterum quodam modo
& consequens putandum est, quod illi ἐπ' ἐντελεχείᾳ
appellant; quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur, id ad-
primo rectissime dicitur: quicquid enim a sapiente pro-
ficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis
partibus; in eo enim positum est id, quod dicimus esse
expetendum. Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere,
parentes violare, fana depeculari, quæ sunt in effectū:
sic timere, sic mævere, sic in libidine esse, peccatum est,
etiam sine effectū. Verum ut hæc, non in posteris & in
consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt: sic
ea quæ proficiscuntur a virtute, SUSCEPTIONE prima,
non PERFECTIONE, recta sunt judicanda. Cic. de
Fin. 1. 3. c. 9. p. 228. Τὸ ἰδίᾳ τέλος τυγχάνει [ἢ λο-
γικὴ ψυχὴ] ὅπῃ ἂν τὸ τῆ βίης πέρας ἐπιγῇ· ἐχ,
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ὀρχήσεως καὶ ὑπομρίσεως καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
ἀτελεῖς

ἀτελής γίνεσθαι ἢ ὅλην πράξιν, εἰάν τι ἐγκόψῃ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντός μέρεος, καὶ ὅτε ἂν καὶ ἀληφθῇ, πλεονεξ καὶ ἀπροσδεῖς ἐαυτῇ τὸ πρότερον ποιεῖ· ὥστε εἰπεῖν, ἐγὼ ἀπέχω τὰ ἐμά. M. Ant. l. 11. f. 1. Et quemadmodum *opportunitas* (sic enim adpellemus εὐκαιρίαν) non fit major productione temporis (habent enim suum modum quaecunque opportuna dicuntur) sic recta effectio (καλὸς-θωσιν enim ita adpello, quoniam rectum factum καλὸρθωμα) recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique IPSUM BONUM, quod in eo positum est ut naturæ consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. Ut enim *opportunitas* illa, sic hæc de quibus dixi, non sunt temporis productione maiora: ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda vita beata, si sit longa, quam si brevis: utunturque simili, ut, si cothurni laus illa est ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponerentur, nec majores minoribus: sic quorum omne bonum convenientiâ atque opportunitate finitur, nec plura paucioribus, nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponentur. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 14. p. 242. See also Dio. Laert. l. 7. f. 101. M. Ant. l. 6. f. 23. l. 3. f. 7. Senec. Epist. 66.

NOTE XXXIII. p. 191.—RECOLLECT THEN, SAID HE, DO YOU NOT REMEMBER THAT ONE PRE-CONCEPTION, &c.] In this, and the subsequent Pages, the general Pre-conceptions of Good are applied to the particular Hypothesis of Good, advanced in this Treatise. See before, p. 115, 121, 122.

NOTE XXXIV. p. 192.—AND IS THERE ANY TIME OR PLACE, WHENCE RECTITUDE OF CONDUCT MAY BE EXCLUDED? ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΤ καὶ ΔΙΗΝΕΚΩΣ ἐπὶ σοί ἐστι, καὶ τῇ παύσῃ συμβάσει θεοσεβῶς εὐαρεσγεῖν, καὶ τοῖς πα-
X 4 ρύσιν

ῥᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ δίκαιοσύνῃν προσφέρεισθαι——M.
Ant. l. 7. f. 54.

NOTE XXXV. p. 192.—WHERE IT SHALL NOT BE IN HIS POWER TO ACT BRAVELY AND HONESTLY.] Μήκει ἂν μοι λέγε, πῶς γένηται; ὅπως γὰρ ἂν γένηται, σὺ αὐτὸ δῆσεις καλῶς, καὶ ἔσται σοι τὸ ἀποδοῦν εὐλύχημα. Arrian. Epict. l. 4. c. 10. p. 650.

.NOTE XXXVI. p. 195.—THERE ARE INSTANCES INNUMERABLE OF MEN BAD, AS WELL AS GOOD, &c.] See a long Catalogue of these in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*; *Spartan Boys*; *Barbarian Sages*; *Indian Wives*; *Egyptian Devotees*, &c. &c. The whole Passage is worth reading. *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 27. p. 400, 401, &c.

NOTE XXXVII. p. 196.—THIS I WRITE YOU (SAYS HE IN ONE OF HIS EPISTLES) WHILE &c.] Τὴν μακαρίαν ἀγониες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τῆ βίης, ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταῦτα· τραγυερίαιε παρηκολαθῆκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη, ὑπερβολὴν ἔκ ἀπολείποντα τῆ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους· ἀντιπαρελάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τέτοις τὸ καλὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμη——Dio. Laer. l. 10. f. 22. Cum ageremus vitæ beatum & eundem supremum diem, scribebamus hæc. Tanti autem morbi aderant vesicæ & viscerum, ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem possit accedere. Compensabatur tamen cum his omnibus animi lætitia, quam capiebam memoriâ rationum inventorumque nostrorum——Cic. de Fin. l. 2. c. 30. p. 173.

Soon after we have another Sentiment of Epicurus, that a rational Adversity was better than an irrational

tional Prosperity. The original Words are — κρείττον εἶναι εὐλογίως ἀτυχεῖν, ἢ ἀλογίως εὐτυχεῖν. Dio. Laert. l. 10. f. 135.

NOTE XXXVIII. p. 198. O CRITO, IF IT BE PLEASING TO THE GODS, &c.] The three Quotations in this Page are taken from *Plato*; the first from the *Crito*, quoted by *Epicætetus* at the End of the *Enchiridion*, and in many other Places; the second from the *Apology*, quoted as frequently by the same Author; the third, from the *Menæxenus* or *Epitaph.* Plat. Opera, tom. 2. p. 248. Edit. Serran. see also *Cic. Tuscul.* l. 5. c. 12.

NOTE XXXIX. p. 199. IF YOU ARE FOR NUMBERS, REPLIED HE, WHAT THINK YOU OF THE NUMEROUS RACE OF PATRIOTS, &c.] *Sed quid duces & principes nominem; cum legiones soribat Cato sæpe alacris in eum locum profectas, unde redituras se non arbitrarentur? Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt: in quos Simonides,*

*Dic hospes Spartæ, nos te hic vidiſſe jacentes,
Dum ſanctis patriæ legibus obſequimur.*

Tuscul. Diſp. l. 1. 42. p. 101.

NOTE XL. *Ibid.* — MARTYRS FOR SYSTEMS WRONG, &c.] That there may be a *bigotted Obſtinacy* in favour of what is *abſurd*, as well as a *rational Conſtancy* in adhering to what is *right*, thoſe *Egyptians* above mentioned may ſerve as Examples. *Ægyptiorum morem quis ignoret? quorum imbutæ mentes pravitatis erroribus quamvis carnificinam prius ſubierint, quam ibim aut aſpidem aut ſelem aut canem aut croco-*

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crocodilum violent: quorum etiam si imprudentes quidpiam fecerint, pœnam nullam recusent. Tusc. Disp. l. 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before, Note XXXVI.

NOTE XLI. p. 200.—CELEBRATED TO SUCH A HEIGHT, IN THE RELIGION, WHICH WE PROFESS, &c.] It is probable that some Analogies of this sort induced a *Father of the Church* (and no less a one than St. *Jerom*) to say of the *Stoics*, who made *moral Rectitude* the ONLY GOOD, — NO-STRO DOGMATI IN PLERISQUE CONCORDANT. *Vid. Menag. in D. Laert.* l. 7. f. 101. p. 300. and *Gatak. Præfat. in M. Anton.* See also of this *Treatise* page 110. and below, Note XLIV.

NOTE XLII. p. 201. TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY, &c.] TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY is here explained to be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE SINGLE CONSONANT SCHEME OR PURPOSE; and our GOOD or HAPPINESS is placed in such CONSISTENCE, upon a supposition that those, who live *inconsistently*, and without any such *uniform Scheme*, are of consequence *miserable*, and *unhappy*. Τὸ τέλος, ὃ μὲν Ζήνων ἔτως ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογεμένως ζῆν· τῆτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἓνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένων ζώντων κακὰ δαιμονίων. *Stob. Ecl. Ethic.* p. 171.

THIS CONSISTENCE was called in *Greek* ὁμολογία, in *Latin* *Convenientia*, and was sometimes by itself alone considered as the END. Τὴν ὁμολογίαν λέγουσι τέλος εἶναι. *Stob. Ecl. Ethic.* p. 172. See also *Cic. de Fin.* l. 3. c. 6. p. 216. So also in the same last named *Treatise*, c. 7. p. 220.—*Ut enim histri-*
oni

oni actio, saltatori motus, non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus : sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus CONVENIENS CONSENTANEUMQUE dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinæ similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, & saltationi; ut in ipsa ARTE insit, NON FORIS petatur EXTREMUM, id est, artis effectio.

It is upon this Principle we find it a Precept in Cicero's Offices——In primis autem constitutum est, quos nos & quales esse velimus, & in quo genere vitæ——l. i. c. 32. So likewise in the *Enchiridion* of Epictetus, c. 33.——Τάξον τινα ἥδη χαρακτῆρα σαυτῷ καὶ τύπον, ὃν φυλάξης ἐπὶ τε σεαυτῷ ὦν, καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἐπισυγγχάνων. Ordain to thyself some Character and Model of Life, which thou mayst maintain both by thyself, and when thou art conversant with Mankind.

So much indeed was rested upon this Principle of Consistence, that even to be any Thing consistently, was held better than the contrary. Thus Epictetus.——Ἐνα σε δεῖ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν· ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν σε δεῖ ἐξεργάζεσθαι τὸ σαυτῷ, ἢ τὰ ἐκτὸς——It behoves thee to be ONE UNIFORM MAN, either good or bad; either to cultivate thy own Mind, or to cultivate Things external——Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does he express himself in a place subsequent; where having first counselled against that False Complaisance, which makes us, to please Mankind, forget our proper Character, and having recommended as our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds——Ἐἰ δὲ μὴ ἀρέσει ταῦτα, ὅλῃ ἀπόκλινον ἐπὶ τ' ἀναντία· γενεῖς εἰς τῶν κιναιδῶν, εἰς τῶν μοιχῶν——Διάφορα δ' ἔτω πρό-

πρόσωπα ἔ μὴ γνῶναι. ἔ δύνασθαι καὶ Θηροσίτην ὑποκρί-
 νασθαι καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα—Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 2. p. 580.
*But if what I recommend to thee do not please, then turn
 thee totally to all that is contrary; become a profligate of
 the most profligate kind—Characters so different are
 not to be blended; thou canst not act at once Thermites
 and Agamemnon.*

So too HORACE:

—Quanto CONSTANTIOR idem
 In vitiis, tanto levius miser, ac prior ille
 Qui jam contento, jam laxo fune laborat.

Sat. 7. l. 2. v. 18.

See also *Characteristics*, V. I. p. 131.

NOTE XLIII. p. 203.—IT IS NOT MERELY
 TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY; BUT TO LIVE CON-
 SISTENTLY WITH NATURE.] Ὁμολογεμένως τῇ
 φύσει ζῆν. Cleanthes in Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 171.—
Congruenter naturæ convenienterque vivere. Cic. de
 Fin. l. 3. c. 7. p. 221. The first Description of
 our *End* [*to live consistently*] was deemed *defective*,
 and therefore was this *Addition* made. See *Stobæus*
 in the Place cited. Arr. Epict. l. 3. c. 1. p. 352.

NOTE XLIV. p. 204.—TO LIVE CONSIS-
 TENTLY WITH NATURE IS TO LIVE ACCORD-
 ING TO JUST EXPERIENCE OF THOSE THINGS,
 WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.] Τέλϑ ἐπὶ τὸ
 ὁμολογεμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ὅπερ ὁ Χρυσίππϑ σα-
 φέτερον βεβλόμενος ποιῆσαι, ἐξήνεγκε τὸν τρόπον τῆτον,
 Ζῆν καὶ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων. Stob. Ecl.
 Ethic. 171. Diog. Laert l. 7. c. 87. *His verbis*
 [scil.

[scil. vivere secundum naturam] tria significari Stoici dicunt. Unum ejusmodi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quæ naturâ evenirent—De Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286. See also the same Treatise, l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. where it is expressed—*Vivere cum intelligentiâ earum rerum quæ naturâ evenirent.*

NOTE XLV. p. 205.—TO LIVE PERPETUALLY SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR END THAT SELECTING, AND THAT REJECTING ONLY.]
 Ὁ τε Ἀντίπατρος, ——— τὸ τέλος κείσθαι, Ἐν τῷ δινηκῶς καὶ ἀπαραβάτως ἐκλέγεσθαι μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλέγεσθαι δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, ὑπολαμβάνει.
 Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2. p. 497. Edit. Potter. This Sentiment was sometimes contracted, and expressed as follows ——— τὸ εὐλογεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐκλογαῖς ——— sometimes, more concisely still, by the single Term τὸ εὐλογεῖν. See Plutarch 1071, 1072. Cicero joins this, and the foregoing Descriptions of Happiness, together. *Circumscriptis igitur his sententiis, quas posui, & si quæ similis earum sint; relinquitur, ut summum bonum sit, vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum, quæ naturâ eveniant, feligentem quæ secundum naturam, & quæ contra naturam sunt rejicientem, id est, convenienter congruenterque naturæ vivere.* De Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227. See also De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. See also Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 88, — Stob. Ecl. Eth. 171.

NOTE XLVI. p. 207. TO LIVE IN THE DISCHARGE OF MORAL OFFICES.] Ἀρχέδημος δὲ
 [τέλος]

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[τέλ^θ φησὶ] τὸ πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα ἐπιτελεῖν ζῆν.
Laert. l. 7. c. 88.—Stob. Ecl. Eth. 171.—*Officia omnia—servantem vivere.* Cic. de Fin. l. 4. c. 6. p. 286.

SOON after we meet the Phrases—TO LIVE ACCORDING TO NATURE; TO LIVE ACCORDING TO VIRTUE. Ὁ Ζήνων—τέλ^θ εἶπε, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Laert. l. 7. c. 87.—*Consentire naturæ; quod esse voluntæ virtute id est, honestate vivere*—De Fin. l. 2. c. 11. p. 113. Where, as has been already observed page 174, and in the Note likewise on the Place, we find the *Lives* according to *Nature* and *Virtue* are considered as the *same*.

HOWEVER, to make this Assertion plainer, (if it be not perhaps sufficiently plain already) it may not be improper to consider what Idea these *Philosophers* had of VIRTUE.

IN *Laertius* (where he delivers the Sentiments of *Zeno* and his followers) *Virtue* is called Διάθεσις ὁμολογεμένη, a consistent Disposition; and soon after, ψυχὴ πεποιημένη πρὸς τὴν ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τῷ βίῳ. A Mind formed to Consistence thro' every Part of Life. Laert. 7. c. 89.

IN *Stobæus* (according to the Sentiments of the same School) it is called Διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφων^θ αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. A Disposition of Mind, consonant to itself throughout the whole of Life. Ecl. Eth. p. 167.

So

So Cicero in his *Laws*—*Constans & perpetua ratio vita, quæ est VIRTUS.*—l. I. c. 17. p. 55.

So Seneca in his 74th *Epistle*—*VIRTUS enim CONVENIENTIA constat: omnia opera ejus cum ipsâ concordant, & congruunt.*

THUS therefore *Consistence* being the *Essence* of *Virtue*, and upon the *Hypothesis* here advanced, the *Essence* also of *Happiness*; it follows first that a *Virtuous* Life will be a *Happy* Life. But if a *Happy* one, then of course a Life according to *Nature*; since nothing can be *Good*, which is *contrary* to *Nature*, nor indeed which is not *consonant*, in the strictest manner, to it.

AND here (as a proper Opportunity seems to offer) we cannot but take notice of the great *Similitude* of *Sentiments*, it may be even said the *Unanimity* of almost all *Philosophers*, on this important Subject concerning *ENDS* and *HAPPINESS*.

THOSE, whose *Hypothesis* we have followed in this Dialogue, supposed it to be *VIRTUE* and *CONSISTENT ACTION*, and that without regard to *Fortune* or *Success*. But even they, who from their *Hypothesis* made *some Degree of Success* requisite; who rested it not merely on *right Action*, but on a proportion of *bodily Welfare*, and good *Fortune* concomitant, even these made *RIGHT ACTION* and *VIRTUE* to be *PRINCIPAL*.

THUS

THUS *Archytas*, according to the Doctrine of the Pythagorean School. *Ευδαιμοσύνα* *χεῖρα* *ἀρετᾶς* ἐν *εὐτυχίᾳ*. *Happiness is the Use or Exercise of Virtue, attended with external good Fortune.* Opusc. Mytholog. p. 678. Consonant to this Sentiment, he says in the beginning of the same Treatise, ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ εὐθέως εὐδαίμων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ εὐδαίμων, καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ἐστίν. *The good Man is not of necessity Happy; [because, upon this Hypothesis, external Fortune may be wanting;] but the happy Man is of necessity Good, [because, upon the same Hypothesis, without Virtue was no Happiness.] Ibid. p. 673. Again—*Αἰεὶ μὲν γὰρ κακοδαίμονεν ἀνάγκη τὸν κακὸν, αἰεὶ ἔχει ὕλαν (κακῶς τε γὰρ αὐτᾷ χρεῖσται) αἰεὶ σπανάζοι.—*The bad Man (says he) must needs at all times be miserable, whether he have, or whether he want, the Materials of external Fortune; for if he have them, he would employ them ill. Ibid. p. 696. Thus we see this Philosopher, tho' he made Externals a Requisite to Happiness, yet still without Virtue he treats them as of no Importance. Again—*Δύο δ' ὁδοὶ τέμνονται ἐν τῷ βίῳ· ἡ μὲν στυγερωπέτερη, ἣν ὁ τλάμων ἐξάδιζεν Ὀδυσσεύς· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονιότερη. τὰν ἐπορεύετο Νέστωρ. Τὰν ὧν ἀρετὴν φαμι δηλῆσθαι (lege δῆλεσθαι, Dorice pro θέλειν) μὲν τάυταν, δύνασθαι δὲ καὶ τήναι. *There are two Roads in Life distinct from each other; one the rougher, which the suffering Ulysses went; the other more smooth, which was travelled by Nestor. Now of these Roads (says he) Virtue desires indeed the latter; and yet is she not unable to travel the former. Ibid. p. 696. From which last Sentiment it appears, that he thought VIRTUE, even in any Fortune, was capable of producing at least some degree of HAPPINESS.*

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As for the *Socratic Doctrine* on this Subject, it may be sufficiently seen by what is quoted from it, in the Dialogue pag. 198, 199. And as the Sentiments, there exhibited, are recorded by *Plato*, they may be called not only *Socratic*, but *Platonic* also. However, lest this should be liable to dispute, the following Sentiment is taken from *Xenocrates*, one of *Plato's* immediate Successors in the old *Academy* by him founded. *Ξενοκράτης φησιν, 'Ευδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· τούτῃν γὰρ ἐκάστω εἶναι Δαίμονα.* *Xenocrates held that he was Eudæmon, or HAPPY, who had a virtuous Mind; for that the Mind was every one's Dæmon or Genius.* *Arist. Top. l. 2. c. 6.*

HERE we see VIRTUE made the Principle of HAPPINESS, according to the Hypothesis of the Dialogue. There is an elegant *Allusion* in the Passage to the *Etymology* of the Word *Ευδαίμων*, which signifies both [*Happy*] and [*possessed of a good Genius or Dæmon*;] an Allusion which in translating it was not possible to preserve. See below, *Note LVIII.*

As for the *Peripatetic School*, we find their Idea of HAPPINESS, as recorded by *Laertius*, to be in a manner the same with that of the *Pythagoreans*. It was *χρησις ἀρετῆς ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*—*The Use or Exercise of Virtue in a complete and perfect Life.* *Laert. l. 5. c. 30.* We have already, in *Note XXV.* cited the same Doctrine (tho' somewhat varied in Expression) from the Founder of the *Peripatetics*, in his first Book of *Ethics*. So again we learn from him ———— ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς καὶ ἐνέργεια λέγονται

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τὸ

τὰ τέλῃ, that it is certain *Actions and Energies* which are to be deemed *THE END*. *Ethic. Nic.* l. 1. c. 8.—And again—Ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραγία τέλῃ. For it is the very *Reclitute of Action*, which is itself the *End*. *Ibid.* l. 6. c. 5. And again, Ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶ ——— *Happiness is a certain Energizing.* l. 9. c. 9. And more explicitly than all these Passages in that elegant Simile, l. 1. c. 8.—Ὡς περ δὲ ὀλυμπιάσιν ἔχ' οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι τεφανῆναι, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τέτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν) ἔτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν Οἱ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΟΡΘΩΣ ἐπὶ ἑσσοιοι γίγνονται. For as in the Olympic Games, not those are crowned, who are handsomest and strongest, but those who combat and contend, (for it is from among these come the Victors;) so, with respect to things laudable and good in human Life, it is the right Actors only that attain the Possession of them. Nay, so much did this Philosopher make *Happiness* depend on right *Action*, that tho' he required some Portion of *Externals* to that *Felicity*, which he held *supreme*; yet still it was *Honour* and *Virtue* which were its principal Ingredients. Thus speaking of the Calamities and external Casualties of Life, which he confesses to be *Impediments* to a *Happiness perfectly complete*, he adds—ὁμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναληψίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὧν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. Ἐἰ δ' εἰσιν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἰπομεν, ἔδειξεν ὅτι τῶν μακαρίων ἀπὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισθὰ καὶ φαῦλα. Τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐμφρονα πάντας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰετὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν καθάπερ καὶ

εὐα-

τρατήγον ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολε-
μικώτατα, καὶ σκυτολόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυλῶν κάλ-
λιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰς ἄλ-
λας τεχνίτας ἀπαντας. Ἐἰ δ' ἔτιω, ἀθλιῶ μὲν εἰδε-
πόσι γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων. *And yet, even in such Inci-*
dents, the fair Principle of Honour and Virtue shines
forth, when a Man with becoming Calmness endures
many and great Misfortunes, and that not thro' Insensi-
bility, but being brave and magnanimous. Nay more,
if it be true, as we have already affirmed, that it is
Actions, which are predominant in constituting a happy
Life, then can no one be completely miserable, who is
happy in his right Conduct, because he will never be the
Actor of what is detestable and base. For it is our Opi-
nion that the Man, truly wise and good, endures all
Fortunes with becoming Decency, and from whatever
happens to arise, still frames the fairest Actions; like as
the good Commander uses the Army, which he happens to
find, after the manner most agreeable to the Rules of
War; and the Shoemaker, from such Skins as others
provide him, makes a Shoe, the best that can be made
from such Materials; and so in the same manner all
other Artists beside. But if this be true, then he, who
is happy in this Rectitude of Genius, can in no Instance
be truly and strictly miserable. Eth. Nic. l. i. c. 10.

As for Epicurus, tho' he was an Advocate for
Pleasure, yet so high was his Opinion of a wise
and right Conduct, that he thought rational Adver-
sity better than irrational Prosperity. See Dial.
p. 197: Hence too he represented that Pleasure,
which he esteemed our Sovereign Happiness, to be
as inseparable from Virtue, as Virtue was from that.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδὺς ζῆν, ἀνευ τῆ φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς, καὶ
δυνατῶς.

δικαίως· ἐδὲ φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, ἄνευ τῆς ἡδews. *It is impossible to live pleasurable, without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; or to live prudently and honourably and justly without living pleasurable.* Epic. in Laert. l. 10. f. 132.

To conclude the whole, our Countryman *Thomas Hobbes*, though he professedly explodes all this Doctrine concerning *Ends*, yet seems insensibly to have established an *End* himself, and to have founded it (like others) in a certain ENERGY or ACTION. For thus it is he informs us, in his Treatise called *Human Nature*, that *there can be no CONTENTMENT, but in PROCEEDING; and that FELICITY consisteth, not in HAVING—but in PROSPERING.* And again, some time after, having admitted the Comparison of *Human Life* to a *Race*, he immediately subjoins—*But this RACE we must suppose to have no other GOAL, nor other GARLAND, but being FOREMOST and IN IT.*

AND thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of *Philosophers* on the Subject of *Ends*, here treated.

NOTE XLVII. p. 208.—YET IT IN NO MANNER TAKES AWAY THE DIFFERENCE AND DISTINCTION OF OTHER THINGS.] *Cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum quæ secundum naturam sint, habere delectum; qui omnia sic exæquaverunt, ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent, uti nullâ selectione uterentur, virtutem ipsam sustulerunt.* Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 4. p. 207.

QUID autem apertius, quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus, quæ contra naturam sint, earum rerum quæ sint secundum naturam, tollatur omnis ea, quæ quaeratur

tur laudeturque prudentia? Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 9. p. 227.

DEINCEPS explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; nec ullum sapientiæ munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter eas res, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset; neque ullum delectum haberi oporteret. Itaque cum esset satis constitutum, id solum esse bonum quod esset honestum, & id malum solum quod turpe; tum inter hæc & illa, quæ nihil valerent ad beate misere vivere vivendum, aliquid tamen, quo differrent, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia æstimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. Ibid. l. 3. c. 15. p. 246.

CÆTERA autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia naturæ esse contraria: iis ipsis alia interjecta & media numerabat, Acad. l. I. c. 11. p. 46. See Dial. p. 187.

NOTE XLVIII. p. 208. IT SUPPRESSES NO SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, &c.] As much has been said concerning the STOIC APATHY, or *Insensibility with respect to Passion*, it may not be improper to inquire, what were their real Sentiments on this Subject.

Πάθος, which we usually render a *Passion*, is always rendered by Cicero, when speaking as a Stoic, *Perturbatio*, a *Perturbation*. As such therefore in the first place we say it ought always to be treated.

THE Definition of the Term πάθος, as given by these Philosophers, was ἐρμὴ πλεονάζουσα, translated by Cicero, *Appetitus vehementior*. Tusc. l. 4. c. 9. p. 273. Now this Definition may be more

easily explained, if we first inquire, what they meant by ὁρμή. Ὅρμη they defined to be πορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι, a *Tendency or Motion of the Soul toward something*. Stob. Ecl. Ethic. p. 175. A πάθος therefore, or *Perturbation*, must have been, according to their Definition, a *Tendency or Motion of the Soul, which was excessive and beyond Bounds*. • Stobæus, from whom this Definition is taken, in commenting upon it observes, ἡ λέγει πεφυκῖα πλεονάζειν, ἀλλ' ἤδη ἐν πλεονάσματι ἔσται ἡ γὰρ δυνάμει, μᾶλλον δ' ἐνεργεία.— that Zeno (its Author) does not call a Πάθος something capable by Nature to pass into Excess, but something actually in Excess already, as having its Essence, not in mere Capacity, but in Actuality. Ecl. Eth. p. 159.

THERE is another Definition of the same Term, which makes it to be ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, a *Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature*. D. Laert. l. 7. f. 110. Andronicus Rhodius adds, to this latter Definition, the Words, δι' ὑπόληψιν κακῆς ἢ ἀγαθῆς, from the *Opinion of something Good or Evil*. Περὶ Πάθ. p. 523. So that its whole Idea is as follows. A *Perturbation, or Stoic Passion, is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to Nature, arising from the Opinion of something Good or Evil*. These last Words, founding the Πάθος or *Perturbation on Opinion*, correspond to what Cicero says, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the Stoic Philosophers, omnes perturbationes judicio fieri & opinione, Tusc. l. 4. c. 7. p. 276. Laertius informs us, that they even made the *Perturbations themselves to be Judgments*. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἀλλοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι. Laert. l. 7. f. 111. He subjoins an Instance to illustrate. Ἦτε γὰρ φιλαργυρία ὑπόληψις ἐστὶ τῷ τὸ ἀρ-
γύριον

γύριον καλὸν εἶναι. For thus (says he) the Love of Money is the Judgment or Opinion, that Money is a thing good and excellent. Plutarch records the same Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample manner. Πάθος — λόγος — πονηρὸς καὶ ἀπόλας, ἐκ φάουλῃς καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβών. A Perturbation is a vitious and intemperate Reasoning, which assumes Vehemence and Strength from bad and erroneous Judgment. Mor. p. 441. D. To these Testimonies may be added that of Themistius. — καὶ οὐ κακῶς οἱ ἀπὸ Ζηλώσεως, τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς τῷ λόγῳ διαστροφᾷ εἶναι τιθέμενοι, καὶ λόγους κρίσεις ἡμαρτημένας. Themist. Paraph. in Aristot. de Animâ, L. 3. p. 90. b. Edit. Aldinæ.

THE Substance of what is said above, seems to amounts to this; that Πάθος, in a Stoic Sense, implied a Perturbation, and not a Passion, and that such Perturbation meant an irrational and violent Motion of the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judgment, which was erroneous and faulty.

Now from hence it follows, that THE MAN OF PERFECT CHARACTER (according to their Hypothesis) must of necessity be ἀπαθής, APATHETIC, OR VOID OF PERTURBATION. For such a Character, as has been shewn, implies perfect Rectitude of Conduct. But perfect Rectitude of Conduct implies perfect Rectitude of Judgment; and such Rectitude of Judgment excludes all Error and wrong Judgment: But if Error and wrong Judgment, then Perturbation of consequence, which they suppose to be derived from thence alone.

THAT this was the Sense, in which they understood APATHY, we have their own Authority, as

given us by *Laertius*. Φασι δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφὸν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπλωτον εἶναι. *Laert.* l. 7. p. 117. *They say the wise Man is apathetic, by being superior to Error*—by being superior to ERROR, if they may be credited themselves; not, as for the most part we absurdly imagine, by being superior to all *Sense*, and *Feeling*, and *Affection*. The Sentence immediately following the foregoing, looks as if these *Philosophers* had foreseen, how likely they were to be misunderstood. Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ τὸν φαῦλον, ἐν ἴσῳ λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀτρέπτῳ—*There is also another Sort of Apathetic Man, who is bad; who is the same in Character, as the hard and inflexible.* To the same Purpose *Epietetus*. 'Ου δεῖ γάρ με εἶναι ἀπαθῆ, ὡς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰς σχέσεις τηρεῖν τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθετάς, ὡς εὐσεῖν, ὡς υἱόν, ὡς ἀδελφόν, ὡς πατέρα, ὡς πολίτην. FOR I AM NOT TO BE APATHETIC, LIKE A STATUE, but I am withal to observe Relations, both the natural and adventitious; as the Man of Religion, as the Son, as the Brother, as the Father, as the Citizen. *Arr. Epiet.* l. 3. c. 2. p. 359.

IMMEDIATELY before this, he tells us in the same Chapter, Πάθος γὰρ ἄλλως ἢ γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ ὀρέξεως ἀπολυγχανέσεως, ἢ ἐκκλίσεως περιπιπίσεως, *that a Perturbation in no other way ever arises, but either when a Desire is frustrated, or an Aversion falls into that which it would avoid.* Where it is observable, that he does not make either *Desire* or *Aversion*, Πάθος, or *Perturbations*, but only the Cause of *Perturbations*, when erroneously conducted.

AGREEABLY to this, in the second Chapter of the *Enchiridion*, we meet with Precepts about the

Conduct and Management of these two *Affections*——
Not a word is said about lopping off either; on the contrary, *Aversion* we are directed how to employ immediately, and *Desire* we are only ordered to suspend for the present, because we want a proper Subject of fit excellence to excite it.

To this may be added, what the same Philosopher speaks, in his own Person, concerning himself. *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 21. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἀρκῶμαι, ἂν ὀρέωμαι καὶ ἐκκλίνω κατὰ φύσιν——I, for my part, am satisfied and contented, if I can DESIRE and AVOID agreeably to Nature. He did not remain it seems dissatisfied, till he had eradicated these *Affections*; but he was satisfied in reducing them to their natural Use.

In *Laertius* we read recorded for a *Stoic* Sentiment, that as the *vitious* Man had his πάθη, or *Perturbations*; so opposed to these, had the *Virtuous* his Ἐυπαθείαι, his *Eupathies* or *Well feelings*, translated by *Cicero* *Constantia*. The three chief of these were Βέλησις, WILL, defined ὀρεξις ἔυλογος, *rational Desire*; Ἐντάλεια, CAUTION, defined ἔκκλισις ἔυλογος, *rational Aversion*; and Χαρά, JOY, defined ἔπαρσις ἔυλογος, *rational Exultation*. To these three principal *Eupathies* belonged many subordinate Species; such as εὐνοία, ἀγάπησις, αἰδώς, τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία, &c. See *Laert.* l. 7. f. 115, 116. *Andron. Rhod.* περὶ πάθων. *Cic. Tusc.* l. 4. c. 6.

CICERO makes *Cato*, under the Character of a *Stoic*, and in explaining their System, use the following expressions. *Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur, intelligi natura fieri, ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a*
quo

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quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequuntur. De Fin. l. 3. c. 19. The same Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laertius. Φασὶ δὲ (οἱ Στωϊκοὶ) καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐτοῖς—They say Parental Affection is natural to them. l. 7. f. 120.

AGAIN, soon after, in the same Treatise de Finibus. Quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit, ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia; facile intelligitur, nos ad conjunctionem congregationemque hominum, & ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. So Laertius. "Αλλὰ μὲν ἔδ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ (φασὶ) βιώσεται ὁ σπευδῶς κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν. The virtuous Man (say they, the Stoics) will never be for living in Solitude; for he is by Nature social, and formed for Action, l. 7. f. 123.

AGAIN, Cicero, in the above-cited Treatise. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus; consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit gerere, & administrare rempublicam; atque ut e natura vivat, uxorem adungere, & velle ex eâ liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur—Ut vero conservetur omnis homini ergo hominem societas, conjunctio, caritas; & emolumenta & detrimenta—communia esse voluerunt. De Fin. l. 3. c. 20, 21.

IN Epictetus the leading Duties, or moral Offices of Man, are enumerated as follows. Πολυτένεσθαι, γαμεῖν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, θεὸν σέβειν, γονέων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καθόλου ὀρέγεσθαι, ἐκκλίνειν, ὁρμᾶν, ἀφορμᾶν, ὡς ἑκαστον

§

τέτων

τῶτων δὲ ποιεῖν, ὡς πεφύκαμεν. Arr. *Epiet.* l. 3. c. 7.
p. 386. The same Sentiments may be found repeated
both in *Stobæus* and *Laertius*.

I SHALL only add one more Sentiment of these
Philosophers, and that is concerning *Friendship*. Λέ-
γουσι δὲ καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς σπουδαίοις εἶναι——
They say that Friendship exists among the Virtuous only.
Laert. l. 7. f. 124.

THE Sum of these Quotations appears to be this;
that the STOICS, in the Character of their virtuous
Man, included rational Desire, Aversion, and Exul-
tation; included Love and parental Affection; Friend-
ship, and a general Charity or Benevolence to all Man-
kind; that they considered it as a Duty, arising from
our very Nature, not to neglect the Welfare of pub-
lic Society, but to be ever ready, according to our
Rank, to act either the Magistrate or the private
Citizen; that their APATHY was no more than a
Freedom from Perturbation, from irrational and ex-
cessive Agitations of the Soul; and consequently that
the strange Apathy, commonly laid to their Charge,
and in the demolishing of which there have been so
many Triumphs, was an imaginary Apathy, for which
they were no way accountable.

NOTE XLIX. p. 209. IT REJECTS NO GAIN,
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE.] The Stoics
were so far from rejecting Wealth, when acquired
fairly, that they allowed their perfect Man, for the
sake of enriching himself, to frequent the Courts of
Kings, and teach Philosophy for a Stipend. Thus
Plutarch from a Treatise of *Chrysippus*——Τὸν μὲν
σοφὸν

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σοφὸν καὶ βασιλεύει συνέσεσθαι φησὶν ἕνεκα χρηματισμῶ, καὶ σοφιστεύειν ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ—*Mor.* p. 1047. F.

So likewise the *Stoic Hecato*, in his *Treatise of Offices*, as quoted by *Cicero*, *Sapientis esse, nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipublicæ. Singulorum enim facultates & copiæ, divitiæ sunt civitatis.* *De Offic.* l. 3. c. 15.

NOTE L. p. 206—UNIVERSALLY AS FAR AS VIRTUE NEITHER FORBIDS NOR DISSUADES, IT ENDEAVOURS TO RENDER LIFE, EVEN IN THE MOST VULGAR ACCEPTATION, AS CHEARFUL, JOYOUS, AND EASY AS POSSIBLE.] *Et exim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet hanc (ut opinor) sententiam, Cum virtute congruere semper: cætera autem, quæ secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent.* *Cic. de Offic.* l. 3. c. 3.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, speaking of the *Stoic Doctrine* concerning the *external Conveniencies*, and common Utilities of Life, delivers their Sentiment in the following Words—ἀλλὰ καὶ δίχα κειμένων ἀρετῆς τε σὺν τέτοις καὶ ἀρετῆς μόνῃς, μηδέποτ' ἂν τὸν σοφὸν τὴν κεχωρισμένην ἐλεσθαι, εἰ εἴη αὐτῷ δυνατόν τὴν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων λαβεῖν. *Supposing there lay Virtue on the one side, attended with these Externals, and Virtue on the other side, alone by herself, the wise Man would never choose that Virtue, which was destitute and single, if it was in his Power to obtain that other,*
which

which was accompanied with these Advantages. Περὶ ψυχ.
p. 157.

NOTE LI. p. 209.—NAY, COULD IT MEND
THE CONDITION OF EXISTENCE—BY ADDING
TO THE AMPLEST POSSESSIONS THE POOREST,
MEANEST UTENSIL, IT WOULD IN NO DEGREE
CONTEMN, &c.]—*Si ad illam vitam, quæ cum vir-
tute degatur, ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum
sapientem eam vitam potius, cui hæc adjecta sint.*—
De Fin. l. 4. c. 12. p. 300.

NOTE LII. p. 210.—COULD IT INDEED CHOOSE
ITS OWN LIFE, IT WOULD BE ALWAYS THAT,
WHERE MOST SOCIAL AFFECTIONS MIGHT BE
EXERTED, &c.] *Itemque magis est secundum naturam,
pro omnibus gentibus (si fieri possit) conservandis aut ju-
vandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere, imitan-
tem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum
memor, in concilio cælestium conlocavit, quam vivere in
solitudine, non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in
maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis; ut
excellas etiam pulchritudine & viribus. Quocirca optimo
quisque & splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic
anteponit.* Cic. de Offic. l. 3. c. 5.

NOTE LIII. p. *ibid.*—IT TEACHES US
TO CONSIDER LIFE, AS ONE GREAT IM-
PORTANT DRAMA, WHERE, &c.] Thus
Aristo the Chian—Εἶναι γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ
ὑποκρίνῃ τὸν σοφόν· ὃς ἂντε Θεσπίτης ἂντε Ἀγαμέμνο-
νος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἐκότερον ὑποκρίνῃναι προση-
κόσως. *The wise Man is like the good Actor; who
whether he assume the Character of Therfites or Aga-
memnon,*

memnon, *aëts either of the two Parts with a becoming Propriety.* D. Laert. l. 7. f. 160.

THIS Comparison of *Life* to a *Drama* or *Stage-play*, seems to have been a Comparison much approved by Authors of Antiquity. See *Epiet. Enchirid.* c. 17. and the Notes of the late learned Editor Mr. Upton. See also *M. Anton.* l. 12. f. 36. and the *Notes of Gataker.* Plat. Gorg. p. 512. T. 1. Ed. Serr.

NOTE LIV. p. 211.—IT ACCEPTS ALL THE JOYS DERIVED FROM THEIR SUCCESS, &c. IT FIXES NOT, LIKE THE MANY, ITS HAPPINESS ON SUCCESS ALONE, &c.] One of the wisest Rules that ever was, with respect to the Enjoyment of External good Fortune, is that delivered by *Epietetus*; to enjoy it, ὡς δέδωται, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον δέδωται, in such manner as it is given, and for such Time as it is given, remembering that neither of these Conditions we have the Power to command. See *Arr. Epiet.* l. 4. c. 1. p. 556. See also p. 573. of the same.

NOTE LV. *Ibid.* ON THE CONTRARY, WHEN THIS HAPPENS, IT IS THEN IT RETIRES INTO ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR, WHAT IS LAUDABLE, &c.] See before, p. 322. ὁμοῦς δὲ καὶ ἐν τέτοις διαλάμπει, &c.

NOTE LVI. p. 212. ALL MEN PURSUE GOOD, &c.] This is a Principle adopted by all the Stoics, and inculcated thro' every part of the Dissertations of *Epietetus*. Take an example or two out of many. Φύσις δ' αὐτῇ πάντος, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, φεύγειν τὸ κακόν——τὴ γὰρ ἀγαθὴ συγγενέστερον ἔδεν. It is the Nature

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*Nature of every one to pursue GOOD, and fly Evil—
for nothing is more intimately allied to us than GOOD.*
Arr. Epict. l. 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, l. 2. c. 22.
p. 313. Πᾶν Ζῶον ἔθεν ἑαυτοῦ ὡς ἰδίῳ
συμπερόνῃ. *To nothing is every ANIMAL so intimately
allied, as to its own peculiar WELFARE, and IN-
TEREST.*

So Cicero. *Omnes enim expetimus UTILITATEM,
ad eamque rapimur, nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus.*
De Offic. l. 3. c. 28. Platon. Gorg. p. 468. T. I.
Edit. Serr. ibid. p. 499. E.

NOTE LVII. p. 213. — ALL DERIVED FROM
EXTERNALS MUST FLUCTUATE, AS THEY FLUC-
TUATE.] See before, p. 126, 130, 133.

NOTE LVIII. *Ibid.* — WHEN WE PLACE THE
SOVEREIGN GOOD IN MIND. —] DÆMON or
GENIUS means every Man's *particular* MIND, and
REASONING FACULTY. Δαίμων — ἕτος δὲ ἐστὶ ὁ
ἐκάστου νόος καὶ λόγος. M. Anton. l. 5. p. 27. *Ge-
nium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; Et ideo esse
singulos singulorum* — Varro in Fragm. It is from this
Interpretation of *Genius*, that the Word, which in
Greek expresses HAPPINESS, is elegantly etymolo-
gized to mean A GOODNESS OF GENIUS OR MIND.
Εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶ δαίμων ἀγαθός. M. Anton. l. 7. f. 17.
See Gataker on the Place. The Sentiment came
originally from the old *Academics*. See before, page
321.

NOTE LIX. p. 214. — BEHOLD THE TRUE
AND PERFECT MAN: THAT ORNAMENT, &c.]
*Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans con-
ficitur*

ficitur persona sapientis? Qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus, vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quæ inrideri ab imperitis solent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex, quam Tarqueni, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit: rectius magister populi, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 22. p. 269. Ergo hic, quisquis est, qui moderatione & constantia quietus animo est, sibi ipse placatus; ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sicciter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat; is est sapiens, quem quærimus, is est beatus: cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lætabile ad exferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum, &c. Tusc. Disp. l. 4. c. 17. p. 298.

NOTE LX. p. 215. — WOULD NOT YOUR SYSTEM IN SUCH A CASE A LITTLE BORDER UPON THE CHIMERICAL? &c.] *Chrysippus* seems to have been sensible of this, if we may judge from a Passage of his, preserved in *Plutarch*. Διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς μεγέθους καὶ τῆς κάλλους, πλάσματος δοκῶμεν ὁμοίᾳ λέγειν, καὶ ἢ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. For this reason, thro' the excessive Greatness and Beauty of what we assert, we appear to say things which look like Fictions, and not such as are suitable to MAN and HUMAN NATURE. MOR. 1041. F.

NOTE LXI. p. 216. — IN ANTIEN T DAYS, WHEN GREECE, &c.] See *Cic. de Invent. l. 2. c. 1.* See also *Maximus Tyrius, Diff. 23. p. 277.* of the late Quarto Edition; and *Xenoph. Memor. l. 3. c. 10.*

NOTE LXII. p. 219. — NO WHERE IN ANY PARTICULAR NATURE IS THE PERFECT CHARACTER TO BE SEEN INTIRE.] The Stoics themselves acknowledged, as we learn from *Clemens of Alexandria*, that their ὁ σοφός, or PERFECT MAN, was difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree; δυσεύρετος πάνι σφόδρα. Strom. p. 348. *Sextus Empiricus* gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as yet found him, μέχρι τῆ νῦν ἀνευρέτα ὄντι καὶ αὐτῶς τῷ σοφῷ. Adv. Phys. p. 582. Edit. Lipsiens.

WHAT *Sextus* says, seems to be confirmed by *Cicero*, who, speaking in his *Offices* the Language of a Stoic, has the following Expressions. *Nec vero, cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius Aristidesve justī nominantur; aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his justitiæ, tanquam a SAPIENTIBUS, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic SAPIENS est, ut SAPIENTEM volumus intelligi. Nec ii, qui sapientes habiti sunt, & nominati, M. Cato & C. Lælius, sapientes fuerunt; ne illi quidem septem: sed ex mediōrum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant, speciemque sapientum. De Offic. l. 3. c. 4.* Again, in his *Lælius*, speaking of the same consummate Wisdom, he calls it, *Sapientia quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus.*

So too *Quintilian*. *Quod si defuit his viris summa virtus, sic quærentibus, an oratores fuerint, respondebo, quo modo Stoici, si interrogentur, an SAPIENS Zeno, an Cleanthes, an Chrysippus, respondeant; magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles; non tamen id, quod natura ho-*

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minis

minis summam habet, consecutos. Inst. Orat. l. 12. c. 1.
p. 721, 722. Edit. Caper.

So likewise *Seneca*: *Scis, quem nunc bonum virum dicam? Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse, tanquam phœnix, semel anno quingentesimo nascitur.* Epist. 42.

NOTE LXIII. p. 219.—I MIGHT INFORM YOU OF THE NATURAL PRE-EMINENCE, AND HIGH RANK OF SPECIFIC IDEAS.] See *Cicero* in his *Orator*, near the Beginning. *Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non, &c. &c.* See also the Verses of *Boethius* before cited, Note XVII. p. 295.

NOTE LXIV. p. 220, 221.—AN EXEMPLAR OF IMITATION, WHICH THO' NONE WE THINK CAN EQUAL; YET ALL AT LEAST MAY FOLLOW—AN EXEMPLAR, &c.] *Seneca* gives it as a general Confession of the *greatest* Philosophers, that the Doctrine they taught, was not *quemadmodum ipsi viverent, sed quemadmodum vivendum esset.* *De vitâ beatâ*, c. 18.

THERE appears indeed to be ONE COMMON REASONING with respect to all MODELS, EXEMPLARS, STANDARDS, CORRECTORS, whatever we call them, and whatever the *Subjects*, which they are destined to adjust. According to this Reasoning, if a Standard be *less* perfect than the Subject to be adjusted, such Adjusting (if it may be so called) becomes a *Detriment*. If it be but *equally* perfect, then
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is the Adjusting *superfluous*. It remains therefore that it must be *more perfect*, and that to any *Transcendence*, any *Accuracy* conceivable. For suppose a Standard as *highly accurate*, as can be imagined. If the Subjects to be adjusted have a Nature *suitable*, then will they arrive, by such Standard, to a degree of *Perfection*, which thro' a Standard *less* accurate they could never possibly attain. On the contrary, if the Subjects be not *so far* capable, the Accuracy of the Standard will never be a hindrance, why they should not become as *perfect*, as their Nature will admit.

IT seems to have been from some Sentiments of this kind, that the Stoics adorned their ὁ σοφὸς, or *perfect Character*, with *Attributes so far superior to ordinary Humanity*. Ἐκείνῳ ὀλίγον, ἐκείνῳ ἀπρόσδεός, ἐκείνῳ ἀνίστασθαι μακάριον, τέλειον — 'Twas he was fortunate; 'twas he was above want; 'twas he was self-sufficient, and happy, and perfect. Plutarch. Mor. 1068. B. See Note LXII.

SOME Philosophers have gone so far, as not to rest satisfied with the *most perfect Idea of Humanity*, but to substitute for our *Exemplar*, even the *supreme Being*, GOD HIMSELF. Thus PLATO, in his *Theætetus*, makes the great Object of our endeavours, to be ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, the becoming like to God, as far as in our power. He immediately explains, what this resemblance is. Ὁμοίωσις δὲ, δικαιοῦν καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. It is the becoming just and holy, along with Wisdom or Prudence. Plat. tom. 1. p. 176. Edit. Serrani. See this Sentiment explained by Ammonius, in *V. Voces Porph.* p. 5. See also Aristotle's *Ethics*, L. 10. C. 8. p. 465.

THE Gospel appears to favour the same Hypothesis. *Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect.* Matt. v. 48.

WHAT has been above said, will be, it is hoped, a sufficient Apology for the *Transcendence* of the Character described in the *Dialogue*.

NOTE LXV. p. 221. THE PROFICIENCY OF SOCRATES—WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCE US—THAT SOME PROGRESS, &c.] See *Diog. Laert.* l. 7. c. 91. p. 420. Τεκμήριον δὲ τὸ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν — τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τὴν περὶ Σωκράτην, καὶ Διογένην, &c.

NOTE LXVI. p. *Ibid.*—NOR WAS THE PRIZE, AS USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO THE FIRST; BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A REWARD, HAVING, &c.] *Verum ut transeundi spes non sit, magna tamen est dignitas subsequendi.* Quint. Inst. l. 12. c. 11. p. 760. *Exigo itaque a me, non ut optimis par sim, sed ut malis melior.* Senec. de Vita beatâ, c. 17. Οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι, καὶ ὅμως ἐν ἀμελῶ τῷ σώματι. ἔδὲ Κροῖσος, καὶ ὅμως ἐν ἀμελῶ τῆς κτήσεως. ἔδ' ἀπλῶς ἄλλε τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῶν αἰώνων, ἀφιστάμεθα. For neither shall I be Milo, and yet I neglect not my Body; nor Croesus, and yet I neglect not my Estate; nor in general do we desist from the proper Care of any thing, thro' Despair of arriving at that which is supreme. Arr. Epict. l. 1. c. 2. See also Horat. Epist. 1. l. 1. v. 28, &c.

NOTE LXVII. p. 225.—THIS WHOLE UNIVERSE—IS ONE CITY OR COMMONWEALTH—]
 'Ο κόσμος ἓστ' μία πόλις ἐστὶ — *Arr. Epict.* l. 3. c. 24. p. 486. This was a *Stoic Doctrine*, of which *Epictetus* and the Emperor *Marcus* make perpetual mention. See of the last, l. 12. f. 36.

So *Cicero*, *Universus hic mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum existimandus*. *De Legg.* l. 1. c. 7. p. 29. See *De Fin.* l. 3. c. 19. *De Nat. Deor.* l. 2. c. 62.

NOTE LXVIII. p. 227.—HENCE THE MIND TRULY WISE, QUITTING THE STUDY OF PARTICULARS, &c.] The *Platonics*, considering SCIENCE as something *ascertained, definite, and steady*, would admit nothing to be its *Object*, which was *vague, infinite, and passing*. For this reason they excluded all INDIVIDUALS, or OBJECTS OF SENSE, and (as *Ammonius* expresses it) raised themselves, in their Contemplations, from *Beings particular* to *Beings universal*, and which as such, from their own Nature, were *eternal and definite*. The whole Passage is worth transcribing. Εἰρηλαί ὅτι ἡ φιλοσοφία, γνῶσις πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα ἐστίν. Ἐζήτησαν ἔν ᾧ φιλόσοφοι, τίνα ἂν τρόπον γένωνται τῶν ὄντων ἐπισήμονες· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἑώρων τὰ κατὰ μέρος γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ ὄντα, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀπειρα, ἡ δὲ ἐπισήμη αἰδιωνία καὶ πεπερασμένων ἐστὶ γνῶσις (τὸ γὰρ γνωστὸν βέβαιον ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως περιλαμβάνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ἀπειρον ἀπερίληπτον) ἀνήγαγον ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν μερικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου, αἰδία ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένα. Ὡς γὰρ φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, Ἐπισήμη εἰρηλαί, παρὰ τὸ εἰς Ἐπίτασιν ἡμᾶς καὶ ὄρον
 Ζ 3 τινὰ

τινὰ προάγειν τῶν πραγμάτων· τὸτο δὲ ποριζόμεθα διὰ τῆς εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομῆς. *Ammonius* in his Preface to *Porphyry's Isagogue*, p. 14. Edit. 8vo.

CONSONANT to this, we learn it was the Advice of *Plato*, with respect to the *Progress* of our *Speculations* and *Inquiries*, when we proceed *Synthetically*, that is to say, from *first Principles* downwards, that we should descend from those higher *Genera*, which include many subordinate *Species*, down to the lowest *Rank* of *Species*, those which include only *Individuals*. But here it was his *Opinion*, that our *Inquiries* should stop, and, as to *Individuals*, let them wholly alone; because of these there could not possibly be any *Science*. Διὸ μέχρι τῶν εἰδικολάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικολάτων καλίουλας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι——τὰ δὲ ἀπειρά φησιν εἶναι, μὴ δὲ γὰρ ἂν ποτε γενέσθαι τῶτων ἐπιστήμην, *Porphyr. Isagog. c. 2*.

SUCH was the Method of *antient* Philosophy. The Fashion at present appears to be somewhat altered, and the Business of Philosophers to be little else, than the collecting from every Quarter, into voluminous Records, an infinite Number of *sensible*, *particular*, and *unconnected* Facts, the chief Effect of which is to excite our Admiration. So that if that well-known Saying of Antiquity be true, *it was Wonder which induced Men first to philosophize*, we may say that Philosophy now *ends*, whence originally it *began*.

NOTE LXIX. p. 228.—A FACULTY, WHICH RECOGNIZING BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS ELSE, BECOMES A CANON, A CORRECTOR, AND A STANDARD UNIVERSAL.] See before, p. 162.
In

In *Epicetetus*, l. i. c. i. p. 6. the Δύναμις λογικὴ or reasoning Power, is called the Power ἡ καὶ αὐτὴν θεωρεῖσα, καὶ τ' ἄλλα πάντα. So *Marcus*—Τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς· ἐαυτὴν ὁρᾷ, ἐαυτὴν διατρεφῶ, &c. *The Properties of the reasoning Soul are, it beholdeth itself; it formeth itself, &c.* l. ii. c. i. So again *Epicetetus*, —ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκρόειν, καὶ νῆ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς ζῆν, καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτὸ, ὑπὲρ καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ οἴνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου εὐχαρίσται τῷ θεῷ· μέμνησο δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τί σοι δέδωκε κρεῖττον ἀπάντων τούτων, τὸ χρησόμενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάζειν, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστων λογίζμενον. *For seeing, for hearing, and indeed for Life itself, and the various Means which co-operate to its Support; for the Fruits of the Earth, for Wine and Oil, for all these Things be thankful to God: yet be mindful that he hath given thee something else, WHICH IS BETTER THAN ALL THESE; something which is to use them, to prove them, to compute the Value of each.* Arr. *Epicet.* l. 2. c. 23. p. 321.

NOTE LXX. p. 228.—[THAT MASTER-SCIENCE, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY ARE, AND THE END TO WHICH, &c.] See Arr. *Epicet.* l. 2. c. 24. p. 337.—See also l. i. c. 6. p. 36. and *Perf. Satyr.* 3. v. 66.

NOTE LXXI. *Ibid.*—[AND NEVER WRETCHEDLY DEGRADE THEMSELVES INTO NATURES TO THEM SUBORDINATE.] See Arr. *Epicet.* l. i. c. 3. p. 21. Διὰ τάντην τὴν συγγένειαν, οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες, λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιτροι καὶ ἐπίβηλοι καὶ βλαβεροί· οἱ δὲ λέεσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις καὶ ἀνήμεροι· οἱ πλείους δ' ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες, &c. *Thro' this*

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Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or baser Part) *some of us, degenerating, become like Wolves, faithless, and treacherous, and mischievous; others, like Lions, fierce, and savage, and wild; but the greater Part turn Foxes, little, fraudulent, wretched Animals.* Cum autem duobus modis id est, aut vi aut fraude fiat injuria; fraus, quasi vulpeculæ, vis, leonis videtur. Cic. de Offic. l. 1. c. 19. See also Arr. Epiet. l. 2. g. p. 210. In our own Language we seem to allude to this Degeneracy of Human Nature, when we call Men, by way of reproach, *Sheepish, Bearish, Hog-gish, Ravenous, &c.*

NOTE LXXII. p. 229. — THAT REASON, OF WHICH OUR OWN IS BUT A PARTICLE, OR SPARK, &c.] — αἱ ψυχὰι μὲν ἕτως εἰσιν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ὅτε αὐτὰ μόρια ἔσται, καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. — Arr. Epiet. l. 1. c. 14. p. 81. — ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἐκάστῳ προσάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἐαυτοῦ. ἔτι δὲ εἰν ὁ ἐκάστῳ νῆς καὶ λόγος. Mar. Ant. l. 5. f. 27. *Humanus autem animus, decerptus ex mente divinâ, cum nullo alio nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest.* Tusc. Disp. l. 5. c. 13. p. 371.

NOTE LXXIII. Ibid. — FIT ACTORS IN THAT GENERAL DRAMA, WHERE THOU HAST ALLOTTED EVERY BEING, GREAT AND SMALL, ITS PROPER PART, &c.] See before p. 210. and Note I. III. See also Arr. Epiet. l. 3. c. 22. p. 444. — Σὺ ἡμεῖς εἰ δύνασαι, &c. The Passage is sublime and great, but too long to be here inserted.

NOTE

NOTE LXXIV. p. 230.—ENABLE US TO CURB DESIRE, &c. ENABLE US EVEN TO SUSPEND IT, &c. BE OUR FIRST WORK TO HAVE ESCAPED, &c.] Ἀπόσχε ποτὲ πανταπᾶσιν ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ καὶ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθῇς. *Abstain for a time from Desire altogether, that in time thou mayst be able to desire rationally.* Arr. Epiēt. l. 3. c. 13. p. 414. Again the same Author—Σήμερον—ὀρέξει οὐκ ἐχρήσαμεν, ἐκκλίσει πρὸς μόνὰ τὰ προαυρεμένα—*To day my Faculty of Desire I have not used at all; my Aversion I have employed with respect only to things, which are in my power.* l. 4. c. 4. p. 588. See also *Enchir.* c. 2. and *Charact.* V. III. p. 202. *Plat. Gorg.* p. 505. B. Tom. I. Edit. Serr. περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν—

HORACE seems also to have alluded to this Doctrine:

Virtus est, vitium fugere; & sapientia prima, Stultitia caruisse—Epist. I. l. I. v. 41.

NOTE LXXV. *Ibid.*—LET NOT OUR LOVE THERE STOP, WHERE IT FIRST BEGINS, BUT INSENSIBLY CONDUCT IT, &c.] See *Plat. Symp.* p. 210. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani. Δεῖ γὰρ, ἔφη, τὸν ὀρθῶς ἰόντα ἐπὶ τῷ πρώτῳ, ἀρχεσθαι, &c.

NOTE LXXVI. *Ibid.*—NOT THAT LITTLE CASUAL SPOT, WHERE, &c.] See *Arrian. Epiēt.* l. I. c. 9. p. 51. *Socrates quidem, cum rogaretur, cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit: totius enim mundi se incolam & civem arbitrabatur.* *Tusc. Disp.* l. 5. c. 37. p. 427.

NOTE LXXVII. p. 231.—TEACH US EACH TO REGARD HIMSELF, BUT AS A PART OF
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THIS GREAT WHOLE; a PART, &c.] Πῶς ἐν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ φύσιν, &c. In what Sense then (says the Philosopher, since all is referable to one universal Providence) are some things called agreeable to our Nature, and others the contrary? The Answer is, They are so called, by considering ourselves as detached, and separate from the Whole. For thus may I say of the Foot, when considered so apart, that it is agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free from Filth. But if we consider it as a Foot, that is, as something not detached, but the Member of a Body, it will behoove it both to pass into the Dirt, and to trample upon Thorns, and even upon occasion to be lopped off, for the Preservation of the Whole. Were not this the case, it would be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind should we conceive with respect to ourselves. — What art thou? A Man. If thou consider thy Being as something separate and detached, it is agreeable to thy Nature, in this View of Independence, to live to extreme Age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if thou consider thyself as a Man, and as the Member of a certain Whole; for the sake of that Whole, it will occasionally behoove thee, at one while to be sick, as another while to sail and risque the Perils of Navigation, at another while to be in want, and at last to die perhaps before thy time. Why therefore dost thou bear those Events impatiently? Knowest thou not, that after the same manner as the Foot ceaseth to be a Foot, so dost thou too cease to be longer a Man? Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 5. p. 191.

NOTE LXXVIII. p. 231. — IN AS MUCH AS FUTURITY, &c.] Μέχρις ἂν ἀδικά μοι ἢ τὰ ἐξῆς, αἰ τῶν ἐνδεσφών ἔχομαι, πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν.

φύσιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ μ' ὁ θεὸς τοιῶτων ἐκλεκτικὸν ἐποίησεν· εἰ δέ γε ἥδεν, ὅτι νόσειν μοι καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὤριμων ἂν ἐπ' αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πῶς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ πηθεῖσθαι. *Arr. Epict. l. 2. c. 6. p. 19.* It appears that the above Sentiment was of *Chrisippus*. In the *tenth Chapter* of the *same Book* we have it repeated, tho' in Words somewhat different. Διατέτο καλῶς λέγουσι οἱ φιλοσοφοί, ὅτι, &c. So *Seneca*—*Quicquid acciderit, sic ferre, quasi tibi volueris accidere. Debuisses enim velle, si scisses omnia ex decreto Dei fieri.* *Nat. Quæst. iii. in Præfat.*

NOTE LXXIX. p. 232.—THAT WE MAY KNOW NO OTHER WILL, THAN THINE ALONE, AND THAT THE HARMONY OF OUR PARTICULAR MINDS WITH THY UNIVERSAL, &c.—] Εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τῆτο τὴν τῷ εὐδαίμονι ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐρυαν βίαν, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῷ παρ' ἐκάστου δαίμονι πρὸς τὴν τῷ ὅλῳ διοικήσει βέλῃσιν. *The Virtue of a happy Man, and the Felicity of Life is this, when all things are transacted in Harmony of a Man's Genius, with the Will of Him, who administers the Whole.* *Diog. Laert. l. 7. c. 88. p. 418.* This is what *Epicletus* calls τὴν αὐτῷ βέλῃσιν. συνάρμουςαι τοῖς γινόμενοις, *to attune or harmonize one's Mind to the things, which happen.* *Diff. l. 2. c. 14. p. 242.*

NOTE LXXX. *Ibid.* YET SINCE TO ATTAIN THIS HEIGHT—IS BUT BARELY POSSIBLE, &c.] See before, page 215, &c. See also *Notes LX. and LXII.*

NOTE LXXXI. p. 223.—SUCH AS TO TRANSFORM US INTO SAVAGE BEASTS OF PREY, SULLEN, &c.] See before, *Note LXXI.* NOTE

NOTE LXXXII. p. 233. THAT ANIMATING WISDOM, WHICH PERVADES, AND RULES THE WHOLE, &c.] *This Power* is called by the Emperor *Marcus*——τὸν διὰ τῆς ἰσίας δῆκοντα λόγον, καὶ——οἰκονομῶντα τὸ πᾶν. l. 5. f. 32.

NOTE LXXXIII. *Ibid.*——THAT MAGIC DIVINE, WHICH, &c.]——καὶ τὸ χάσμα ἐν τῷ λέοντι, καὶ το δηλητήριον, καὶ πᾶσα κακουργία, ὡς ἀκανθα, ὡς βόρβορος, ἐκείνων ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν· μὴ ἐν αὐτὰ ἀλλότρια τέτρα, ἢ σέσεις, φαυλάξαι· ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντων πηγὴν ἐπιλογίζεαι. M. Ant. l. 6. f. 36——See also l. 4. f. 44. l. 3. f. 2. Ὡς περ γὰρ αἱ καμφοδίαί (φυσίν) ἐπιγράμματα γελοῖα φέρονται, αὐτὰ καὶ ἐαυτὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φαῦλα, τῷ δὲ ὅλῳ ποιήματι χάριν τινὰ προσθήσιν· ἔτιως ψέξεις ἀν αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἐαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἐκ ἀχρηστός ἐστι. Chrysip. and Plutarch. p. 1065. D.

Οὐδὲ τι γίνεσθαι ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σὺ δίχα, Δαίμων,
Οὔτε καὶ αὐθέριον θεῖον πόλον, ἔτ' ἐπὶ πόντῳ,
Πλὴν ὅποσα ῥέξῃσι κακοὶ σφείεργον ἀγοίαις.
Ἄλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίσασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι,
Καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα· καὶ ἔ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἔστιν.
Ὡδὲ γὰρ εἰς ἐν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὡσθ' ἕνα γίνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντων. forf. ἐόντα,

Cleantes Hymn, apud Steph. in Poesi Philos. p. 49, 50.

[THE Reader will observe that the fourth of the above Verses is supplied by the *Miscell. Observations Criticæ,*

Criticæ, Vol. VII. from a Manuscript of *Vossius* at *Leyden*.]

NOTE LXXXIV. p. 234.—WITH THESE MAY OUR MINDS BE UNCHANGEABLY TINGED, &c.] —βάπτεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ ψυχὴ—*M. Ant.* l. 5. f. 16.

NOTE LXXXV. *Ibid.*——WITH A RESERVE, &c.] μεθ' ὑπεξαίρεσως. See *Epicl. Enchirid.* c. 2. *M. Ant.* l. 4. f. 1. l. 5. f. 20. *Seneca* translates it, *cum exceptione*. See *De Beneficiis*, l. 4. f. 34.

NOTE LXXXVI. *Ibid.*——NEVER MISS WHAT WE WOULD OBTAIN, OR FALL INTO THAT WHICH WE WOULD AVOID, &c.] μήτε ὀρεγόμενον ἀποτυγχάνειν, μηδ' ἐκκλίνοντα περιπίπτειν. *Arr. Epicl.* l. 3. c. 12. p. 404.

NOTE LXXXVII. p. 235.——CONDUCT ME, THOU, &c.]

Ἄγε δὲ μ', ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ' ἡ πεπρωμένη,
Ὡποῖ ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένη.
Ὡς, εἴδομαι γ' ἄοκνον· ἦν δὲ γε μὴ δέλω,
Κακὸς γενόμενος, εἰδὲν ἥτιον εἴδομαι.

Cleanthes in Epicl. Ench. c. 52.

Thus translated by *Seneca*:

*Duc me, parens, celsique dominator poli,
Quocunque placuit: nulla parendi mora est:*

Adfum

NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

*Adsum impiger, fac nolle: comitabor gemens,
Malusque patiar, quod bono licuit pati.*

Epist. 107.

NOTE LXXXVIII. p. 236. IT IS HABIT, REPLIED HE, IS ALL IN ALL. IT IS PRACTICE AND EXERCISE, WHICH CAN ONLY, &c. &c. to the End of the Paragraph]—Ἀλλὰ πολλῆς ἔχει χρείαν παρασκευῆς καὶ πόνου πολλῆ καὶ μαθημάτων. Τί ἔν; ἐλπίζεις, ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην τέχνην ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ἔστιν ἀπολαβεῖν;—But (says one, with respect to the virtuous Character) there is need of much Preparation, of much Labour and Learning. And what? Dost thou expect it should be possible (answers the Philosopher) to obtain, by little Pains, the chiefest GREATEST ART? Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 20. p. 111. Ἄφνω δὲ ταύρῳ εἰ γίνεσθαι, ἢ δὲ γενναίῳ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλὰ δεῖ χρεμασκήσθαι. παρασκευάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ εἰκὴ προσπηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα. No robust and mighty Animal is complete at once; nor more is the brave and generous Man. It is necessary to undergo the severest Exercise and Preparation, and not rashly plunge into things, which are no way suitable. Ejusd. Differt. l. i. c. 2. p. 18. See also the same Author, l. i. c. 15. p. 86. l. 2. c. 14. p. 243. Sed ut nec medici, nec imperatores, nec oratores, quamvis artis præcepta perceperint, quidquam magna laude dignum sine usu & exercitatione consequi possunt: sic officii conservandi præcepta traduntur illa quidem (ut facimus ipsi;) sed rei magnitudo usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat. Cic. de Offic. l. i. c. 18. ἢ δ' ἩΘΙΚΗ ἐξ ἙΘΟΥΣ περιγίνεσθαι ὅθεν καὶ τὸ νόμα ἐσσχυνε—Ethic. Nicom. l. 2. c. 1.

NOTE

NOTE LXXXIX. p. 236. NOTHING IS TO BE HAD GRATIS, &c.] Προϊνα ἐδδεν γίνεσθαι. *Arr. Epict.* l. 4. c. 10. p. 653. The same Sentiment is often repeated by the same Author.

NOTE XC. p. 241. ——— WE ARE ALL GOVERNED BY INTEREST, &c.] See of the *Dialogue*, p. 212. 246. See also *Notes* LVI. and XCII.

NOTE XCI. p. 243. ——— IT IS A SMOAKY HOUSE — Καπνός ἐστὶ ἀπέρχομαι. *M. Ant.* l. 5. c. 29. See *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 25. p. 129.

NOTE XCII. *Ibid.* IS A SOCIAL INTEREST, &c.] As the STOICS; above all Philosophers, opposed a *lazy inactive Life*, so they were perpetually recommending a proper regard to the *Public*, and encouraging the Practice of every *social Duty*. And tho' they made the *original Spring* of every particular Man's Action, to be *Self-love*, and the prospect of *private Interest*; yet so intimately united did they esteem this *private Interest* with the *public*, that they held it *impossible* to promote the *former*, and not at the same time promote the *latter*. Τοιαύτην φύσιν τῷ λογικῷ ζῷῳ κατεσκεύασεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν δύνῃται τυχεῖν, εἰ μὴ τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμον προσφέρῃται· οὕτως οὐκέτι ἀκοινωνήσιον γίνεσθαι, τὸ πάντα αὐτῷ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν. *God hath so framed the Nature of the rational Animal, that it should not be able to obtain any private Goods, if it contribute not withal something profitable to the Community. Thus is there no longer any thing UNSOCIAL, IN DOING ALL THINGS FOR THE SAKE OF SELF.* *Arr. Epict.* l. 1. c. 19. p. 106.

THE Peripatetic Doctrine was much the same. Πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν, καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, κοινῇ τ' ἂν παντὶ εἴη τὰ δεόντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάσῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιούτων ἐστὶ ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθόν, δεῖ φιλαυτὸν εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὠφελήσει. *Were all to aim jointly at the fair Principle of Honour, and ever strive to do what is fairest and most laudable, there would be to every one in common whatever was wanting, and to each Man in particular of all Goods the greatest, if Virtue deserve justly to be so esteemed. So that the good Man is necessarily a FRIEND to SELF: For by doing what is laudable, he will always himself be profited, as well as at the same time be beneficial to others. Ethic. Nicom. l. 9. c. 8.*

NOTE XCIII. p. 243.—[IF SO, THEN HONOUR AND JUSTICE ARE MY INTERESTS, &c.] Thus Cicero, after having supposed a social common Interest to be the natural Interest of Man; subjoins immediately—*Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes & eadem lege naturæ. Idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum lege naturæ prohibemur. De Offic. l. 3. c. 6.*

NOTE XCIV. *Ibid.*—[WITHOUT SOME PORTION OF WHICH NOT EVEN THIEVES, &c.]—*Cujus (sc. Justitiæ) tanta vis est, ut ne illi quidem, qui maleficio & scelere pascuntur, possint sine ulla particula justitiæ vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam, qui una latrocinantur, furatur aliquid aut eripit, is sibi ne in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ille autem qui*
archi-

archipirata dicitur, nisi æquabiliter prædam, &c. De Offic. l. 2. c. 11.

— Ἄλλ' ἔστιν ἀνάγκη, φυσικῆς ἕως τῆς κοινωνίας, εἶναι φύσει καὶ τὰ δίκαια, δι' ὧν ἔστιν ἡ κοινωνία. Ὅτι γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον συνέχει τὴν κοινωνίαν, ὁρῶντες ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδικωτέων εἶναι δοκῶντων. ἔτοι δὲ εἰσιν οἱ λησαῖ· οἷς ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνία ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης σώζεται τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Διὰ τε γὰρ τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀλλήλους, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸ κρεῖττον δοκῶν, καὶ τὸ τὰ συλκείμενα φυλάττειν, καὶ διὰ τὸ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀσθενετέροις, διὰ ταῦτα ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους αὐτοῖς κοινωνία συμμένει. ὧν πᾶν τέλειον εἰς ἕς ἀδικῶσι ποιεῶσιν. *It is necessary, SOCIETY being natural, that JUSTICE should be natural also, by which Society exists. For that Justice holds Society together, is evident in those, who appear of all the most unjust, such I mean as Robbers or Banditti, whose Society with each other is preserved by their Justice to each other. For by not aspiring to any unequal Shares, and by never falsifying, and by submitting to what appears expedient, and by justly guarding the Booty amassed together, and by assisting their weaker Companions, by these things it is, that their Society subsists; the contrary to all which they do by those, whom they injure. Alex. Aphrod. περὶ ψυχ. p. 156. Edit. Ald. See also Plat. de Repub. l. 1. p. 351. tom. 11. Edit. Serrani.*

NOTE XCV. p. 245. WHAT THEN HAVE I TO DO, BUT TO ENLARGE VIRTUE INTO PIETY? NOT ONLY HONOUR, &c.]

ALL manner of Events, which any way affect a Man, arise either from within *himself*, or from *Causes independent*. In the former case, he maintains an *active* Part; in the latter, a *passive*. The *active* Part of his Character seems chiefly to be the Care of VIRTUE, for it is Virtue which teaches us what we are to *act* or *do*; the *passive* Part seems to belong more immediately to PIETY, because by this we are enabled to *resign* and *acquiesce*, and *bear* with a manly Calmness whatever befalls us. As therefore we are framed by Nature both to *act* and to *suffer*, and are placed in a Universe, where we are perpetually compelled to both; neither *Virtue* nor *Piety* is of *itself* sufficient, but to pass becomingly thro' Life, we should participate of *each*.

SUCH appears to have been the Sentiment of the wise and good *Emperor* — ἀνέκεν ὅλον ἑαυτὸν, δικαιοσύνη μὲν εἰς τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργούμενα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμείνανσι, τῇ τῶν ὧν φύσει. Τί δ' ἐρεῖ τις, ἢ ὑπολήψεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ πράξει καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἔδ' εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν, δύο τέτοις ἀρκέμενος, αὐτὸς δικαιοπραγεῖν τὸ νῦν πρᾶσσόμενον, καὶ φιλεῖν τὸ νῦν ἀπονεμόμενον ἑαυτῷ — He (the perfect Man) commits himself wholly to JUSTICE, and the UNIVERSAL NATURE; TO JUSTICE, as to those things which are done by himself; and in all other Events, to the NATURE OF THE WHOLE. What any one will say, or think about him, or act against him, he doth not so much as take into consideration; contented and abundantly satisfied with these two things, himself TO DO JUSTLY what is at this Instant doing, and to AP-

PROVE

PROVE and LOVE what is at this Instant allotted him.

M. Anton. l. 10. f. 11. Πάντα ἐκεῖνα, ἐφ' ἃ διὰ περιόδου εὐχῇ ἐλθεῖν, ἤδη ἔχειν δύνασθαι, εἰάν μὴ σαυτῷ φθονῇ· τὸτο δὲ ἐστίν, εἰάν πᾶν τὸ παρελθὸν καταλίπῃς, καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐπιτρέψῃς τῇ προνοίᾳ, καὶ τὸ παρὸν μόνον ἀπευθύνης πρὸς ὍΣΙΟΤΗΤΑ καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΤΗΝΗΝ· ὁσιότηλα μὲν, ἵνα φιλῇς τὸ ἀπονεμόμενον· σοὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις ἔφερε, καὶ σὲ τῷ δικαιοσύνῃ δὲ, ἵνα ἐλευθέρως καὶ χωρὶς περιπλοκῆς λέγῃς τε τ' ἀληθῆ, καὶ πράσσης τὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν—*All those things, at which thou wishest to arrive by a road round about, thou mayst instantly possess, if thou dost not grudge them to thyself; that is to say, in other words, if every thing past thou intirely quit, if the future thou trust to Providence, and the present alone thou adjust according to PIETY and JUSTICE: according to Piety, that so thou mayst approve, and love what is allotted, (for whatever it be, it was Nature brought it to thee, and thee to it;) according to Justice, that so thou mayst generously and without disguise both speak the Truth, and act what is consonant to [the general] Law, and the real Value of things.* M. Ant. l. 12. c. 1. See also l. 7. c. 54. and Plato's Gorgias, p. 507. Tom. 1. Edit. Ser. καὶ μὴν ὅγε σῶφρων. κ. τ. λ.

NOTE XCVI. p. 245.—I HAVE AN INTEREST WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTERING THE PLAN OF PROVIDENCE; WITHOUT MENDING, &c.] Παιδεύεσθαι—τελέει τὸ μανθάνειν ἕκαστὰ ἕτω θέλειν, ὡς, &c. *To be instructed—that is to say, to learn so to will all things, as in fact they happen. And how do they happen? As He, who ordains them, hath ordained. Now he hath ordained that there should be Summer and Winter, and Plenty*

NOTES on TREATISE the Third.

and Famine, and Virtue and Vice, and all manner of Contrarieties, for the Harmony of the Whole; and to each of us hath He given a Body, and its Members, and a Fortune, and certain Associates. Mindful therefore of this Order, ought we to come for Instruction, not indeed how we may alter what is already established, (for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better so to be;) but how, while things continue around us, just as they are, and as is their Nature, we may still preserve our Judgment in harmony with all that happens. Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 12. p. 74.

NOTE XCVII. p. 246. WHO WOULD BE UNHAPPY? WHO WOULD NOT, IF HE KNEW HOW, ENJOY ONE PERPETUAL FELICITY, &c.] — τῶν (sc. εὐδαιμονίας) γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντες πάντα πράττομεν. It is for the sake of Happiness, we all of us do all other things whatever. Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. 12. sub. fin.—See before, of the Dialogue pages 212, 241. and Notes LVI. and XCII. Plat. Protag. p. 358. T. i. Ed. Serr.

NOTE XCVIII. Ibid.—IF IT HAPPEN TO BE ERRONEOUS, IT IS A GRATEFUL ERROR, WHICH I CHERISH, &c.] Ἐι δὲ ἐξαπατηθέντι τινὰ εἶδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποραιρέτων ἔδεν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἡμελλόν ευρῶς καὶ ἀταράχως βιώσεσθαι. Were a Man to be deceived, in having learnt concerning Externals, that all beyond our Power was to us as nothing; I for my own part, would desire a Deceit, which would enable me for the future to live tranquil and undisturbed. Arr. Epict. l. i. c. 4. p. 27:

NOTE

NOTE XCIX. p. 247. — WHEN WE ARE ONCE, SAID HE, WELL HABITUATED TO THIS — MORAL SCIENCE, THEN LOGIC AND PHYSICS BECOME TWO PROFITABLE ADJUNCTS, &c.] *Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adiungunt & Physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine adpellant: alteram, quod habeat rationem ne cui falso assentiamur, neve, &c. Cic. de Fin. l. 3. c. 21. p. 265.*

THE THREEFOLD DIVISION of PHILOSOPHY into *Ethics*, *Physics*, and *Logic*, was commonly received by most Sects of Philosophers. See *Laert.* l. 7. c. 39. See also *Cicero* in his Treatise *de Legibus*, l. 1. c. 23. and in his *Academics*, l. 1. c. 5. *Fuit ergo jam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, &c. Plutarch de Placit. Philos. p. 874,*

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Notes, chiefly taken from Greek Manuscripts, are added partly to explain, partly to give the Reader a Specimen of certain Works, valuable for their Rarity, as well as for their Merit.

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FOR THE YEAR 1883

1884

A D D I T I O N A L N O T E

O N

TREATISE the Second.

PAGE 54.—THE NECESSARY ARTS SEEM
TO HAVE BEEN PRIOR, &c.

THE following Extract from a Manuscript of *Philoponus* may help to shew the *comparative* Priority of Arts and Sciences, by shewing (according to this Author) the order of their Revival in a *new formed* Society. Such Society he supposes to have arisen from scattered Individuals again assembling themselves, after former Societies had by various Incidents of War, Famine, Inundation, and the like, been dissipated and destroyed.

HAVING spoken of the Effects of *Deucalion's* Flood, he proceeds as follows—Οὗτοι ἔν οι περιλειφθέντες, μὴ ἔχοντες ὅθεν ἂν τραφεῖεν, ἐπενόνον ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τὰ πρὸς χρείαν, οἷον τὸ ἀλήθειν μύλαις σῖτον, ἢ τὸ σπείρειν, ἢ τι τοιῶτον ἄλλο· καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπινοίαν σοφίαν, τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῷ βίῳ τὸ λυσιτελεῖν ἐξευρίσκεισαν, καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ἐπινοησιμώτα.

Πάλιν

Πάλιν ἐπενόησαν τέχνας, ὡς φησὶν ὁ ποιητής,

——— ὑποθημοσύνησιν Ἀθήνης,

ἔ μόνον τὰς μέχρι τῆς εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνάγκης ἱσαμένας,
ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι τῆ καλῆ καὶ ἀγέει προίτσας· καὶ τῆτο
πάλιν σοφίαν κεκλήμασιν, καὶ τὸν εὐρόνλα σοφόν· ὡς τὸ,

——— σοφὸς ἦραρε τέκλων,

Ἐν εἰδῶς σοφίης —

——— ὑποθημοσύνησι δ' Ἀθήνης εἶπεν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τὴν
ὑπερβολὴν τῶν εὐρημάτων εἰς θεὸν τὴν τέτων ἐπίνοιαν
ἀνέφερον.

Πάλιν, ἀπέδεψαν πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα,
καὶ ἐξεύρον νόμους, καὶ πάντα τὰ συνιστῶντα τὰς πόλεις·
καὶ ταύτην πάλιν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν ἐκάλεσαν· τοιοῦτοι
γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ ἐπ' αὐτὰ σοφοί, πολιτικὰς τινας ἀρετὰς εὐ-
ρόντες.

Εἶτα λοιπὸν, ὁδῶ προϊόντες, καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα,
καὶ τὴν δημιουργὸν αὐτῶν προῆλθον φύσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἐδι-
κώτερον φυσικὴν ἐκάλεσαν θεωρίαν, καὶ σοφὸς τὴς τὴν
τοιούτην μετιόντας σκέψιν.

Τελευταῖον δ' ἐπ' αὐτὰ λοιπὸν ἔφθασαν τὰ θεῖα, καὶ
ὑπερκόσμη, καὶ ἀμετάβλητα παντελῶς, καὶ τὴν τέτων
Γνώσιν κυριωτάτην σοφίαν ὠνόμασαν.

THESE therefore, that were thus left, not having
whence they could support themselves, began thro' ne-
cessity to contrive things relative to immediate Want,
such as the grinding of Corn by Mills, or the sowing
it, or something else of like kind; and such Contrivance,
dis-

Additional Note on Treatise the Second.

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discovering what was conducive to the Necessaries of Life, they called *Wisdom*, and him a wise Man, who had been the Contriver.

AGAIN, they contrived Arts (as Homer says)

By Precepts of *Minerva* ———

that is, not only those Arts, that stop at the Necessity of Life, but those also that advance as far as the Fair and Elegant; and this too they called *Wisdom*, and the Inventor a wise Man. Thus the Poet:

—————The Work

'Twas a wise Artist fram'd, his *Wisdom* taught.

By Precepts of *Minerva* ———

The last Words are added, because, from the Transcendence of the Inventions, they referred their contrivance to a Divinity.

AGAIN, they turned their Eyes to Matters Political, and found out Laws, and the several things that constitute Cities, or civil Communities; and this Contrivance in its turn they called *Wisdom*, and of this sort were those celebrated Seven Wise Men, the Inventors of certain Virtues Political.

AFTER this, still advancing in a road, they proceeded to corporeal Substances, and to Nature, their efficient Cause; and this Speculation, by a more specific Name, they called Natural Speculation, and those Persons wise, who pursued such Inquiries.

LAST of all, they attained even to Beings divine, supramundane, and wholly unchangeable; and the
Know-

Additional Note on Treatise the Second.

Knowledge of these they named THE MOST EXCELLENT WISDOM.

A FEW Observations on this important Passage may not perhaps be improper.

OUR first Observation is, that tho' we give it from *Philoponus*, yet is it by him (as he informs us) taken from a Work of *Aristocles*, an ancient Peripatetic, intituled, *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, *Concerning Philosophy*. Some indeed have conjectured that for *Aristocles* we ought to read *Aristoteles*, because the last published a Work under this title, which he quotes himself in his Treatise, *De Animâ*. Be this as it may, the Extract itself is valuable, not only for its Matter, but for being the Fragment of a Treatise now no longer extant,

OUR next Observation is, that by *Matters Political* in their third Paragraph, the Author means not the first Associations of Mankind, for these were prior to almost every thing else, and were not referable to *Art*, but to the innate Impulse of the social Principle: He means on the contrary those more exquisite and artificial Forms, given to Societies already established, in order to render them happy, and rescue and preserve them from tyrannic Power. Such was the Polity given by *Lycurgus* to the *Lacedemonians*, by *Solon* to the *Athenians*, by *Numa* to the *Romans*, &c. Those great and good Men, in meditating their Institutions, had the same Sentiment with *Alcidamas*, according to that noble Fragment of his preserved in the Scholiast upon *Aristotle's Rhetoric*—*Ἐλευθέρις ἄφηκε πᾶσι θεός· ἰδὲνα δέον ἢ φύσις πεποιήμεν.* God hath sent forth all Men free; Nature hath made no Man a Slave.

OUR

OUR third Observation is, that by the *most excellent Science*, in the last Paragraph, is meant the Science of *Causes*, and, above all others, of *Causes efficient* and *final*, as these necessarily imply pervading Reason, and superintending Wisdom. This Science, as Men were naturally led to it from the Contemplation of *Effects*, which Effects were the Tribe of Beings *natural* or *physical*, was, from being thus *subsequent to these physical Inquiries*, called *Metaphysical*; but with a View to itself, and the transcendent Eminence of its *Object*, was more properly called ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

OUR fourth Observation is on the *Order* of these Inventions, namely, Arts *necessary*; Arts *elegant*; Arts *political*; Science *physical*; Science *metaphysical*; in all, *five* Habits, or Modes of Wisdom. *The necessary Arts* it is evident must on all Accounts have come first. When these were once established, the Transition to the *Elegant* was easy and obvious. Inventions of *Necessity*, by the Super-additions of Dispatch, Facility, and the like, soon ripened into Inventions of *Convenience*; and again these, having in their very nature a certain Beauty and Grace, easily suggested Inventions of pure and simple *Elegance*.

THAT the Legislators, tho' in Rank and Genius far superior to all natural Philosophers, should come before them in point of time, is owing to the nature of their *Subject*, which had a more immediate Connection with *Man*, and *Human Happiness*. It was not indeed till Societies were thoroughly established, and Peace had been well secured both internally and externally,

that Men had Leisure, or even Inclination, to reflect on the Objects round them, or to recognize that vast Mansion, in which they found themselves existing.

LASTLY, as the *tremendous* Part of *physical* Events led weak Minds, who could not explain them, into the Abyss of dark and dreary *Superstition*; so those *physical* Events, which had *Beauty* and Order, being in their turn equally striking, and equally Objects of Admiration, led strong and generous Minds into Principles the very reverse. They conceived it probable, as their own Views were limited, that, even where Beauty and Order were not to them apparent, they might still in other views have a most real Existence. Farther, as these Observers could perceive nothing done either by themselves, or those of their own Species, which, if it in the least aspired to Utility, or Beauty, was not necessarily the Effect of a *conscious* and *intelligent* Cause, they were, from the superior Utility and Beauty of *physical* Effects, induced to infer a *conscious* and *intelligent* Cause of these, *far superior* to themselves; a Cause, which from the *Universality* of these Events, as well as from their *Union* and *Sympathy*, was not, as are the Sons of Men, a *Multitude of limited Causes*, but a *simple Cause*, *universal* and *one*; a Cause too, which, from the never-ceasing of its Events, was not, like the same human Beings, an *intermittent Cause*, but a *Cause, ever operating, ever in Energy*.

WE see therefore the Reason why this FIRST PHILOSOPHY was *subsequent in point of Time* to *physical* Speculation, and why of course to the other Habits or Modes of Wisdom here enumerated, tho' in its own Dignity and Importance far superior to them all.

OUR

OUR fifth Observation is, that as a Nation may be said to be in a State of Perfection, which is in the full Possession of all these Habits, or Modes of Wisdom; so those Nations are nearest to Perfection, that possess them in the greatest *Number*, or in a state of the greatest *Maturity*.

A MAN of Ingenuity might find rational Amusement from this Speculation, by comparing the same Nation as to these Matters, either with itself in different Periods, or with its Neighbours in the same Periods, either past or present. He might for example compare *antient Britain* with *antient Greece*; *present Britain* with *present Greece*; *Britain* in the Age of *Crusades*, with *Britain* in the Age of *Elizabeth*; *present Britain*, with her Colonies; with *Italy*, *France*, *Holland*, and the enlightened Countries; with *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Barbary*, &c. But this we leave, as foreign to our Work, and drawing us into a Theory, which merits a better place than an occasional Note.

A D D I T I O N A L N O T E S O N T R E A T I S E the Third.

PAGE 115.—AND THAT THE DIFFERENCE LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM TO PARTICULARS.] So *Proclus* in his *Manuscript* Comment on the *first Alcibiades of Plato*, p. 139. Ἡ κοινὴ καὶ ἀδιάστροφος ἐννοία τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῇ ἀνταρκείᾳ χαρακτηρίζει· παρ' ὧν γὰρ τὸ εὖ, παρὰ τέτων καὶ τὸ ἀνταρκές. καὶ ὅρας δὴ πάλιν ὅπως ἐνταῦθα καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης κατορθοῖ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μείζονα σφάλλεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐλάττωσαν πρότασιν. Συλλογίζεται γὰρ ἔτως· ἐγὼ διὰ σώμα, καὶ γένεθ, καὶ φίλος, καὶ πλεονεκτήων εὐδαίμων· ὁ εὐδαίμων ἀνευδής· ἐγὼ (φροῖν) ἀνευδής· ἐκὼν ὅτι μὲν ὁ εὐδαίμων ἀνευδής, ἀληθές· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων, ψευδές· τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα ψευδές διὰ τὴν ἐλάττωσαν. καὶ ἔτως ἐσθήσεις καὶ τὸν φιλήδονον, καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, διὰ ταύτην ψευδομένους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῇ, ὁ δὲ χρήματι τίθεται τὸ ἀγαθόν· ὅτι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ἐφετὸν ἀγαθόν, κοινόν

κοινόν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς. καὶ συνελόντι φάναι, τὰς μὲν μεί-
ζους τῶν προτάσεων ἕκαστοι τιθέασιν, ἀπὸ τῶν κοι-
νῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ τὰ λόγους ταύτας προβάλλοντες, τὰς δὲ
ἐλάττω ἀπὸ φαντασίας, ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, ἀπὸ τῶν
ἀλόγων προφέρονται παθῶν· διὸ καὶ ταύταις μὲν διαφέ-
ρονται πρὸς ἀλλήλας, ἐκείναις δὲ ὁμοφρονέσι. τὰ μὲν
γὰρ πάθη μερισμῷ καὶ διατάσεώς ἐστιν αἰτία ταῖς ψυ-
χαῖς· τιτανικὰ γάρ ἐστι, καὶ διασπᾷ, καὶ σπαράττει τὸν ἐν
ἡμῖν νῦν· ὁ δὲ λόγος κοινός ἐστι πᾶσι, καὶ ἡ τῶν λόγων προ-
βολή, καὶ διὰ τὸτο ΚΟΙΝΟΣ Ο ΕΡΜΗΣ, ἵνα δὴ καὶ
ἠθικῶς αὐτῶν ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν.

The UNIVERSAL and unpervverted Idea of Man cha-
racterises HAPPINESS by SELF-SUFFICIENCY. For
with whomever Well-being exists, with them the Self-
sufficient exists also. You see therefore, how here again
Alcibiades is right as to his MAJOR PROPOSITION;
but mistaken as to the MINOR. For thus it is he
syllogizes—"I, on account of my Person and Family
"and Friends and Wealth, am HAPPY.—The Person
"HAPPY is SUPERIOR TO WANT—therefore am I
"SUPERIOR TO WANT." Now that, THE PER-
SON HAPPY IS SUPERIOR TO WANT, is true; but
that HE WAS HAPPY, was false. THE CONCLU-
SION therefore is FALSE thro' the MINOR PROPOSI-
TION.

It is thus also You will find the Lover of Pleasure,
and the Lover of Money, erring in their Reasonings,
thro' the same Proposition. For one of them lays down
the Good of Man to be Pleasure, the other to be
Riches; but that every thing DESIRABLE is GOOD;

Additional Notes on Treatise the Third.

this they possess in common, and assent to on both sides.

IT may be said indeed universally, that all Individuals produce the GENERAL PROPOSITIONS, which they lay down, from their COMMON or UNIVERSAL IDEAS, and from the Faculty of REASON: but that their MINOR PROPOSITIONS are produced from IMAGINATION, from SENSE, and from irrational PASSIONS. And hence it is, that about these LAST they differ one with another, while in the FORMER they all agree. THE PASSIONS indeed may be considered within the Souls of Men as the Causes of Division and Distance; for they are TITANIC, and distract and tear our Intellect to pieces. But REASON is the same and common to all, as is also the Faculty of Speech, the Medium of its Promulgation. And hence it is, that HERMES (the Type of rational Discourse) is called COMMON and UNIVERSAL, if we may be allowed to give of him an Ethical Explanation.

P. 185.—FIX OUR HAPPINESS IN THE MERE DOING.] So Proclus—Πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ τῆ σπουδαίας πράξεις πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔχουσι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐνεργήσας ἐν ἐνεργητικῶς καὶ θεοπρεπῶς, ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ τέλος ἔχει. All the Actions of the virtuous Man have reference to himself. When therefore he has energized beneficently and divinely, it is IN THE VERY ENERGY ITSELF THAT HE OBTAINS HIS END.—This from the same MS. Comment as the Note preceding.

P. 220.—THE GENUINE SPHERE AND GENUINE CYLINDER, &c.] — ἀλλ' ἤγε ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ πολ-
λω

λῶ καὶ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ καθαρώτερα τῶν φαινομένων ἐπι-
νοεῖν δύναται, καὶ γεννᾷ· τὸν γ' ἔν φαινόμενον κύκλον
ἐπιδιορθῆται, καὶ λέγει, καθόσον ἔτος ἀπολείπεται τῷ
ἀκρίβεις, καὶ ὁῦλον, ὡς ὁρῶσα τι τέτε κάλλιον ἄλλο καὶ
τελειότερον εἶδος· ἔ· γὰρ πᾶς μηδενός ἐφαπτομένη, μηδὲ
εἰς τι καθαρώτερον βλέψασα, τῷτο μὲν ἔ· φησιν ὅτιως εἶναι
καλὸν, τῷτο δὲ ἔ· πᾶν ἴσον· αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ λέγειν ταῦτα,
δείκνυσιν ὡς ὁρᾷ TO ΠΑΝΘΙ ΚΑΛΟΝ καὶ ΠΑΝ-
ΘΙ ΙΣΟΝ. *Our Soul is able both to perceive
and to produce Objects much more accurate and pure,
than those which are visibly apparent. It corrects there-
fore the apparent Circle, and says, how much that
Circle wants of the Perfect one; and this it evidently
does, by beholding some FORM, which is fairer than
the visible one, and more perfect. It is not indeed
possible, that, without connection with any thing else,
or without looking upon something more pure, it should
say that this is not really Fair, this is not in every re-
spect Equal: For by these very Assertions, it proves that
it beholds THAT WHICH IS IN EVERY RESPECT
FAIR, AND IN EVERY RESPECT EQUAL. From
the MS. Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides, Book
the Third.*

Ibid.—[*The Source of infinite Truths, &c.*] The
Antients held *four Methods* or *Processes* in their *Dia-
lectic* for the Investigation of Truth: First the *Divi-
sive* (ἡ διαγερτική) by which we divide and separate the
real Attributes of Being; next the *Definitive*, (ἡ ὁρι-
στική) by which we bring them again together, and by
a just arrangement form them into *Definitions*; thirdly,
the *Demonstrative*, (ἡ ἀποδεικτική) in which we em-
ploy those Definitions, and by syllogizing descend thro'

them from Causes to Effects; and lastly the *Analytic* (ἡ ἀναλυτική) in which, by an *inverse* Process we unravel Demonstrations, and so ascend from Effects to Causes.

Now to all these Methods they held ΕΙΔΗ, that is, SPECIFIC FORMS or IDEAS to be indispensably requisite, from their two important Characters of Permanence, and Comprehension.

HENCE it is that *Proclus*, in the fifth Book of his Comment on the *Parmenides*, having gone thro' the several Methods above mentioned, concludes with the following remark.

Εἰ ἄρα μή ἐστὶ τὰ Εἶδη, οὐκ ἔσονται αἱ διαλεκτικοὶ μέθοδοι, καθ' ἃς τὰ ὄντα γινώσκουμεν, ἐδ' ὅποι τρέφομεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχομεν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς, μάλα ποθέουσα τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐπὶ τὰ Εἶδη καταφεύγει. If therefore there are no SPECIFIC IDEAS or FORMS, there can be none of those *Dialectic Methods*, by which we come to the Knowledge of things, nor shall we know whither to direct our *Discursive Faculty*; for this is that Power of the Soul, which, desiring above all others the Cause or Reason of things, flies for that Purpose to FORMS or SPECIFIC IDEAS.

P. 226.—NOT THE SMALLEST ATOM IS EITHER FOREIGN OR DETACHED.]—ἐδὲν ἔν ἐστιν ἔτις ἄτιμον καὶ φαῦλον, ὃ μὴ μετέχει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, καὶ κεῖθεν ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν ὕλην εἴποις, εὐρήσεις καὶ ταύτην ἀθάθον· καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κακὸν, εὐρήσεις καὶ τὸτο μετέχον ἀγαθῷ τινός, καὶ ἐδὲ ἄλλως ὑποστῆναι δυνάμενον, ἢ τῷ ἀγαθῷ χρωνόμενον, καὶ μεταλαμβάνον ἀγαθῷ τινός· ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν τῶν

τῶν ἀνθρώπων δοῦναι σμικρὰ καὶ εὐτελῇ τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἐξ-
 ἀπλεῖν ἐξαισχύνονται, πρὸς τὴν τέτων ἀποβλέψασαι φύσιν,
 ἔτι πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, καὶ ὅτι τῶν μειζόνων ἕσα
 γεννητικὴ πολλῶ πλεον ἐστὶ τῶν ἐλασσόνων· οἱ δὲ ὄντως
 φιλόσοφοι, πάντα ὅσα πέρα ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ με-
 γάλα καὶ σμικρὰ προνοίας ἐξάψαντες, ἔδδεν ἄτιμον, ἔδδεν
 ἀποκλητὸν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τῆς Διὸς ὀρώσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα
 ἀγαθὰ, καθόσον ἐκ προνοίας ὑφέστηκε, καὶ καλὰ, κατ'
 αἰτίαν γεγονότα τὴν θεῖαν. *There is therefore nothing*
ignoble and base, which doth not participate of THE
GOOD PRINCIPLE, and hath not from thence its Origin.
Should you even instance MATTER, you will find even
that to be Good; should you instance EVIL itself,
you will find that also participating of some Good,
and no otherwise able to subsist, than as COLOURED BY
GOOD, and partaking of it. The Opinions indeed of
ordinary men are ashamed to refer little and contemptible
Things to the [primary and] divine Cause, looking [in
their reasonings] to the Nature of the Subjects, not to
the Power of the Cause, and [to this necessary con-
sequence] that if it be productive of the greater Ef-
fects, much more so is it of the inferior. But those
on the contrary, who are truly Philosophers, referring
all Things both great and small, that exist in the Uni-
verse, to a PROVIDENCE, behold nothing fit to be re-
jected in this MANSION of JOVE, but all Things GOOD,
as having been established by a PROVIDENCE, and
FAIR, as having been produced by a CAUSE, WHICH
IS DIVINE. Proclus in his manuscript Comment on
the Parmenides of Plato.

P. 234.—WHO ART OF PURER EYES, THAN
 EVER TO BEHOLD INIQUITY.]—An Ear, that was to
 hear a musical Discord alone, would have Ideas of

Dissonance, unknown to that Ear, which, *along with* the Discord, was to hear its Preparation and Resolution. An Eye, that was to see *only* the Words—*venis & cæco carpitur*—would have Ideas of Absurdity, unknown to that Eye, which was to behold the Verse *intire*:

Vulnus alis venis, et cæco carpitur igni.

Numerous are the Ideas of Defect, Errour, Absurdity, Falshood, &c. all referable to this Class; Ideas, which arise purely from *partial* and *incomplete* Comprehension, and which have no Existence, where the Comprehension is *universal* and *complete*. It seems to be from this reasoning, that *Themistius* asserts—*τιμωτέρος γὰρ Νῆς, ἔχ' ὁ τὰ πλείω νοῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰ ἀμείνω*. THE MORE RESPECTABLE MIND is not that, which perceiveth the GREATER NUMBER of Objects, but THE BETTER and MORE EXCELLENT ones. *Them.* in *Aristot. de Anim.* p. 92. Edit, Ald.

POST-

P O S T S C R I P T.

WE must not conclude, without saying a few words on the elegant Frontispiece, with which this Volume is adorned.

THE Figure in the middle represents NATURE; that, which is crowning her, VIRTUE; both after the antique. The several *Genii*, or *Youths*, represent the tribe of ARTS, all of which are seen in various manners attending upon NATURE, *as having a necessary* * *Reference to her in all their Operations.*

OF ARTS (as has been † said already) some *imitate* Nature, others *cultivate* and *finish* her.

THE *Genii* or *Youths* in the fore-ground represent the *Imitative Arts*; He with the Lyre, *Music*; He with the Scroll, *Poetry*; He with the Tablet, *Painting*. A Busto stands near them, to denote *Sculpture*; and they are grouped together from their known *Affinity*.

IF we proceed, we may imagine the *different Parts of the Column* to denote *Architecture*; the *Youth, plowing with Oxen*, to denote *Agriculture*; two Arts, which have this in common, that they exert their Powers on the ‡ *insensitive* Parts of Nature. Not so the *Youth, who is managing the Horse*: In Him we see the Force of Art, where Nature is living and ¶ *sensitive*.

B b 4

ALL

* P. 22. † P. 38. 279. ‡ P. 39. ¶ P. 40.

P O S T S C R I P T.

ALL these latter Arts are distinguished from the *imitative*, as being Powers, by which Nature is *adorned* and *cultivated*.

To the same Class we may refer those Arts, characterised by the *three Youths*, placed immediately over Nature, of whom one holds a Basket of Flowers, which the others are throwing upon her; as also *the two below*, who are decorating her with a Festoon.

As these last *Youths* by the several Employes appear to *co-operate* with the Figure representing VIRTUE, they may be supposed to exhibit those *higher Arts of Cultivation*, which peculiarly respect the * *rational* Nature; those Arts, that Virtue presides over, by prescribing their Mode and Limits, and while these in an *inferior* Degree render Nature more accomplished, VIRTUE with a superior dignity *places the Crown upon her Head*.

MR. STUART, the ingenious Designer of this Piece, has not only distinguished himself as a Painter in the *Disposition* of his Figures, and in their graceful *Attitudes*; but has contrived withal, that each of them should have a *meaning*; each *apply with Propriety* to some one of the several Treatises.

THE whole Design *taken together*, by exhibiting NATURE as a *passive Subject*, on which ART in all its Species is seen to operate as an *efficient Cause*, has an immediate reference to THE FIRST TREATISE, where Art is considered in a view the most general and comprehensive.

THE

POSTSCRIPT.

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THE *three Youths*, that bear the Symbols of a Lyre, a Scroll, and Tablet, by denoting the MIMETIC or IMITATIVE ARTS, have reference to THE SECOND TREATISE, *where those Arts in particular are examined and compared.*


THE *two principal Figures* in the Design, one of which is seen *crowning* the other, as they shew the *Honours* and *Pre-eminence* that NATURE derives from VIRTUE, characterise very aptly the Subject of THE THIRD TREATISE, which professes to prove, that *the Perfection and Happiness of Human Nature are only to be obtained thro' the Medium of a moral and a virtuous Life.*

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